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lë
It would perliaips be worth while to survey the various Idioms 
wliioli can be said to express the generic notion of usings - 8uoh an - 
exercise in logical geogmpii^ ?’ would centre on voxbs likes *useS 
*eBiploy®^ , ®a,pply'p * oxeroise * , * practise * operate*, (manipulate',
*function*, *exploit*, &e©; on verb phrases likes * put to use*, " 
*make use of\ ^put into pràotiçe*, &o$g and on nouns associated ; 
with these veo^s and verb phraeees *use*, * employment*, *applioatlon*, 
(instrument*, * method*, (utility*, &c* This would be a%% eminently 
useful bit of logical geography and, I dare aay, it would prove to 
be of philosophical signifioahce e.g.. in dealing with such pusssleO; 
as (using words, ^ expressions, &o. *, * following rules *, (applying 
mathematics*, and so forth. In the course of this paper I touch 
upon such pussies as these, and others like them. I do not, however, 
engage in logical cax’tograpliy, . Indeed, at times my investigation 
tramples somewhat rudely 'on niceties of English Usages from time to 
time I go - against usage (and, perhapstruth as well) by forcing / -
expressions into conceptual pigeon-holes that are not mirrored in 
their grammar. In other words, the general tendency of this paper is 
constructive rather tlmn descriptive. My occasional use of symbolism 
undoubtedly emphasises the categorising aspect of my procédure.
hot us suppose a generic notion of using finds expression in 
locutions gathered into a set called the *U^ »set*. It seomo to 
me/
me that in going through the U^eet wo might oome upon such
diverse phraaeo as * using a hammer*, (following a rule* and
* implementing a decision*© (To the objections "But we don* t mgr
(using a decision* whereao wo do say *using a rule* it can be %
answered that the OKD gives a sense of *UGO* in which we could
\  (l)say (using a dooision**) : %  first task is to characterise
some features of the concept expressed in locutions of the U'^ set^  
assuming there to be such a concept©: In viev/ of the strong 
instrumentai overtones of the verb * to use*, it. might be preferable . 
to thinic of this concept in terms of involvemg^ in action; to 
think, that is to say, of the modes - in which items, are involved 
in action, Hammei^, w^leo and decisidne are in this sense involved 
in actions in which they are used, followed and implemonted, 
respectively.. Their mode of involvement is a function both of their 
nature (hammers aro not lilm decisions) and of the miniiQ of the 
action in which they are invqlVe# (using a hammer to do sudi'-andTSùA 
is not like implementing a decision in doi^ GOrSSârÊô) ,'
It might nonetheless be suggested that the notion of 
instrumentality provides conceptual glue binding together 
diverse idioms in the U#"oet, ' There are > historical grounds to 
support this suggestions such verbs as * exercise * and (practise*, 
for example, had a. usagé "until the XVIII century permitting
"m/
"Ba knows how to exorcise (praotlse) the lon^iow" (op» **He Imows 
how to ttéô (mb to use, employa &o«.) the lomgbow")g O #  '«jntpK^riitot 
a clGolsioh* os? 'exooixtitag aa isitentios' (op* escecutihg’a ’plaà). . 
might seem to hear the marks of instrumentality. It is indeed 
part of the stoiy^ hut #  would he wrong to accept inetrumentality 
as the" whole, of-it» There la clearly a difforonce between e.g.; 
using a hammer and executing a decision (op» executing a pirouette) 
which cannot he ignored© Let us tentatively say tWt the 
fundamental ideas, expressed in U^veAs are formulated in one or 
the other or both of the two formulae^ *.puttihg»»t into practice* 
end (putting#©;,^.to ueo*. We can place these ideas in oppCeition 
to one another by saying that the first formula e^ cpresseo 
non^instrumental, and the,, second instrumentals involvement.. This *■ 
suggests a dletj^otion among itemc in so far as they fit éitlier or 
both of thesQ fofmulâeg some things con intelligibly be said to 
be put to usé, but not put j^to practice (é.g# words, tools, ooins^ 
&o»)$ other things can intelligibly be Construed in either of tho 
fosmmlae (e»g* rules, techniques, methodsÿ skills, oriteria, &o»)^ 
and items in a third g^oup seem to fit (problematically) only the 
(put into practioe* locution (decisions, intenbions and orders).
To explicate this trichotomy wo introduce two. modèles first,. tlmt 
provided by pazsdigmo of (manipulative) iimtrumsntality suoh ao 
the involvement of à hemmor in someone's driving nails or the use 
of/ :
in
of a scalpél/a opération; end soooMÿ the Involvomont
of a map or itinerary in à journey-taken by following it© The 
instrumental model f motions ahalogicelly only with re ops ot to 
non=^ paradigmQ,tio » cases of instz^entel involvement s obviously 
it cannot eluoidâte instanoos of (mnipulatlvo) instsnmontality 
which Gonotitute it© - . But with respeot to non-standard casesA 
such as the involvement of *quasi«^instriments* (i.e, proçôdniW, 
rules, methods, teoh#qties, &0,) :ln the regulation of action, the 
instrumental model plays m  analogical role» The itinerary 
model is meant to eluoidate the noh^'instrumental âspêot of 
quasi-illstrumèntal inyoltement& qimsi^'instrumonts oan be regarded 
in thé light of either the instrumental or the itinerary model#
For êscamplê, to o^râte with a plan in building a house) is
to build *by meansof it (similarly as operating With à limimer 
is performing à task by méané of it), or it is to oonstruot the 
house *in aGcordanoe* with it (analo^usly W  following a route-map 
in taking à journey), The itinerary model may also eluoidate 
involvement of hônAihstrumehts « items which cannot intelligibly 
be said to be 'put to use*-, We might, that is to say, some how view 
Intentioïio 5 decisions and directive© as involved in instances of . 
their execution, implementation or compliance similarly as 
route-mapa are involved In journeys, This seems a dubious analogy, 
however, and I largely ignore non-4nstrmnente in what follows* 
Henceforth/
Henceforth w  attention is direot^i on instances of itmtrumont^ 
and gu&0i4inOtrmental involvement that are more- or less, y
paradlgimtlo, mid: i .mention only eWiperipW;^. oases as may 
ûffodt.my invoBtigatipm. : . .
[ l] Let us begin'by ooneidering in moie detail, the, notion^ ^ 
of. imtmmental. ln.yol'vement, i,e, the cpmeôtion: between an 
instrument and on potion in #ildh the instrument, is (bei%) pût 
tq uee# (Hoto that we epealc of .'invqlyement* and of 'poimeotion*; 
an imderlying qWBtioh Ip thie$ Are inetrumntp (qdae^'^inetrammte). 
internally or externally , relpted tO; potlpm? That ip, ore they , 
imrolvêd in. or linked to aotion3! ) \Ye adopt ae paradigm escpreeeion 
of inètrûmehtal involvampnt the iqputieh,- (ueing-x (in order) tp 
do a*; . tliie e}:p3?08èeé 'ptroi^ g* ilnetruméni^ l^ity., # d  
from/the lùoution ;inetrume%%tallty S  in
(the. course of) 4oiï% A*y Thne, a: oaayenter'e #ctio%Pimy bp 
deeoribed by *uéî!ig. ^ Bmnier in build^ë^ n hcupe\ or . by *, * *. in laying
a floor* ) they are : aÏBp dpaqribeble by 'using hpi#er to drive 
naile* or to ptW.ghten bent naiig*^ It Bhpuld bo obseryed 
tlmt Ordinary Lang#;^ makoe np. olear distinction between these
twô'-O2çpresslon0 of instrumental Involvement; we migh^ t describo the 
oarppntpr as using a hammer in straightening nails or as using’ , 
it to build a houseA- general. rule ' seems to be that a deeoripMon 
of/; ■
of ( weak* Instrumentality is appmprlato only if aotlom 
describablo by ezprassioW of *8t2X)ùg* Izmtrumontality oonstitute 
steps in the perfo^mmoP of thé first aôtiôn*. That lo^ assuming 
that (building a lioueo'r can bè said to desoribo an aotiqn, the 
deeoription (ubing % in building a houoo* is true of ^  only 
if thozB are àotioÙB A, B« suoh that 'using x to do A' , 'uoing 
d: to do B* and 'ùoihg 3C to do oLaré true of #T, and by doing 
A, B, %  i8 building a houoo, 8ince it io usually possible jn 
this .\vay to reiMce e3qpre8Giôno.of 'weak* to those of 'strong* 
inetnmsntality^ henoeforth wè GOhoe%%, ourselves only with the
latter* ' . ' ' . % ' '
One Guggeetod anaiyeio of the deooription 'using % to do a* 
might be 'doing a by means, of %*, To say that the carpenter is 
uàiûâ e, hammer to otzaighteu nails io juot to say that ho ie 
straightening nailB by means, of the hammer. Or, to describe a .
golfer as 'using a number seven iron to .make the shot* is just to 
describe him as making tho shot by meam of a number seven iron# 
There are I I belle vo, good reasons for rejecting this analysis#:' 
It may be granted that there is no logical contradiotion in the 
conjtmotlon of 'using, the hammer to straighten nàile* end 
'aooidontally straightened a n a Ü *, or the eonjunotion. of 'used a 
number seven iron to make the shot* and 'unintentionally made the 
shot's/
but there le extreme oddity^ end (l should oontend) 
misuse of the verb 'use*. On thP other Wnda there is no eudi 
oddity la the pbnjmiotlon of * straightened a &mil hy meam of the 
hammer* and 'pnlntentloimlly etralghkened a hail*^ or the . 
Gonjuhotio3% of 'olpaved hie mother'?ln'b*law*e êïmll with (by mesao of) 
on a%e * m%d *oleaved,her plmll acoldentQlly\ . The point le oimply 
tlmt uaihg X to do à 10 )iot elmplv doing 6 by meahe of %, for the 
former implieo^ihter alia, an attenrnt to do é, (I 8%ue later that 
it implies more , thayi thie) , This ip .not to deny tlmt the *hy 
meam of* Ipoatioh oooàoiqnally (maries suoh aati implication; 
nqr is it ; to deny that we mighty GOy *U80»o#âooidentally to do 
sO'^ a^nd-sO* or'miintehtionally UBe*.» to do GUoh-oâd-Buoh*^ 
Honotheloos,, for the pdrpoBOo of this .^BduBoiox^ of inotrimentality 
I feel juetified ih drawing a êhà%> dlGtihotion.hetwooh 'doing 
to do a* and 'doi^g g^ .hy mej^o of , m%d iii olaiMDg ,thq,t only the 
first escpresBOB the invblv^eht of ^  perfoim^hoo
of a© For tho preoent we can ©ay that 'using % to dp, W  entailo 
' trying to do a by means of x*-Tf-- .<-w-  ^ ' tar.ÎÎS» ■■■© ■
This mlBoa the question of * taok* versua ) achievement' for 
one qriterion of BO^called 'aohievement verbb* io tliàt we oan 
alvmyo talk of tsying# andfailingq, to do the thiiig in queetion#
It Wight be worth asking whether vèzbG tlmt can ho. i&itrodaood into 
the /
Ê4» Q ( 53 , '
the to dp a* satisfy another 03^ terlqn@ vl0o
whether they do nqt ,8lgç#y the poowrenoe of a p^ zoqesq# Oleurly 
they do not, for the most part, satisfy this seoond oriterloh, for 
it io usually legitimate to ask "How long did it’take you to dp 
a by means of, There are Gxoentlohs#^ of oohrao# but in
general aptions which inot%%mentally involve an item are âespoiatèd' 
both #thàcGompliohment, and with .performance of. a taolc* Thus* 
someone^desoribablp as 'using a Wmner to hit a nail' may achieve 
sometMng over and above tho mere iiailK*hitting action if he 
suooeeds iii hitting, the nail with the Imimer, whether ho hits 
it or not^ he. Is ptill, despribable. as 'using a haimer, to lilt â 
nail', On the other hand, someone dêscrlbable as 'using a hemmor= 
to drive a nail' dope not,aohleW^^Qhything over and abovo^ hid -, 
mil'^driving aption if ho Cucqepds ii% driyj^ it^ for tlie fomer 
just is the latter* Action describablG. by 'using x to do a ïî^ has 
as its, goal dpizig a, or rather the agent aims at doing a* We shall 
Speak of this, as .the tasic in pprformnoe of whio)^ ,x is iWptrumentally 
invqlvèdi©,. . . . ' ' ..: . - / .
Another oriterion for instrumentality has been suggested by 
C«E# Omntÿ . ' ' , \
I oen Say, Ü^t I use something to dp so and so only if I oduld hate-used something else to dp the same thing*''upp' is being used. .cp^ect%y it entails. , that there arP âlterhâtiveSa i.eo tWt there is a possibility ofchoice© v-1
The/ .
The "I could have used" in Grant's first sentence' mu# be . -
miderstood to have the force 'logically possible for me to 
have used*- # clearly if a carpaater forgets all his saws ' but one, ; 
he could have used only that which he remembered, though he could 
liavQ used another saw if it had been avaüàble, Furthe3&more, 
it seems to me that Grant is guilty of unauthorised linguistic. 
legislation in olaimihg *'use* to be improper when there is no , 
such possibility of choice^ Oh the pther hand# for purposes of 
exhibiting salient features of the concept of instsmmentallty, 
til© prinoipl© that 'using x to do a' entails the (logical) 
possibility of 'using K to do a', 'using to do a',: &o# serves .
efflolently to explain our uneaslhess at admitting oertaln cases' ■; : r - ■ ' ; ■ 'under this conoept,:
For example, .It provides us with:a better reason for relegating 
'using the mind tp think' to the periphery Of this concept than the 
reason offered 1)y Ayer In his inaugural Idcture* "The reason#" 
he writes,' "w3^  It Is not legitimate regard the mind as the 
lnst3Mment with wMdh.a person thinks or feelol is#©# that thinklhg 
and feeling are not the sort of things that a^ zê dono with any 
instrument at all, "  ^ Again# he o].aimô T*thlnklng lo done by 
persons but . not with any Instmmeht, whethe^ K'. the mind or any 
other, Blit lie olso suggests that a loss misleading anCwer (to 
the/ , ,
thé question do 'you tKWc With?') is *i think with laiÿ
brain*, thoûgdi -6ô. qualifies this "té mémi only ' thàt the state ôf 
oùr brMks. is a oausal condition of o w  thWcihg* ônd adds t^t 
the braln is "in.no ordinary dsns®-, 'an instrument of thought*#
A better reason why neither the mind nor the brain is satisfaotorily 
oharàoteriséd aë .*aniûstrûmônt of thought* is' that there is'ho 
.sèma-leve^ possibility of ohoiOe iamong ) the mind (or brain) and . 
dtlBr 'lhstrûmohte*# It w y  be gmntod that there is a possibillly^ 
of choice between e#g# oalbhlating in,one's liehd and using an 
adding imchinog but tliis dhoiop is not between alternàtivé 
'ihstriments* oh the same Xohto)Logicai Iev^;' ivWiW for 
OmmplG y.. thero is à ' samé/^lêvël ohpioê among différent golf oluhs 
with respect to a golf sWt or among pehs With reèpêot to signing 
a., cheque# 8imilaily .with/oth09z bodily , it;iô improper
to talk of using, one*8 luhgs . to breathe . 6r Wsc heart , to pump blood 
simply beoauBé there, . are, ho a^me-lèirel alternatives / to these 
organs (iyon! ).uùgs. ^ d  .artifioiàl"'.héàÿts bo.ing:aûâiogOus 'to. mÿ 
addiizg màohihe). This is,not to dmiy that there might be such 
possibility of phoioe e*g# througli evolutionàry .dei^lopment of 
organs which we could use. "in .lieu of bur ordinary organs $ and - 
perhaps, à situation .is. physiologically (and hehco logically) . 
possible in ivhioh tlie, question "Gbbrge,. are you usi^ your left 
or your right lung tp breathe now?*' has seme,
;/ ■
Ayer seCmq to aqoept without the vlew that ,peroeptual
organs. are înQtrmientâlly dJirVoIvod in ' perpeptiml aotlvitioq *, 
and he l8\.tÇB@ited.ta.-hff 1%. that we perform, these.aotlVltlee pith; 
ourbralne elnce. "there le good pmMrioal evldauce that a certMa.
condition of the brain léçaufmlly neoesëa^ for the ooourréHoo
of Ghy .perceptual ,âçtivltyl*! As to the. first point# Ayor
eeeme to make mi ^ asmmp'b^^ to the odnvorse of whioh, he tmoee ' 
the .ponception .6f tho,.mih4 .-ae, .àp. .Instrument of thought#..via, the 
aabWptlon V'every aptivi^" nmst have its opecioi prgoh"; that is# 
he arguee from.^ ^^ thé!.P^ ##8pO;(l) Gve;^ ÿ'/$peolal ormn Dmôt have'
Its activity,G^d (8) the pprceptual organs (e*g# eyee# eare, &o) 
are speoiai org^ÔÀ ,tQ:the.qohdiueiqsi ( )^ there are ,'i^rqeptual 
aôtivitieé'%* A0i#.f37opJ[^,%llapy'whl^ ar^ed) ^
is #pliôlt in {l):# :hqwevel*,: WG. csn reje the Vièi^  tlmt perceptual 
are lnB;b5Wiehtàlly 1^  aotivitieo on the
:g^ùhdO\ae before{,.:,l©ef, just 4ô,,there.arê no O0i#.-leVel altermtivos 
,to the b # # ,  I w o  or heart*. In. the seme way thpzia io no , ,
possibility of choice in thé case Of aural# v i w ï  and olfactory 
organs# Oonoerning Ayor.'e eepond eug^ètlçn#, t^t our brqinp are 
Imtsmmentally involved, #.Tperoeptual qçtiyltiGB*^ this ip open 
to thp. same ebrt .pf ipbjeotlph^ Ayer, might arguo tWt all he mans . 
by * inptrimontis * cpusî^ intermediary* # and that. in this oense 
the brain and othe^ /orgems'/p,::^ , inct;A#ehtally ihvolvod in \ 
our/
our aotivitieo© This exempllfiee a qonoeptual mtidôle vjhloli 
might be named * the causal theozy of Instrumentality' ; as I argue 
in detail later# 'using x to do a' is simply not equivalent to .
'some state of x ie a nOoêasary causal condition for performance
of a'8 the two descriptions are on a different conceptual level©
A link between instrumentality and mental activities goes
back at least to Plato, and is invariably to be found in theories :
. (5)of the Soul a.nd of BicultieSe Aristotle compares the soul
with the hand§ the hand ie xo opyoivov while ' the mind is
To etSo? ÊtSw Prichard accuses Locke of regarding the
mind "a$ if it were a tool# of which the capacity of being used
for a certain purpose should be ascertained before wo uso it for (7)that purpose"®/  ^ We even find traces of :it in ByXe's view that 
"effective possession of a piece of Impwledge-tMt - involves knowing 
how to use that Imowledge# when required# for the solution of other 
theoretical or praotical problems." Ryle seems to be claiming 
that Imowl edge-that , is instrumentally involved in problem^
BolviUige In 80 far as various pieces of laio'wledge-thut;. ; (c*g. -
different theories) can sometimes bé 'used' for solving the same 
problem# this case apparently satisfies the criterion of same-level 
possibility of choice© But to the extent that îmowledge^ tîiat is 
transformed into knowledge-how when involved in. problem-solving# 
iJb/
it ie perhaps better to regard it As qim0i«»*instii.imontal3.y 
tlmn as instromentaXly involved© For Imowledge#4ïO%7 is putV  IS.S££!9irZ«jf
into praotic© as well as put to use#Kz5»caa*3 èaifèftascifi*
In ooncluding this introduotory dieoussion of instrumentality 
I am aware of having ignored several important topics* Some of 
these such as thè relation of causality and instrumentality 
are considered later# and others such as the work of Kohler 
and others on the psychology of tool-use .are omitted from 
consideration as not directly relevant to my development of the 
concept of InstrOTiental involvement*
Turning now to quasi-t^ instruniental involvement #» the 
involvement of rules # methods # techniques# prlnoiples# &o* in 
action > Y/e must first answer this objections Why# if quasi#) 
instrumentally Involved items can intelligibly he construed 
as instazumentally involved in action# should the former be 
distinguished from the latter? After all# the objection qontlnues 
the only difference between paradigms of instruments hammercs# ■ 
pens# scalpels# &o#  ^and typical 'quasi#-instruments' is that 
the former are material objects used in (for) phe performance 
of tasks whereas the latter are immaterial 'objects' 'used' 
in/
In (for) the ragulatlon of conduot; but both types of
Involvement - involvement in' taek-peif ormanco and involvement
- , . , - ■ ■
in qom&wt-regolatiom  ^are of the instrumentai mode* It 
followe that the 'itinerary model* introduced above ie totally 
unneoeeeary to explicate involvement of quaei-inetrumbnto in 
action* The burden of this ob jection is that e#g# to play 
bridge in aqoordanoe' with a certain conventiôn is to use the 
rules of that convention in (for) playing hands of bridge 
similarly as one uses a hammer in building a house© It need not . : 
be held that the rules are# theBiseiyoe* ' instrumente# but only 
that their involvement is adequately explained by analogy with ' “ , 
para,digra^ i^nstances of instrumental involvemieht# How I do not 
deny that considerable light may be tlirown' on the quasi-instnmiental 
mode of involvement by comparing it with the instrumental - mode; , 
nor do I deny that it may even be feasible to regard some instances 
of the involvement of rules, te ohniquoG, procedures * &c. as 
paj^ adigiiie of instrumental Involvamaatl but I would urge 
nonetheless that quasi-instruments are involved analogously also ■ 
as itineraries or route-mapB are involved in journeys# and that 
since the latter mode of involvement cannot be entirely 
assimilated to the instrumental model it follows that itG 
analogue# quasi-instnmental involvement* câimot be time assimilated^
-15-.
The premie se s of this claim peem to be plausible § that . 
aoting in aooordance with a quasi-instrumenb is like following 
a imp or itinerary# and that following a map or itinerary io 
not exhaustively (if at all) explained In terms of an instrumental
analogy^ On the other hand# 1 do not ask more of the itineraiy
■ - ' ■ t ' ' ■ ■ 'model than that it provide ; a ? picture' auggeativo of tho 
difference between, instrument^ ,! and qimsl-instramental .involvement#
Ilôt tis. asks wlmt is wrong with regarding a rule as *•
instrumentally involved in mi actio# Grammatically, there is - 
nothing: wrong# for wo can and jdb say e %  that we dp suoh-and-moh 
with or by means of or through (the use of) a rule or method orfgçiesHÿ^  «al» a#*#»*?? A  - . _ f
procedure, âo© To give some examples#
(a) Both “"the Plassical and the ihtuitionist calculi are '/ 
desired fo^ usp ih making inferenoes^
(b). Of course# we cannot, whèn debating wlmt criteria ; 
to use for moral grading# grade the criteria morally ©
(o) [Ooncept] ©»© %  meiitai principle through lïhich an . individual oaniolnssify a numher of objooto in his
stimulus world*
l) Fogz J^stançô, it is çommèniy stated thàt the rule by 
which a discoverer is determined# ip publiqation.
(e) Thero is no qompelling à priori reason' why the tdrmihologioai rules Which vo use for desoribing . the perceptible wd^ld must apply in .all respects to images.. - \ - - - y' " . : , -
(f) , fprinoiplOs which* »* are W e d  in' arguments wMoh start f rom what is expsrionced# # » » They ponstituto the means of. drawing ^iforenpes from what is given in densation, w/
donsidez/
.Gonsldor. (h); using criteria for grading# Urmson 
éxpreoees the involvement of criteria in gradlng-perfozmenoeo . 
by other locutionss grading is "a businees done in aoôôrdhnôe 
with prinoiplee";^^^) "choosing in accordance with a rule ie 
veiy diiE'ferent in'many waye from grading" though there is an 
_analogy between '!the relation of rule to -choice and criteria to 
gmde labei"; criteria àre "employed" in gazading .
s i t u a t i o n s O t h e r  exproseione which Ur&Bson usoe do not 
explicitly mention involvement of criteria, jji,grading performances# 
G#g# "criteria for grading" and "orite^a for the application of 
grading labels"; but here# I wpuld suggest* the 'for* can be 
understood as ah abbreviation for 'for use in' or 'to be used for'# 
It beems olear .that grading-Critéria arè moro. like inetyumonto with 
respect to thôir-application .than: are#: say* moral - pfinoiples. with - 
respect to action in which they arc involved*^ A.t tlB same time* . , 
as Umison's uee of 'in acocrdahce with' indloatec# he regards 
crito#a. âlôo as. more li%<:e principles than likoy say#, garden hoes /. 
or scalpels* % . short# he i#nt8 to say both that wo grade with 
(by mems of) g^diiigwp^teria and that we grade, in apcordahcO/ 
with them. Grading, is- indeed zule^gaided action but it is also 
carried out by. the use of iuioa as standard^; and there is à 
same-level possibility \0# choice of standards just as there is a 
choice/
ri?*.
choioe. among ga-rd©n hoes and acaXpQls* It will bo recalled .
that ,WQ ' desoriber oommaads* .decisions and intentions • as 'nqn- 
instruments* ; one reason for their non-instrumentality is /
illustrated by the fact that criteria » - in. common with other. .
Instruments and Quasi-lnstruments - are involved In instances 
Of .their application*, whereas•* directives# decisions.and 
intentions are not involved in. instances: of their oomnlianco, 
execution and implementation since they have no instances»
Against this it may be urged that commands are unlike décisions 
and intentions in precisely this respect; an order can be 
obeyed on a number of oooasione whereas a deoision or,ah 
intention oan.be carried but or executed only.once®. But in so 
far qs a oommàhd has . this rulo-lilce quality it is eilher the 
layi% down or the fomûlatlon of a rule and therefore not
paimdigmatloally a, oommand# . The specified dlraotivo - a command '
addressed to particular individuals, explicitly .prescribing- an . 
occasion of perforn^oo, - is involved in the. perfornxanoo .in, 
question similarly'as,-a decision in its implomentation or an 
intention in its execution© . guleefomulàting, commands#\t on 
the other hand, suCh as doctor's orders, are involved in instances 
of obedienoG rather like? i^es and other qimsi-instruments, ?
' Granted#/ .
Granted* then, that qiiasi-instxumenbal is legitimately 
distinguished from instrumental involvement* we now prooeed to , 
investigate its non-instrimental featuWa, iU,e«; features whioh
make instanoes of quaei-Instrumental ity construablo on the
itinerary model# In this investigation it is taken as intuitively
clear’ what it ie to aot in aooordànoe with, or to follow, rules©
This is a large assumption. There are rules,©# and there are
rules. We can distinguish at least four general types of rule* .
(12a)ranging from recipes to statutes; and usage of the word "rule" - 
when untainted hy philosophy is so ill-delimited as alwoet to 
defy lexicographical classification© While it is perhaps to he 
regretted that my investigation makes ©xtensive use of such a vague 
obncOpt as 'following a rulo', nonetheless I do not thinlc that 
a preliminary analysis of this concept is noceseary or indeed even 
possible © It is not necessary because I believe that ihtuitivoly 4..
■ It ■ . ■ , ■ ■  ■1,0, on a philosophical naive level of thought the concept is ■ ; 
fairly oloar; end it is ndkpossiblo because such an analysis would
involve sifting usages of "rule", and this would probably destroy 
the intuitive clarity of the concept©. I hope that this does not 
constitute an excuse or justification for shoddy reasoning in what 
follows*
Though I do not sift usages of "rule", I do make a basic 
distinction/
distinction between two modes of lùle-lnvolvomçnt and the types 
of rule peculiar to each mode# To do this I distinguish between 
two locutions» the and 0-looutionB# as follows;
R8 * in doing a, acting' in accordance with xi, or 
'aotihg in açôordance ^ th g;^ doing a'# 6r ' doing a in accordance with x? a ^fSSin ÏWiftA/f'
0: ' in (by) doting id accordance with sc# doingà*, or 'doing a in (by) acting in accordance withaasJi ^  MfppscaZ'd
These locutions are expressions of R^ and 0-invoivement of x' •» ' , ’ ' • ta» ►' . ’Ci=» * # 3%  . .
in doing à* and the rules# in each locution are acoordingly , 
designated R- and G-rules respectlyelyq R-involvement is
distinguished from 0-involvement by the fact that to aot in 
acoordahoe with the G-rule g just is to engage in action described 
by 'doing a'.'i whereas action in accordance with the R«,rùlé X must 
be desoribable by 'doing a/ apart from involvement of ||© In teroas 
of the itinéras^ model* an R^rulo ie involved in a performance 
similarly ae one of a number of possible itineraries is involved 
in a journey in accordance with it# while a 0-rule is involved in 
a. performance analogously as an itinérazÿ which is the only possible 
vjay of tabling the jouzney* (Thie analogy strikes me as very 
unsatisfactory here, though it may nonetheless help to distinguish 
R-» from Ofinvolyement,) Kant's opposition of 'constitutive* and 
'regulative' principles is suggestive of the distinction between 
C- and R-rules*(^ ^) "Constitutive" is also used in contompomry 
diBcusaions/
ctlGoueGlow of for by Balers /'raleG In this
sensG [eq^ ; c^oiiBtit'utivo rules*]] are nim t constitutes 'tbo nature 
of à der#ln rule^âeteminçâ àotivliy»" Aulôs of games^ , some
legal rules, and. rules definitive of rituals -are ' commonly' Ween ' '
as- pamdigDfio of O-^ rules^ . In ibj investigation, ' hot/ever^  the scope ' 
of *0"3?ule* is considerably extended beyond these obyious cases 
,qf rulé*delimited activities# . ■
To implement this investigation/Ï first develop, somov/lmt 
dogmatically, a certain view of human action* Lot us distinguish 
between Activity* and * action* along the following liness 
someone * s behaviour oil à given occasioh (a .U>eliaviour-4.nstance * ) 
is desorlbable either as activity (in an * ac ti vlty^ <le script ion ^ )
Or as an action of a certain type (in ah %Gtion^descriptioh^ )» For 
instance, my preseht behaviour cén be described either in such 
terms as *arm moving so«-and-so,. fingers striking keys, or, on
the other imndj in suoh terms as * typing, Composing a thesis, &o# * #. 
A behaviLourmins tance desoribable %  aoti on^ d^e script ion 3) would be 
seen as an instance of that action by. an observer competent to give 
and understand D as à descmptlon of any such behavioUr"^instancG# 
This ' m y  seem an extraordinary olaim, for it seems to put the cart 
( desqriptioh-ùs) before thé îioi^ se (séëihg^ a^s)* That is to soy, 
it might be objected that someone must be dn a position to see X 
as/ ' ■ - ' ' -
21.
aa a behaVlous>'lnatanoo deaorlbable by 33 before he can describe
X in to3m^ of it will be argued tMt little ohildren m d
dogs can see X as an inetanoe of D«^ de8oribable behaviour without
being able to deeoribe X by D<, To answer thia objeotiôà would
involve à lengthy diGoupoion of thé relation between 'seeing^ao^ uses ofand deaoriptiv^laiigUags», Binoe. the point ie not of central 
importâaco for argument I, do not undertake such a dieoueBlon hero, 
and would only point out that I talk above of ^seeing X as à 
behavibur^instanoe desoribable W  It le, however, of
. i .'I , ,• r .y» '»■ • * _ t * .  ^ ,
considerable Importmibe for my, argument tl#it the notion of 
behavlour^4ua-aotio$i is language "^dependent in the way oiitlined 
above, This langiiagé^dependonc^' commets with the notiOh of practice 
and with the Intelligib^ i ty of behaviour^om;4),ot^  ^ I tzy to show 
below. One further, terminological, point must be mentioned^ 
for X# u bèhaviour^instanbè on the part of agent A, and action/ . ' 
àotivlty«déBoriptionI>^ I regardas oquivulèht t W  îooùtions 
( desoribing X by Idbscribjhi^ A by 3)*, *desorlbing X às and 
,? describing A as P if , . , ,
We may clarify the distinction between action and activity by 
the , foiioY/lng. considérations o Tliink of. the difference between 
describing somemm as tmaking noises, into an odd^^shaped blade object 
held in his handy &o,* and as ^carrying on a telephozie conversation,
&0ÿ ^ / ' '
&Ù6* Oonoider. the amount of escplanation and Instritotion neoessary 
to bring someone totally ignorant of the pra,otioe of telephone 
conversation, to such a state bf knowledge that he would see, as a 
matter of course, someone making noises, into a .black object# &b# as- 
a person engaged in a/tolephoho oonvorsatibh# and would 
unhesitatin^y describe him aq engagod in this praotice; 
consider, too, the fact that yjjo.-'do-as a matter of course, without 
any ado and unhesitatingly desoribe and see such a behaviour^-instonoo 
as an inotaiioe of this, practlèe. The point is, tlmt the 
possibility of describing behaviour^instanceo as actions-depends \ 
on Iwowledjge and understanding of what it is to perform such actions^ 
aiid this knowledge is gained throu^ becoming *at home* both in 
engaging in practices and in dealing wlih ' other people w W  engage in - 
these praotioeS* The concept of action is intelligible only whon Set 
agdiiist a fabric of social praotioes*; TW.s follows from the assertion 
that behaviour itself is hot . action, but beMviourTihC'WhCGs can be 
described as actions* That ,is,; the concept of action is dependent. 
on the notion of description-aa, la# since this notion includes the 
possibility of misdesorlption* and since this possibility exists only 
where there are oonventibnEp.iy accepted criter#* for trMt is to 
count as correct , desoriptio)!, it follô&?s that the concept of aetioh 
is logically dependent' Ph that of conventions or pzactioes* Bet us 
unfold/ . , : /
viîifold this In somewhat. greater dp tail* For a belmviour^lnstanoe ■ 
to count as an action it ,»ïust be dèscribable. as an' instance of a 
practice, or at least in terms of pzaictlces; .#èn we speak of 
Bom3ono*s action wo do not mean simply his movomeùts* &0o (in our; 
sense of . *action* ) p for to describe his.behaviour .as action is. to
Indicate that we can make sense , of his movements* &o^ in terms of
. .. . . . . ^   ^ .
oonventionally aoceptod oritèri(3^ by reference to. which ân action- 
desoription is judged to b.e correct or hot; but these oazLteria 
(get a grip* only in the context of .agreement as to the. / -
desoribability'/of • the;movements, &o*; V/îiothor a particular 
behavioùr«'inàtance is to. be. described as a particular type of action 
depends on .whether it satisfies the criteria#, and that there aro•• ' • '. > V  . «5ceiiiB*iïL-*sx» ‘ • * ' . :
such:criteria follows from agreement as to what is, And what is not, 
to count , as doing sudh^and^sùoh where * doing .such)»andr8uoh* names â - 
typo , of action o:^  a praotioo* A bohâviour):*instQnco is given action# 
status only if thes^ is a praotioe or peactioes in te:%QS of which 
it, is/intelligible,'and hence,doscribable as an. action* The 
o?a%ciai/po%t he?:^ o.iE^  t W  lntergdependency of the concept of 
conventionally accepted, criteria in terms of which behavioUr#instances 
are describablo (identifiable) as actions, with the oohoépt of 
]^aotices against the background of which .bohaviour^instânoës are 
intelligible as actions* That there are aotioh^dèscriptiôhs rests , 
on/
p?24“* ' ■ .
on the fact that hehaviour^ i^nstances are intelligible in tersis 
of practices# or perhaps we should say that actloa^ -descriptioms 
maalfeat this Intelligibility* The converse may also bo stateâs 
that we find behaviour-inetanoes intelligible follows from the 
possibility of describing them in terms of practices* . In sum, 
describabillty is presupposed by intelligibility, and vice..versa*
A word should be said about my use of the notion of * practice* * 
Practice", like "constitutive rule"., has a, broader usage in this 
paper than in other instances of its use# Bawls, for example, employs 
"practice" as "a sort of technical term meaning any form Of 
activity specified by à system of rules which defihos offices, 
roles, moves, penalties, defences and so on, and which gives the 
activity its structure* " This, would àpproxlmte to my
conception of * practice * if (i) the clause about offices, roles, 
moves# &c* were omitted# and (ii) a clause were added connecting 
the * system of rules , * * which gives the activity its structure! with 
the conventionally accepted descriptive oritoria mentioned above*
A word should be said too about the word "conventional" as it-' 
occurs in * Conventionally accepted criteria* s I do not mean, that 
the criteria are agreed-upon by common consent like e#g# criteria ; 
for grading apples# the * agreement* behind iny * conventionally 
aooentod criteria*, is, as it were, more profound than agreement 
by/
by common consent, in the sense that activities In whioli
Guoh criteria are involved serve as - paradigms of agreement and
- •./ , ' . \ ■ ' cannot therefore be escplained in temë Of agreement* (I mention this
point briefly later, in discussing Wittgenstein* s treatment of
* calculating* *)
Let us now return to Rv and Q^involvemOnt, to: lihkc the 
distinction between modes of involvement of rules in action with , , 
the view of action developed above* The 0 ^locution# * doing a in 
(by) acting in aooordanoe with x*, can be. explained in this ways 
for anyone to behave in suoh a way that he would be described as
* doing a* by someone oonversont in the praotioo bf doing &@is
presumptively for him to engage in this praotico in (by) belmvipg
in this way# but for him to behave in this vmy is for him to; , ' conduot his activities within limits correlated with oonventloimlly
aoceptèd criteria which define the practice# that is# it is for
him to act in accordance with rules expressive of these limits
(which we call * rules oonstltutive of a/praotico* or !o#rulèo of
' ; _ i: 'a praotioe*); hence# we say *in (by) acting in aooordanoe with 
0#rules of the praotioQ of doing a#,-one is doing a* * It is 
otherwise with the R^locutlon 'doing ^  in aooo37danoe with^'* Am
expression of R#involvement is intelligible only if the 
behaviour^instanoe in question is. desoribable in terms of praotioee#
2^6^  . ' ' ' \ '
since to describe someone as 'doing a, in àooOrdçmqd with %' ' 
presupposes desorib^illty by 'doing a*' and this,: assuming it to . 
be an aption«»desoription,. is .equivalent to, 'acting in aooordanoo. 
with ÇwitûLos of the praotioo of doing a'* It follows, then# that 
R'finvolvement is parasitlo onO^lnVolvemontb Against this it may 
be objected, that the behaviour'^instanQe desorlbp^ by an R-looution 
need not be desoribable as mi action,- and only on the asammptlon 
tlmt 'doing is an aotion^'dGSoription does it follpw that 
Involvement of R'^ 3?ales inbehavioua^'^lnstandes desoribablo by 
'doing a' is pamsltip on. Involvement Of G«frules in these instances. 
That is to say#ybehaviour desoilbable.by 'doing a in accordance 
with %' would not, in suoh a case,' depend for intelligibility on 
understanding' vtot it is to engage in the practice'of doing a*
This objection could# I thinlc, be answered* To answer it 
fully# however# would re^lsre detailed emmination of various 
sorts of R**rule8 and the perfomanoes in which they are involved# 
showing in each case that the perfoizmance is dosoribabXe by àn , • 
R*4ooution only in so far as it is desoribabie by an aotion«« 
description (not aiiy action description, but one oorrelatod with 
practices whose 0-rules stand to the %-rule in a speoial relation) 
To tako just one eimmple^ consider 'assessing g'o in- àooordhnoë 
with standard S's the aotion-descriptlon 'assessing %'s' can
bo applied to a bebav^'Our-lnstanoe deeorlbable by this R-looutioa# 
whlqh l8 to say that 8 Is subordinated somehow i^ o the 0-ruleo of 
the praotlce of BOjBoaslng g|*ô# In general, applicability of 
'doing & In aooôr$moê withx''entails that either (l) 'doing 
is itself on aotlon-desoription or (2) somo aotlon?deBG3d.ption 
'doing b' la applicable such that % is subordinated to O-rules 
of the .practice of doing h( 1,0# either 'doingb in acqordonoe with 
%' or 'doing ^  in doing a' or 'doing g. in -doing b'.iis applicable 
i am not prepared, #  present# to attempt to justify, this general 
principle, tliough it eeemé to ma prima, faciQ to bo plausible# :
[g] 1 want now to propose# and reject, one poeelbXo view of the 
nature of instrumental and quaei-instmmehtal involvement#, This 
theory - let ue call it the oaueal-iiiterpretative tteory -, gives a 
oaueal account of instrumentaliiy and locates the noxi-instxmental 
aspect of quas:Winstrumental involvement in the notion of rule- ' 
interpretation*,
It i8 tempting to thd#i that, on iteni .instrumbnt^^ 
in an. action is ipso faotC càuBàlly connected v/ith it* After all#
' .  ^ . % , > , . ..  ^ . , t' I
à reasonably commoh definition of ' instalment is 'means by which 
something is caused or brought about' # and it eeems plausible 
that to use % to do a is to cause a to be done by setting x into■ , « w^ V  —  ™4*
motion/
motion or othoxlîiâo activating it* We fixxd this view expressed 
by Aquinas when he says that the carpenter using a saw to create 
something is the principal cause of this creation while "the saw 
ia its instx^enl^l cause;, the agent is aotivo in himpolf and .
imparts motion to the tool, thereby miking it active and an '
' ( 171instrumental cause of that of vfhich the agent is principal cause*
An instrument is realty an instrument when it is an instrumental
cause# ie.eÿ: when it' is set in motion by. some princi$Bl oàusep
(Aqui^ aas argues that %7ere there no first mover all things in
motion would be instriwents# bût rm need not pursue this . ;
interesting theological Imfe*) The causal tlieoxy of. instrumentality;^
oon be summarised; .g is describable by 'using g  to do g' iJ^#- .
and only if# moypàents and (cpnqequontly)'movements of % arô
desbribable by Dÿ where dosoribability by D lô a neoessa%r(ùnd
sufficient) omisai. oondition oT de8oribGbi].ity by :'dôinga'Q' \
On this: theo##' the. .(Aip0hter^ œz^eot%'.d#orlbç.d[by *sa#ng
a planlc' only: on, oohditipn\ that. his movemehts^ and those of the
sawsati#y. oriteriûfprytheàpplioabili'lÿôfw.aoti^^
de scription 'moving (the, saw) sOf'aûd?^ o ' an& of a movement*,
desor jÿtion ' the saw moying suoh**m;d,t8ûoh?; # = Two considerations
\7eigh û6&ih8t this theory# In the first plaoe# whilp; the notion ,
of #wing â p3:a:hk i8 indeed, Circumsombed by . general; ca^'ter^ -
conventionally accepted criteria; associated with G-rules qf 
practices/
pmctioes in terms of whidh behaviour deêqribahle.by -'sawing ' . 
a - plank', is intelligible «* yet these are not oriteriâ for the 
applicabllIty of activity-.. and movemeht-deaoriptionse • To be 
correctly described by ' sawing a plank' it is not heoeséary for 
oite to make certain movements with a saws . in so far as the 
causal theory implies that it is necessary# the theo^ ie wrong#
Note that I do not deny that somo movement on the part of the 
carpenter and the saw is necessary if ' sawing a plonk' is to be ; ' .. 
correotly applied to him; I do deny# however# what the causal /
theory seems to imply# via# that • certain movement/activity can be .
speqlfied as necessa;^ for the correctiiess of 'salving a planlc',
A second objection is this; if movement/activity descriptions: 
are <%msally. connected ' ^ #  tha action-description 'doing a' as ' 
outlisied abow# then wo should expect the fozmer to embody a causal 
explanation of the latter; but it is clear that they do not# The 
statement. ,'.tcarpentê3? NN's movement with sa# as described in 
movement/activity.description P# is the..cause of Mp. sawing the 
’plank"'is difficult to construe# for OTie movement with saw x  just is ^ . . . .  f < * 5 4 ^  - ' \ t a # #
his .sawing the planlcl If the qqniieôtiôn between s movement 
with % and his sàwipg -thé plWc were causal' then we might expect 
this statement to be an bypqthesiO or to exprese’ a general law 
about necessofy oohcomitahts of pestË'ormànces nàmêd by 'sawing a 
piCnkl; it is not ah hypothesis ÿ howeveÿ# because nothing counts 
as/. ' ,  ^ ;. V ' '. ' ' ;
as testing it# nor does it express a la^rbecauBO it serves to 
explain nothing and would he of little use as a prédictive
device#
The Gonnê'otiôn between instrument-', or agent^movemeiits 
and taek-pèrforhiànoe is obnoeptuàl and not causal* Imagine a 
man v/ho# in. swinging an axe while cutting kindling^ cleaves 
hio wife's elcull with the inêtrument* A nwnbor of witnesses 
are colleotedp A repoi'ts having eeeh him using the axe to out 
kindling and aooidentalXy Gatolning his wife on a backsiïing; B 
reporte having seen him pretending to u W  the axe to out Icindling 
“but aotmlly using it to kill his wife; 0, reports having seen 
him swinging the axe and striking his %7ifo with it* %at G comes 
to cee or understand when he learna that the rnmi was using the 
axe either to out kindlihg (ahd accidentally strubkhiB \vifo) or ;bo 
kill hip wife (y#ile pretending to cut kindling) # is not a causal 
çonnoqtion between his swinging the ; ax© and his striking his wife 
(in the latter case) or the lack Of this coimeotion (in the 
former case)* To see that aomeon© is trying to bring something 
about by means of an instrument is to see W.s behaviour in a 
différent light# so to speak# rather than to bq apprised of a 
speqial relation obtaining among agent#:- instrument # movement ' of 
the instrument and performance of the deed (or attompted 
performnoe)*/
perfomsmoë).* The deaorlption to db^'imÿliea' on
attempt to do a# ând lt alob impliéo thè .«piaêi^ minGtrumntfÉ^  '
involvement lu this attempt' of some' skill or method# but it 
.' a law . ' - , _ .. ■'does not smmBrise/or formulate à oâuBal hypothesis to the
effect that- movement of g  danses his perfdrmnoe of a#!
The dsusal theozy of iiistiumentol involvement is 
complementary to an intes^retative theory , of gtmâi^^^nstrumental 
involvement# I- deal with one aspect of tMs theory later# in 
eiamiining infinite regresses which it generates# but now 13 
merely indicate how the notion of rule-intorpi^tation fits into 
a dausalf,interpretativ0 theoiy of instrumental and #asi-instrum<mtal 
involvement. If# as suggested above# the ihvolvemcnt of a sule 
in action is analogous to that of a ronte-map in a jouitney# then 
the rule 4. like the map mist he i#erpret#iveîy involved in ; ; 
action perfomed in aôoordànqé with it; that is# neither rùle nor - 
map can he effectively-, followed' W e s s  they, are imderstcod. and to 
understand them is to decide how they are- to be followed or to, 
interpret ' t W % . Tho sitimtidn resC#ies thst of ï%othôticof^ 
deduotive acooimts of 8cient#iô theories as mean^ü^ess (hence, 
applicàtionless) -fo3?i^ l/syBt(#0' wtii, theia^  ^ primitivo'-'team^ -.are'. ; 
intez^nreted throuf?h Eluqrdnm^ only when thus
interpreted is the systbm a,qoiÇnt#iô theory whidi cah he applied 
in formulating predictions: ra,trodlctions and explanations of states
•Of/ " ' .■ . ' ' ■ ' -
of affaire in teiins of which its primitive ' terms -'ore ' - '
Intezpretèâ# Similarly # mi R-ÿule e* g* - en i>i8ti^qtibn or ;
a 'ru].e of skill' oaimot# logimlly# be applied by ê^ y^ohe . 
who has hot interpreted it in terms of the aotion in which it is 
to be involved# To interpret a maÿ ie to read it in aqoordânoe ' ! \
with some method, of projeotio%i# mid to interpret a dodhotive
'extern ie to imderetand it in terme of some %uorj^ungedef 
by analogy# to interpret; a rule is to gmep it by referonoe to a
' ' '% - ' ' 1 - \ - I _ , , ' ' ' ■* ■ ' ‘ ft
Goham whioh intixmtéé hog it ie tp be followed^ To follow, a _role 
le te follow it in aqoordahoe vfith ^n> in,terpretatio#^%\eph^^ 
similarly he following' a route#*map ihvolvee following it in \
aocordsnoo with eomO Diethod of projection 0 wfe are now in the " >
jawe of a .regreêoh sinoe thé interpietational èchêiiâ does not 
contain in itself ah incüLoàtion of how-it ie to be quael-inetrumental 
involved in the action in which the rule le itself involved# and. . 
hence some Bohemà for thie schema ie regnlred* The causal# 
interpretative theoiy provides -.a-way of- escape from thie regrèda#
It.agrees that the èccohcc of quaci-inpti^ehtal invoiyement lieo 
in rill e-lnterpre tat long and therefore it eictoowledges the . '
involvement of a eohema in actions involving a quasif Instrument s' : *
but it denies that the pqhema itself ie. quapi'^inetrumenta^y 
and hence interprotativély m involved', in thésé pèrformànoes# 
eaying/ . . . .  . .'
eayiïig Instead that the schema is Instrumentally - and hence 
catisal ly « Involved in them# To grasp a rule is « according to 
this theory g to 'acquire' a schema which (causally) detezmlnes 
the way in which one follows the rule in subsequent actions; 
one 'uses' the schema in acting in abcordanoe with th© rulo* The ; 
way one follows a rule could he explained in terms of ooourrenoe 
of certain 'brain-processes' which manifesto Ife'activation* of. à 
rule-schema#. Or# it might be held that the act of grasping th© 
rule itself determines the way it is subsequently followed# \7ith011t 
the mediation of a schema 'acquired' in this act*
This account does indeed stop the regress#, but it breaks on 
the rocks of the causal theory of instrumentality® If it is 
implausible to hold that material instruments are causally connected 
with the performance of tasks# then it is even more unlikely that 
pieces of mental hardware suoh as interpretational schemata should 
causally effect the way in which à, rule is followed®/ "But you have 
not shorn this at all# for what is absurd is that schemata should be 
instnmentally involved in action# not that they should be 
causally involved; to say that schema S determines the way M  
follows rule E in doing such-and-such* is not to say that M  uses B. 
in doing such-andm.suoh in accordance with E; your criticism of the 
causal theory of Instrumentality therefore has no force hora@" But
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if the view that sohemato, are somehow 'used' in detoriiriniiig 
how a rule is to he applied ie given up# then schemata and 
rule-interpretation are tuuieoessary^  That is to say# if a 
desoription of ' brain-prooesses ' merely chamoterises an event 
found to coincide with behaviour described by 'following R in way 
and does nqt desoribo what happonG whoh somsons. 'aotivates' an 
interpretational schema# then wa can regard E itself as 
instrmientallÿ' and henoe causally involved In pasèfomancos 
undertaken 'in aooorâaitao with E'i Hence.we find an. 
intelleotualist view that the. eesence of guasi-ihstrumental 
involvement lies ;in rale^interpretation to be incompatible with 
the view that rule-interpretation ie causally explicable* It 
follows from the latter view that rules themselvoG are 
Instrumentâlly (causally) involved in action; we have already 
argued against both these pointa# via» that quasi-instrument8 are. 
only Instrmmentally involved in action and that instrumentality is 
explicable exolixpivoly in terms of causality* We return later to 
consider one consequénce - infinite regress - of the former view#
I should perhaps emphasise that my denial of the causal 
aocount of instrumentality is not to be odnatrued as a repudiation 
of the idea that the concept of instznn^ entality io somehow 
eoimepted with that of causality. What I object to is the view
tMt the former concept is to be exp3J.cated solely, in terms of 
the latter® Some usages of "instrumental*! are thoroughly 
Causal# when we # y  "The wind was Instrumental in the ship' s 
reaoliihg port ahead of aohedule"* But whe3:% human action la
ooncerned it seems to me that the causal accomit is radically
wrong# Instrumental involvement of Items in action.is à highly-,
sophisticated phenomenon in the sense that it can adequately : be
treated only in terms of an essentially philosophical theory
of human action. This means not only that , the eattsaX account as
I. have sketched it is wrong#* but also that psychological theories
of instrumental involvement - even those which are not
behaviourist and hence basically causal # are inadequate# In
this isddmp connection it is interesting to read what the
behaviouriat Hull writes concerning * too1-use'r
Thé use of tools is so haturtC and universal with humaha that WQ are li%0 ly to pass thio problem over 
without eithought# or to consider it too unimportant to mérit serious consideration# A-^eàtér mistake couid scarcely be made,\^^)
I am in complete accord with this remark# though it seems to mo
that it.should be addressed to philosophers a.s well as
peychplogists#.
IIo
In this Chapter I put forward a unified clmraotoriaa/bion 
of instrumental and quasi-lnstrUraental involvement# in the 
sense that I study the interrelation of aotion-desoriptions of the 
form 'using % to do bÈ ’ and those of the fom '(using % to do a) 
in aooordanoe with m* * These are Bpeoimona of what I eall 
'hasio H-formulae* (hufs)# the former being an ' oC-huf* and the 
latter a ' ^  -huf ' ( ' doing a in accprclsnoe with m' is the general 
form of a ' 6 -huf ' Tims# when I apeak hereafter of instrumental 
or quasi-instrumental involvement# unless othervdse ©peeified my 
3%aaarks concern behaviour-instanoes desoribabl© byoj-bufs and - 
Ç^ -bufs®, It will become clear in what follows - if it is not 
already evident 4 that the sort pf . instrument I most oÇten have/, 
in mind is one that ia manipulated# ^ It will also become clear '
that the 'ml in the 6-buf 'doing a in accordance with m* isie«e % ««a cija
most often construed as a procedure (teolmique# method# &o.)o At
times I may seem to be led astray.by the 'pictures' associated 
with procedural quasi-iiistrumenWlity aaid manipulative 
instrumental ity into olaiming something to be generally true for 
instruments and qu(^ l'?lK^8truments that actually holds only for 
manipulate and methods involved in undertaking manipulative tasks®/ 
I have tried to avoid suoh oohocptiml astigmatism but '^ t may 
nonetheless affect my argument#
w /
[l] I now show that Instrumental Involyémo# éhtailXs quASl** 
Instrumental involvsment # In the qanoe tlmt behaviow^^lnotanoee 
deBorihahle by Bom a m  ipso faoto desorihablo by some
p 4buf# argmont proooedo on tv/o fronts; the first is 
based on the intentiôn-dêpendenoe of instrumental involvement, 
and i&nmlwo an aï^gumoht a&ipted from MiSs AnsOoxabeis book : 
Intention# and the- sebond ie based On the fact that <X*#buf5 , 
are aotlon-desOriptions and hênoe linked to praotioes# • ' , •. ;
Somooha qorreotly desoribed by an (x^ u^f must have 'non- 
observational Imowledge' of %dmt h^ is doing# that is, if ho 
can be desoribod by 'using x to do a' then he can comeetly answer: 
the qitGstiOn "What a m  you doing with without 'looking to 
see'*- lon-obsarvatiohal lüiowledge of this sort is one aspect, of 
what can be called 'practical knowledge*# One's knowledge that ' 
some action is a causal ooneequenoe of his manipulation of an 
instriimont is not practical khowlodge ; it is not a necessary 
condition for tW qofroctness of 'doing a with (by mèans of) %' 
that the agent'a answer to the question "What are you doing with 
X?" should maliifest Eon^obsèrmtional knowledge of what he is 
doingizith For example, euppooo sbmoono to bo oorrOotly
described by 'Bcratohing the table with his pen while writing
- ■ ' ■
a/
a letter', êmd thàt to the queetion "Y&at are you doing with' 
your pan?" he ans^mrs that he la (a) ?n4t#g a letter and
(h) aora/bohing the table g where (a.) '/manifests :: rEOh-obsormtiohàl 
knmledge but (b) is based on hiià notioing that ho is soratohiixg 
the table with M s  pen while engaged in (a) * How suppose his , 
ansmr (b) to be# like (a), nùn-obsearvatioimlly.grounded; that 
is# auppose thBt /he ImowB he is sqratohlng the table with his 
pen in the eame wuy that he knows himself to be writilng a letter 
with its can it be infeawed from this that he is using, the pen 
both to write letters and to soratoh the table? In other words, 
is npn-observatlonsl knowledge of what one is doing with % 3 
.sufficient as well m  necessary for the truth of a statement, that 
one is using % to do that of wliioh he claims to have suoh
knowledge? ' . .
; % & , :
Falsity of the statement 'HH is using x to do à' /would - .
indeed seem to oontradiot HH's answer 'Doing a' to the question\ ‘ manifests'What are you doing with X?' where this amwer
mÈ. hônwobsorvational knowledge. But. does its falsity directly
oontradiot the answer? Adapting, an argument from Mis© Aneodmba's
Intention, we say tlmt. the answer would be dirootly. oontradioted
only by the performance ('What you did was a mistake,%beoaude
it/ . .
it waà not ±i% aooordanoe \?ith wlmt yoii ©aid*") # and mot by 
a fact that renders the deeorlption false (mot; "What yoù . .
said was a mietal® beoauee it was euppoeed to deeoribe what 
you did and did mot deepribo i t . " ) * ^ ' . Im other wordo# what 
is logically imcomoistemt with W  * s answer "Doing a" ia mot , 
falsity of the 'tisimg sc to do a*# but M ' s  performance
which this purportedly describes,® Since mistake a in performahce 
are poaeible it foilowa that practical Imowled^ of what ohé 
is doing with m% instrument is not a suf fiaient condition for the 
truth of a porz^eappn^ng p «-buf s eoaieom may be truly deaoribed 
by 'using X to do b'/.pV'^n^thpug^ hie anowor '^Doing :^ ' to tho . 
question "What are you doing ivith sc?'* ximiifeOtq non^'Obaeryatiohal 
knowledge of vdmt he ie doing with For example, One might: 
say "How I am using my pen to write à letter" while engaged in - . , ■. 
scratckliig the table with its aocording to thie argument, if 
the statement is noh-obsormtionâlly grounded then the mletako 
ie not in it but in the perfér&mnôe (1*0# ocratchimg the tablé), 
MlGé Ansoombe claims thlo to be ànalogoim té obeying mi order 
wrongly, where the fault is one of execution^ not of dieobedienoe#
disregard# or i^orance of tW order; though ehe admito thê =
' % ' - ' . ' (poYana^ logy. .to break down "where we begin .to, ©peak of iaiowlodge* "
1 am not sure tWt I Tmdoretand this argument completely, thou^
1/ ■ :■ ' ■
I bêliévé it supports the oonoluaiqn addqqod above6 praotiqal 
(nm^obGerva1d.om{|,ly based) khqwledgo: twt ohe l0 doing &  with 
g is a neùQGBsrÿ W t  not suffi oient ophditién for tsaith of the 
oôrrêoponding oc^ buf Hieing x to.do, a'®- . ■• '.
Howa /etill fqlloiTing Mieè Awoombo, we m y  that pmotioal 
knowledge,, in addition to having a 'noh'^obeervational* aepeot, 
also is ôomiéoted with "a certain eort of general capaoity in 
a particular field^ * exeroieo of whidh ie oonetitutêd by "nothing 
but the doing or euporvlsing. of the. operations of v/hiqh a man , 
hao pràôtio^ knowledge^!;'^ in other worde#, intentional 
notion involves the êxerùieo of aome ^ pnoitÿ to thé extent that 
it involves pmotloal knowledge. In terms of InstmmenbEà . * - 
Involvement, we onn put it this à neoeeeary condition of
the t37uth of an <x#buf is the truth of bobxo 6 4buf insofar ne 
the for<&ér:prêDuppo8éé 'pmqtioél Mowlédge' # let tie unpq,dc thio. 
To e w  that the.i.truth of A**buf prasuppoeee 'pmotioai ^mov&edge' 
is to Goy tWt if (ueihg ^  to do .n'ris true df oomeohG then ho #  
ç,blé: dorrect^ÿ.to the quGBti^ you doing with^"
. withpût need of; ob.éér#ng hie W##.our* (Thio io thé é#o sort 
of ability âs that inyplyed in oprzodtly anewer^^ the question \ 
yip your #ddle ;^inger straight or bént?"# . it ie not pimply % 
'being able to pay' ouoh he is involved in answering thé questloh 
"Where/
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"Where does your leg But praotloàl knowledge ,
ie manifested oleo in one's exerqieo of à ôàpaoiiy; . it hàe 
a 'laiopfing'm.hôw' ae well ae a 'knowi%-that' dimonêion, ' 8oineone 
who manifeste practical loiowledge in its knowing-that aopeot by 
giving a (correot) non-oheer^tiomllybaaedmmwer to the 
question "W3mt are you doing with |ÿ‘k can be presumed to have 
the oapaoity to use g to do what he says he is doing with it 
(rather; what he knows he is doing wi&i it), This duality of 
practical knowledge comes out in the sentences "Hé knows what :■ 
he' 8 doing (with %)" ; the question; you really know what 
you're doing with x?" also outs both ways# for it might, moon 
either "Do you have the capacity to do tlmt with gf " or "Do
' '  ^ V - " r. 'you know what you're doing .with If Œ  is correctly described
by the (Xmbuf 'using .a saw to out a two-by-four*then he bus 
laiowledge which ia manifested both in his reply "I'm cutting 
this plank" to the question "V/hat are you doing with that saw?" 
and in hia perfomanoG# But the 'knowlng^how* aapeot of this 
laiowlodgG ia not only manifeste.d in the performanceo it la 
quaai-inGtrumentally Involved ^  it, in ao far as it oonoiata of 
R-mlee (of skill) in accordanoe with which M  is using the saw 
to cut the planic® Since every parformaxioe daacribab.le by an cx-buf 
involves practical îmowledge in this way# we conclude tlmt the 
truth of any (x^ buf entails the truth of some p-buf*/
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We reach the same conclusion by arguing from the notion - 
of practice e rather than (as above) fimi the. inteiitloh-dependenoe ' . 
of instrumontal ' involvement® Since û(4jufs' are aotlon-desorlptioms, 
it follows tlmt any bohavitmr-lnetance dooorlbable by aomo (X-^ buf 
om% be Gonotrued ae an instance of a practice;' that is to soy,, 
if Œ  ie oorrootly described by 'ueihg'Sc to do, à* then it must 
be possible to thinlc of him as engaged in the pmotice of using 
(something like) sc to do, (something like) a#; whether or not there ; 
actually i© ouoh a praetice* But any belmviour-instance thus 
describàble as being conducted in accordance with the C-rules of 
some praotiçe is thereby desoribable as being eonductod in ,,
aooordanoe wi;kh the R^rules of some method of engaging in thè 
practice, For éxamplo# that Eg ie shaving : - implies that he ie 
using a ragor in accordance with borne .inctliod of ohatlngiifith it; ; 
if ro is uBing a hoe to dig his garden then he must be using it 
to perform this task in some, way, and jm asstlme that hie procedure 
can be expressed in terms of some Wthod Of using the hoe to dig# 
similarly with other oases of (manipulative) instrumental 
involvement, An interesting conneotion can b# established between ■ 
this demonetration of the dependence of (x on. ^ -buf s and the 
démonstration bs/sed, on 'poetical knowledge' # To know how to use 
% to do a is to have learnt how to do thisi but to learn how to«SV» te^ '# ^
use X to do a is*, on thé one hand# to learn a method (prooedure)OSSA f  . " . Ç . ' ■ V 4- ■ f
of/ ■ .
of using 5: (to do on., the other hand# to acquire .©kill . ’
ill using X (to do. a):$ pne must# hCwGver, alrea^ posseso the > 
oapaoity to usa x to do a (iih,0.i* physical and. mpntal capabilltlao) 
if one is to learn a method or to aoguire sld.llg therefore# 
wliat one.learns (aoqulres) is teohnigio for (in) the exploitation, 
of his .capacity#? the-method learnt and-skill ©.cquirad 
aspects of this technique*. . It. im important to note the distinotlPn 
betxTeen possessing the capacity to u s e z  to dog# and possessing' 
skill in using % to do a*; The knoWn^how dimension of nraotioai^  BA#' '.- V '
Itnowledge is basically this eapaoiiy# though we, are ùBrranted in - 
assuming that instances of its exercise consist in the qaaei- 
instrumental juvolvoment of rules of skill ( * technique in the 
exploitation of the capacity')<; This is not to .dony. tlxat tliere 
may be behavi.our-ihstanoe.s desorlbablo by. an . oc^ '^ buf Y/here the 
agent has not acquired skills but this does not entail the 
impossibility of formulating us rules of skill the technique by 
which he exploits his oapdoity* A person who has not learned 
how to ÛBO X to do a, but who\has tlie camcity to uso x to do â® : 
surely may not succeed in his first attempt at doing ^  with %#. 
bu;b any attempt f-' any oxeroieo .of the capacity - can be 
doseribed by some {Sf4)uf spèôifyi% a techiiiquo qgasl'^instrûmentallÿ 
involved in the action,, . ' ,
Eyle/'
Ryle has argtied foroefully that "there need hé nothing in 
the perfonaancse of a solitary operation to show witnesses or 
even the agènt himself v/hethef thé perfoilaance wa,s ak exerolse of 
skill ) prudence # taste, logical , acumen or any other brand of 
iatelliganqe.* * ways of operating are displayed not by single 
operations but by arrays of operations and to have a method is to 
operate in oertdln ways* *? goes on to disHnguish "habituai
actions from actions done with method# !! saying that the latter 
differ from the former in point of adaptation to problems # 
situations# etc. Two points are raised by Ryle's argument; first# 
whether single instances of instrumental involvement can be held 
to display some .'way of operating* g and second# whether actions 
describable by some G/#buf can be merely habitual, and not entail 
the truth of soma ^ ;»buf specifying a method or technique quasi#" 
instrumentally involved in the action® I vant to . contend that 
instances of instrumental involvemeht both (à) display in themselves 
some method and (b) cannot, be merely habitual; and that#' in
view of this, Ryle's strictures do hot hold for performances' ' ' ' ■ ' . . ' ' -.
described by (X^ bufs® Since these content ions are far from being 
obvious,^  I must say a .word in defence of them*. (a) As I have ■ 
argued above, (mahipiilative) instrumental entails quasi-instrumehtal 
involvement: someone using x to do à (and not simply doing a by
"^45" '
moaiiB of x ) is followlm^ a method ore tecî^ iciue or procodu?:© 
dJA hi.8 ]Kk)kr crliaxb i33?cr':<3CH0Hid;b3.o*i(3 Tizidks#? Tfbul(%hi 1;hl:3 TBtyuuLcl
be false? Presimably %ie- v q v ù â argue timt oad might sucoeed
' /  ' '. • ■ ■ ' . . ■ ' ■ '-r ■ ■  . '
ill doing a* W t  only through luohg or that one might act 
habitually in using k to do à» is oonceiirablo that someone .
should try to do a by means of gg. but should suoo’eed only by - ' 
luck; obaW,^r' a eoldloy ualng hie riflo la .targot israotdLcKs m%& 
acçidéhtaily. scorihg.a bullae,eyet surely this is a ease of 
instrumental involvement without-cjux^ si<instmmi©ntal involvement*/* 
Surely it is not* The soldier is using his rifle to fire at the 
target; and in doing this he is trying to fire a builds eyes 
some method or technique must be quusi^ i^nstrLmientally involved 
in M s  using the rifle to fire at the targetthoiigh it may be 
granted that no method or 'teolmiqu© need be involved in his hitting^  '•Eaicatai • '
the builds eye'o. Indeed^  if he were to hit the builds eye 
through the exercise of ekillg/ rather than through Lady huok; 
we should not say that this slclll is involved in his aotionV  j^ -6yeitoj«6»ia , ’
over and above the method or techiique already involved in his 
using the rifle to fife at the targets the skill is this method 
in a iperfeoted state. It would be odd to say that the soldief 
uses his rifle to fire at the target; but. that he suocee’ds. in 
firing at it thfougb ludkr From this I conclude that actions . ; 
deoof:lbable/
desoribable by oaimotp logioally; be flukes^ (b) The
other oaee in/wMoh • mail an action might be held hot to 
quabi^instrumentaliy Involve a method or technique 0 is that in 
which it is perfomed Mbitually* It seems to me as inf el ici tone 
to talk of habitually using s^ t^o do as to talk of, accidentally 
using g to do a^ "But surely we say e*g% that a maolUne^operator 
on a factory aseemb3.yMine habitually or iiYltMnMhgly'uses his 
imchine to perform tasks; every time a g^moraclc reaches a certain 
point oh the conveycr"^b0it; he automatically presses a button^ / 
thoreby using the machiüie tid do something to the' gimpradc. Or 
consider driving a car; we manipulate pedals and levers • . 
automatically or habitually m d h  of the tlmoü and in doing this 
we are surely using thorn to drive the oar,’3 Admittedly there 
1 sn ^ t much of a metho d or techniqu# involved in the ■ machine 
operator's action; but his aotion is only pe'oblematically 
described by #1 (x^ bUf f Opemting à ma<^ino (or an Automobile) 
stands on the periÿheiy of actions in which items are instrimentaîlÿ 
involved* iUeing^ " a mâohlhe to perform a task for which the 
machine has been designed is^ like *Using*s ône*s lungs to breathe 
or brain to think; a,; degenerate case of mstramentalityi as 
suggested above,j,a rough criterion fpr actions to be genuinely 
deecribablè. by o<«^bitfs ie, pamë^ l^ével poBàibility of choice of 
instnWnts* As there is no clwloe of breathing apparatus (hehpe
the oddlty of limgs to breathe*); in the eeme
. . '.. . ^ .. . '- . I . - - , ' . ' t ' ' ' , -
way a maohlne^opeiator apparently has'no ohdlce of i#ohinG 
to do the same jobs though, of obureo; hs iriight ïiatu suoh a 
eame^lovel choice* (The waraing, isCuèd above; tlmt I take 
manipulative inotrumehts). involvement as a paradigm should be 
repeated here^ This paradigm might aoooimt for the tenacity 
with whioh I argue against /uaing lungO* and fusing a complex 
maohlhe*o I wou],d lll<e to thinl(, however; that this is hot 
simply a case of oonoeptual astigmatisme) At all éventa ;
* habitually % to do a® la feliditoas only when ®itae* Ims 
this (peripheiai) senoo; but where inatsAmental involvement io 
olearLy in question; it ia as unh3,ppy a tuin of pMaae as
* aopidentally using g tb do or  ^luoMly ua:îlig x ^  do , We 
oonolude; thm; that Rylçlô strioturea do not hold for aotiOW ; : 
genuinely deapribable by oc^ kbufo and tlmt therefore ^atmioea of 
ihetimiental involvement display in .themselves the (pmei«'*instrumentg 
involvement of sWe method; procedure or teohniquç!^ ;^
[2] The notion of oirdumstanti^ spéoifiôation is essential 
not only for a Unified chafacteriaatioh of instrumental and 
qUasi^ihstrumental involvement but also for a ' satisfactory Ucoount
of/ - ■ ...
of human action». Aftor dlccusslng this notion dn both aopoots 
I symbolioe some oor)?elativQ rOlatlono of oircumotântial^ 
specif led and To impimpnt tliis lattor mdooyow
and to aid in reproBoUting the concept of oircw^tantial 
spooification; the following symbolimtioh ip uBofUl#»
(1) 8tah(^ for the (x4)nf % s i %  x to do ;a*otahdo f or the *^*buf * doing ^  in aooord^oe 'with
(2) ®(^a/o)* stands for tM o-èpeoifled o(:«bt%f *usingXtoto do %  under Conditions?^stands for the;^lspodified jg-^ bUf ® doing b in. accordance, with m.under conditions \o* •
(5) * etands f or the (m,c)";^ 8pecified (X4)ùf Hising ■,% in aooOixMhco with to do a lUidef dohditiônc a* è or for thé jC'i'Opecifie^  ® u M %  x to do a :ln accordancewith m under conditio#'^®  ^'
Ihte^^fetatioh of oirouz^tantial spoclfioâtion that ie, 
how , Wider oonditiohe o* la to bé/underetood.^ depends on One *9 
Standpoint with fespeot to the fiotlon# Bpeçilfication of the 
oiroimstanoes Wder yWoh an action ie (being) pe^ormed can be 
viewed from two points of vievfs the spectator*^ mid t W  agent*0» 
gnov/ledge of the conditions : W # r  whiO someone is acting embloç 
an onlooker or potential onlooker to make senee pf his behavipw 
and to identify it ae an action,^  Pzom the agent's point of view, 
knowledge of the ocnMtiona Wdorwhioh W  hâe performed or is 
perfomiiing enables him to ocrrelate meth&ds or prooeduros
W3
with oircithstantiai faotors; thereby to formulate rales of 
Gondaotg knowledge of the conditions under which he ' Is to perform 
a task enables'him to act in accordance vrith a method wel-Ustiited 
to the task under eudh oonditidns, It can be seen that the 
npeotator-aspeot of ôirdiMstantial specif icatioii Ims to do 
with the notion of practice»
Before opmienting on circumstantial specification ...
vis‘-a-vie the notion of practice « however, I want to distinguishftoijr'-.wEsfcSiC’Js» . » . ■ ,
between two senses of 'under, conditions o'» In the first sense «/  ^ ;
*it means 'under conditions of type o® (or8 'under oondition'-type 
£®)g such that different performances of the same type of aotion 
can be carried out 'under conditions c® % in the second sense» 
it means 'under partioulhr conditions o' $ such that only one 
performance of a given type *of action can be carried out 'under 
conditions o' » Partloular conditions are determinate both 
spatiO"temporally and with respect to some non-spatio-temporel 
factors. Any aotion is performed under particular conditions, 
and whether or not a circumstantial factor has miy bearing on 
the aotioup it is to be mentioned in its particular circumstantial, 
speoifioation», On the- other hahd, unless particular conditions, had 
significant common/
c(Wioh' f so' psÿformànoeà dml'â' be W-th'-
respëot to the ti^é. of conditions imder which they aièè oarriod 
out; knowledge of pùrtioMâr ôonMtipzw would ho%thor hqlp à 
spootator imke 8(mBe 6f éomb^ie' s boMî^ eî^lo an agent
to formulate rules bf oonduot and put tîiem iiitb pmotioGo 
Think of tho manifold of fhotors in a partiouli^r oircumstantiel /
spooifioation as à fine mesh; mid thinlt of a bpnditioh«type 
ao a pattei&i blookod out on the mesh: a opeote(tor regarde a. ^  ' . ' - ,  4 ' - ' ' ** ■ ' %
belmviour^iimtanoe in the light of a number of such patteruo, 
and as eeeh through one or another of them it iô iicitelligiblo 
to him as a%l aotiong ah agent; viewing his uotioh'i'pG^forme& or to<? 
be«^perfOrmed tMough varioua meeh'^patterùBg ié ^imblod thereby 
to formulate ai# apply riales of oonduot » If Xiq patterns reairred 
from one ineeh to another; then, oiroumsta^itièl egpebifioatioa wouLd 
be of little imiportancè for imderstandiiig human beïiavibur or
for effective regulation of oondUPt*
Wéréao, of oouree, it i$ of o^msiderable importance»
Imgine a game called 'Oircumstanoe Charades * in vdiioh ohly the 
oircumetances in which someone io ca#yiiig'out w  action are glvmis 
the stage is set, the. circimatanôè-meêh laid out»! is ,
seated in hie room with a thoughtful look on hib faoo; thero \ 
are Bounds of a typev/riter'arid .of Mosa-rt in the air, the desk -
W  ' ' .
.51-^ "
•■il:by his side is piled high with books and papors#-»;," "Wlmt 
else coMd ie be ,doing but typing his thêsio?" Inférence fz^m. -, ■ : ' i|; • . T
. - - .. : . . . : - , . .: , . \ t' : ' ' ' ' . : . ;oiroumetsatial factors to aotiôù z^ eenibleG liiferenoe from 
mowment to aotion^ the latter is imdèrWcénih ordinary 
Charade 8» Just as pertièular ' ophdit'iôns can dieple^ a pattern 
'wbl6h m^kes bebayiow intelligible as action, so movements -
as described in aotivity#deBorlptionG m,y satisfy conventionally 
accepted oriteriA by vfhioli beWvicm? is identlfiablb as action 
of a certain .type,- The questi^n "What Would be the reasonable 
thing for somone âGtli^ imder tlmt conditiôn^type to be doing^" 
is parallel to the question ,"%Vhst is somom, : making suoh-^ andf'suoh / 
movements lil<ely to be doih^". It W m o t  be .said,. howevoD]", that 
in ioaki% those movements or in acting in thosé cirGumstàacéG à 
, person .W e t  bs ehgaged -in-a'..certain type of actioag nor -can; it 
bé ^ sai.d that if bè is engaged in thiS: action then 'the oircumstanoes 
or his moven^nts must be Ijice ,th^, ' .Wittgenstein ywitess T'The
gsmew one would, like to my; has not only rules bût also a point,
' - /' - - ' ^  ^ . ' ' ' ! -  - '. ' . \  '- " * * * '  -
S):Wilarly; a praotiôe is pircü^scribèd, not o M y  by. a^^<^ 
oqrrelàted with oonvehtiohally accepted oyite&% for : understanding
.cad. idoh'b'ify#^ :'. behaviour,^  in,-.terms .of. the. pÿaoticç " but also .
' . ... ' ' '. ' ' ... -. ^ -^ - * '- ' " ; ' ' : by:ciycumstaaçerpatto;m8 .or ,ôôh#tio%irty08y. Tfhi(^  to imke
behaviour iiitelligiblé .^0 ûct# by tbro#% light on its ." ' ', -. ' t ' ' " ^
Someone/ -
» (2
imable to identify present action from the 
pircRmotantial .opsqifiGatipn m d p a t t h o  bQgi&ming bf tliio 
pamgraph mi^it see igmédiatoly that I am typing whoa he 
learns of my status as a student with a. thesis' due ehortiye .
-this, gives him a clue, as to the point of ny behaviour gu% typing. 
On the other hand, oleanLynot all oir<3Um8tüatial factors have
to do with t W  ix)int of behaviours the fact that there are .' ‘ . , •  .....
sounds - of typing: in %%r roomp for' examplo» And,- of course ^ m # y  \ 
factors may bè of n6 use in' môlsing.behaviour iutelligiblos the
fact t)iat my room is hideously decorated or tWt eouudc Of a clook
' ■ ■ ' ‘ ' ' . ' . . . . . . . '. tiokihg,besides those of. the typom?itêr end. of Mosart^aro ih.
> - • ■ - ■ " ' • *  v ' -  . . , . , -■ ■ '
.iclK) eulsff'. : ' : '. : ^
Turning how to eirG^atàatiol sueoifioation of (bGÏiaviôür
' - '. - - - ... :. : : . -? -. .." /v '.. \ ^   ^ . - : ' ; ^ ' 'deoCribed by) "ci^ and .W'fir#' 'pbOôrVey'tbut, given both
oiroumetanoes of a behavi our^^^nètahoe and inetrhment .and/or
q m^oi'^ iiictrumènt involved in' thé behaviour, ohé may be. ablo to
Identify the ûôtiOh^^^ a certaihi type. For exanrnle*- : . ' . ' . / : , ' ,'. : './\ ' : ' .'; ;'^. ' '. ; ' : ; ':. given thût soméçhê ié wielding a golf olub on a well*^ *mowod patch
of lôm with a hole in the centre, it's à reasonable bet that
ho*8 puttings a.peyeoniBrforiMng ïn.aocordàïïoè withThel^ethod
whih on. a stage is almost dèrbainlÿ àdtihg. imagine à variant
(SE)/ ' ' ' -  ^ . ':
of.'the gai# ' 'Olroumstonoe Charades* in whic^ i some oircumetanbial 
factor ±8 picked out aB.imvliig "fbnotional or inatrumentàl 
vàlué®- (Kohler); and the problem is to identify the\aotion 
(being) imdertaken. or task (being) performed^ -
Yet this game, though porbâpe amûeihg to play, would be : 
of little practical valueB à' gdmo that is' of value ocaisiots lh 
correlating an iimtrumenb' ââd/oÿ Q3L^i;"ln8t$%mdht ' with â given 
taok under given oôhditibhè* Thé #éêtiè%i .iè '^ow did (do) 
you do a under ct", the answer to wMch specif lee wi instrumézit . 
and/or qùaeiMnstrmàent ihimlyéd, or to be involved; in doing 
a under o* Therefore it is misleading' to talk of ^'cirmmstantial 
specification* A and what we have called *^oirametahtially
5 . - ■ ' s '  ' - • ,: .
8peoified buf8* . \%)uld better be designated- :*:l%ietrame#ally % 
(<paa8i"ih8trmiehtallÿ). epeçifled, taEk^TcircùmetaâOe bomplexef^ » ^ \ . 
Inetnictiom forjâLd^ioe;, though Wnt'l(mi%. oonditione -w^er which' 
the dpvice can be (id to be) used to perform C6rta;M t88ke, 
cdrreiate the, device with ta8k4and"fConditipii8 zither tban t W  ' 
conditions Witli tapk(^ .ndf$devioe, %  muet diotliigaieh hot only - 
betweph pm?tiôûla#; conditions # d  cchditioh"*%pee but also . 
between taeke and tûbîc'^ typeb,. for the poeeibility of framiiig 
ihetamotionè .and ralea of coAduct deptmdç as iRûçh ph the exietenoe 
.çf eortallyf^related taelce as oh the fact that particula;*^  ,
- - r ' , . - ' ,. 'opAditlohe/ -
odndltlons elmre slgnlfloaAt common features. . It may bo 
suggested that partlqular tasks are nothing but epeoial 
oiroumstantial factors, elnoe dlfferoàôes between tseko pan . \
oftoA be traced to dlfferenoeo in the oonditione imder which \
they are to bo performed. One aiieli différence betv/eea, e»g#
driyihg A mid driving B le that performance of the 
first is spatially, and perhaps temporally, diotinot from 
peifO;:^TanoQ of the secoa^# but this faqt in itself msiy not bo
' ' ' ' - - . ' ' ^ f, - I I . ' ' % . :e a o u ^  to malce the first 6 different tyco of task frdm the eocoad, 
80 lohg as the same Instrimmt (say, hammer %) can be need in
àooOfdance with the same method (aày, method m) to < ^ v e  A; as to 
drive On thé. Other hand, some oircumatantial fhctoà^, éuoh . 
a8 diCferenoe;ih poeitioA of nailO A and B, may suffloe to render. . . ' \ ' . . J' ' . '". I' '. ,
A a different tygë of i^ok from thle ia the
case g hw/eVer» if&: other oiroumotantiàl factors more :
03? loss slmllag; the3?@: Ig no j^^#gm&"mo#]iod. ' (g#)
which ;Oai% he (ognally w é p )  to-volvoâ à  :üi
B* Mother complication in diçtihgaiehiiig taek^types io that 
w M l o  driyin^ A  had %' may fall ûûdei^ the aame tâek-'typc
for One agéat, they may bo i&^tahces of quite different taok^types 
for @31 ageht with othor capacities#, g  regard both taeke aô 
(equally we%l) approachable with (x,m), whereas may not be
able/ .
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able to us© 3Î by.a to teiv© .à« but bnls- to'toive'B'«, ®tlS«ÏJii -, - W  _ *?«»<. . , V  . \ n?3 ..
dlffiwlty oould perlapg bo by regarMhg agents as
olroumstantlal factors;. or ovWi by 'Introducing the notion of 
agent"typo# ThUo, the taaW drj.vi% A and drivj,i3g B are 
iii0ta%ioeS of the eainé tàpk'^ typo with , réspdçt to oonditlom^typo 0(gg) ; 
wîîilô only tho latter is an inétanoB of ' this typo with respect 
to Gondit ion-typo 0(gP) end the former: is an inetanôe of some 
other task-type under this conditioh-t%p* - -
\yitliout canÿihg this mmiysis any further we can draw 
i#: hioral# the notions, of taék"**'byp@ and oondition-type are 
Mteiwove^i to suph a degree of complexity that à separate paper ' 
would be needed to Untangle them satisfabtorily. It is enough, 
for. pur,present purposes, to draw attontidh to thd distihotion 
between 'particular‘ tasks' and particular conditWis oh thé one ‘. . 
hand, and tasWkypes and oqnditiôh^types on the other* This 
differentiation is çepaoiaXly' crucial in dealing with instrumental - / 
and qimsi-instrumental inyolvement, since, as I 'hayb suggested, / 
the very pqssibility of coraxalating instruments çhd/drqùasiM 
instruments.with. ta.sk-cirdmistanoe complexes ' depends on the ‘ 
existence of sortàlly^^relàted ..tasks and conditions»/ One fhrtbe^ 
point should.be mdhtioned before iwe ttrcn to consider this 
dorrdlatlon*/ , . . . .'
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corz'Glo.tlon* Tlieword "complex" la thé phrases 'task^^olroumstance 
Gômplmc' and 'Instruméat-method complex* should bo understood
quite literally8 the notiosis of 'task* and ( :' 'oircuiaotance* are : 
complexly interconnected; as are the notions, of * instrument * and, 
f* quasi-instrument*,
To express the correlation of instrument and/or method with 
taslcrolroumstanoG complex we introduce correlative formulae 
involTing circumstantially specified o(^  and ^-bufs# These 
formulae can be either normatively or non-nozmatively interpreted#. 
Interpreted normatively, they express ' technical norms * which 
either 'prescribe* or 'permit* involvement of an instrument and/ 
or method in the performance of a task( ^*'type) under a comdi tion( -type 
In their non*nomatiye Interpretation they ca-n be construed ae 
statements to the effect either that a taek is beet (i,e» most 
efficiently) undertaken vdth: a certain ins trament and/or in 
accordance with a certain method, or that it is at least 'possible* 
to perform a task with a certain instrument and/or in accordance 
with a certain method*' My aim here is only to schematise inters* 
relations Among these corrélative formula^ ;/
E-formulae exnress rules of conduct (i»e, technical norms) 
vdiioh/
to»*-} (m
' t/Moh 'preaqriptiveiy- oqrrelato inetzumentB and/or quBoi- 
instrumonts (methods, toohnlquee, ècr) with task-oiroimstanco 
comploxes* An instrumental IWommla »\ synAolised by
* expfosseB the rule# 'to do £, under o, uee gc*, ore ;
is to be used to do a under e,*| where a is a taek-type and c 
a condition-type# A cmaei-inetnmeatal R^fomula# symbolised 
by p expresses the rule; 'to do a imder £, dot in
^  accordance with m% or; *m ie to be followed in doing a under c/|
where a and o are again task-type and oonditlon-type reapeotivély*, 
The complex R^ rformula, *R Ixua'^ n/o *§ which results from conjoining 
instrumental and quasi ^instrumental R-foraiulae, seems to be 
ambiguousÿ That is,) we might take the R-fommla  ^to
mean (1) '% ie to be used in accordance with m to do a under c*, 
where only g is prescribed# or (2) *m ie to be followed in 
using Û to . do a under c*, where only m is preacribedp or (3)
*32 is to be need to do a under o, and m ie to be followed in using 
X to do a under c*$ where both x and m are prescribed» In  wlmt<te=* '. *K> ; = 4  ,7 ■ ■ _ • . •  ,
follows we are interested oilly in (3), In which this- R- ., , ; ;
, formula can be said to fcspeoify the instrumont'^ method complex 
(gim) with 5?espoot to the task^ oircusistoioe complex (E?#)»
Gonfrented with task a, under conditions p in which instruments 
are available, wO seek the inatrument-method comple;>^
such/
BÙôh that to lise the Instrument by the method to do a ia td 
operate mpét efficiently, given ' conditions 0» In the first 
place, ?/o rejéot'VthoBQ instrumente for which there le no 
methbd Of uêing them to do under o#r if is mch an instmmmt,
grbimde fbr aayihg that cannot he used &o. are piovidod by
' '  ^ . ' : „' '**'. ' ' ' ' ' - . ' . '/ . ' iadc of any' method m in àcbor^hoe mth which con be used &o.
To express this implication, we introduoo correlative formulae ,
which GxprôGS the p^ossibility* of an instalment m  d/or method
with respect to a. task^circDÆBtanoë complox, P'#formùlae; , r . ‘ ,
iPlgv^bp’ for ,*g. can be used to do a under o,* f f c a n  be followed in doine a n'a':'in/oii lor «m can c r iJ. oo. .^ u g unaer OT
Xwà'^wcT for *ra can be followed in using x to do a«7=1» «==/ es!f I ■ ■ ■ ■ , . -  •, ' ^  Çii» ■ ■ i«àt . ,, ■ ' mSBp a',i : , ' , _(1,6# %. ôàn be followed, &0, g ahdx oah be
used, &c,®)» _
-W© formulate a sufficient condition for rejecting g. in the : thesis#
G g M  p [ Cs/â] ) ' p [^s/a] »
From this the following theqi#. can bo deduced# '
,  >' (3i).( p [%wâPa/£_] )
This must be amended, however; for existence of à method is hot 
the only necessary condition , of validity of an instrumental . ;
P-formula (i»e, of the ' possibility* of ân instilment with respect 
to a task-Oircumstanoe complex)» Mother .condition is that the 
instrument., be; ' available 1 with respect to this oomÿlex* ^ To say 
"klKa/U/f
te»
tîmt .g ie ®avaiIab3.Q® .vdth respeot to the .oomplox, (a,o) ia to
aay tîmt it ia a oiroiimstantia,! factor of £ (ors *x6o')« Binoe
these necesaary conditions conjointly imply the, validity of- ' - ' . »' -
the instreimenta3, P^ ’formula,. W0..ha»w the oqaivBlesioog , .. .
p ^ $  & O m )  ( )
In wordoe o M  he used to do & i W w  ^  %  w d  only If, 3L ip
available in a and aome m can he followed in itôing.X,.^  to do a under
a"
We are ready now to deal w ith  the question-Of sp©cify;lng
an optimum instriment'^method oômplex.» ThiO amounts, In
to consideration o f the re la tio n  between and P-fom m lae, since
the optimum complex, as stated in  ahR -form ula, miXst he selected  
from the range of 'possible* oomploxes whloh are s-^ted in
pwformulaG, To illu s tra te  th is  ; we suppose that o f a v a ila b le  %.'a  
only and x . are 'possib le '# th at is , there ex is t methods,' "T? "rVk / ... ;.. ' . ,  -, ; . . . . : .
say r  and s fo r  and t  fo r  x .., which can be followed in  using“  tpa c aa wmt(\ Kfti * W L ’ ■ ■ ' . * ■-■■■ •: ■ ' : . ,  - ' . , . 
or X. to do a under o* Kenoe we have the 'possib le ' complexes
y  . T ~  . . T ^ V ,  . . . .  ^ . . . . . : ;  . / .  . . . .. . ^  ,
(Xg, r ) ,  and * sts,ted in  the P-formuihe#
p|â^.6rV&]
The question is , fo r  which o f these F-formulae is  a oorrespohding 
R-fomm la Valid? To deal w ith  th is  question we. must in t roduoo the ; 
ideas o f 'procédure ànd instrumônt-assessment*
S ince/
Sinoè is definable in terns of px^oedurs#.
aaeeaement we first oonaider the latter# S^t^thet^oal' ia to 
be distinguished from retzTbspeotive prooedure-aosossment# The 
foamier oonsists in judging that one method of performing a task 
under certain conditions would be more efficient, or othorwioe 
suitable, than another possible method# This judgiaent need not 
precede the perforimnce, for any aotion in whioh a-method is . 
Involved canbo said, to manifestYjM;hypotMti(%!,l procedure*^ 
assessment# Q)%e ms^ . undertake task in one way without being 
aware of the possibility of doing it in acoordanoe with other 
procedures $ but to imdertake the perPozmsnoe in that uqy % 
entails the judgment that one's method had certain merits, if hO'k 
of effioienoy then perhaps Of aesthetic or some other non^  ^ ■ 
procédural factor# Retrospeotivq proceduro^assesEments, on 
the other hand; are subsêqûenb to performances or attempted 
parfomances; though in so far as action in acoorddnoe with a 
oerbain method mgy reflect the adoption of a ^ zule of dpnduot, 
rétrospective assessments are displayed in, performances#
represent a prooedure-assGssmQnt, hypothetical or retrospective;
■ " ’■ ' ' . ■ - - ■ '    . '
to the effect that following m in doins & (in tryiiyg to do a) 
under conditions c is at least; ae efficient, or otherwise
. . .  ' ' .r -
suitable, ap following %  in #ing to #  a) under o,.
by the inequality-or-ideiitity;  ^ ^ [â^ lî/.^  ■
MalcUig àsi bypothetioal assessment is like »®kihg a 
sretroduotive Inference, in that for Bucoessfiil asBGSBmént as 
for fruitful retroduotion a certain amount of 'insight* or 
perhaps 'genius* is required# The criteria by wliioh one method 
is adjudged 'better* ('probably more efficient*) than others, 
like those involved in detemini% one hypothesis to be 'better* 
('probably more fruitful') than others, cannot be exhaustively 
qodified into asseaement*=r or retrodùetion^ r reoipeô» On the 
other hand, ]%rpothetical prooedurO'-assessments, again like 
retroduotions, are not a-reasonableg the question "How did you 
Imow that was the best way to go about doing so-and-so under 
such-andmsuoh conditions?" ;is not always answered by a shrug of 
the shoulders or a glib "I guess I'm a genius» " * Insightful
behaviour*, to use psychologists^ jargon# does not always aptly 
describe performances that manifest hypothetical procédure- 
assessment# for often one can offer good reason® ex post facto 
for acting in ç.ocordanod with one method rather than another» 
Mother danger is that procedural factors may be confused with 
ncn-prooeduml factors as determinants in prooedare-asseesments# 
Ryle appears to fall into this confusion when he says "to operate 
efficiently# # # is to perform one operation in a certain manner
or Mth a certain style or procédure." 1 should have
thought that ' manner * and 'style®, unless manifestations of 
'procedure*, are to be ignored in a.ssessiUig an operation fore 
effioienoy§ stylistic factors are not determinants of 
efficient performance if they are wholly distinct from procédural 
factors. One of the, difficulties in making retrospective 
procedure-assessments is to determine vdiioh stylistic factors 
are simply idiosyncraticand which have procedural import *
Of course some idiosyncracies are not purely stylistic, but are 
procedural* though uncodifiables these are flairs and geniuseo, 
elements, of Art as agaimt Skill, In speaking hexe of * optimum 
method* wo iiave in mind only non-idioBynoratie pzooodural factors, 
and we assmiie tîiat codifiability of methods is an overriding 
consideration in retrospective proqodure-assessmont.
Now# in terms of procedurG-assessmeht mo define instrument-
assessment» An instrument, is to be adjudged 'better* (i.e#
'more effioient or otherwise suitable®) than another instrument,
y, if, and only if, there exists some method of using x to do the
task in question under given oiroumstsiices such that following’ thisadjudged to .be
method (in using x, &o.) is/at, least as efficient, or otherwiso’ 
suitable, as following any method in accordance with whioh y can be 
used/
iised to do the task under the oifoumstanoeea Syaboiically,
[s-i/âjà^ji-â/fi] ^ (Rm) (a) ( ï^ js^ -gra/i]
' [iv,grmycj >  )°
Assuming the notion of procediire- and instrmiiont-aseessment to : 
be at least intuitively clear (which is all that ia required) ^ ! we- .- 
next analyse R-formlae, in terms of assessment and P-fomulae#
Firstj wo say that.a. certain method# m, is to be followed in doing 
b under o. If; and only if, (i) b can'bo done under o in aooérdanoQ • 
with m# and (il) m is at least aa efficient (or otherwlse suitable)' 
as any method which can be foliOwed in doing b under c. That is 8,
p[bVs] & (ë) )
Simiiarly, we say that % is to be used to do under q if# and 
only iff (i) ÿ qah be so used'p^ end (ii) it is at ledst as offioient 
(or otherwise suitable) to use x to do a under o. as it is to use - ;
any other instrument whioh can be so used» In symbols# >
K|gva/i] < > p[sv&/&J & ; (s) |avâ/G]ÿ|&vâ/o] )
. We are finally in a position to oonA)ine these results and
analyse, the-H-formula * in terms of (i) complex P-f ormulae
of the form *P * # and ( ii) prooedurè^ssessment with
respect tô task*pirou!Mtance opmplex (g#è). and the range of 
IpOGSiblé*/. '
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* pùBBlble * compXexeB»: . • It, will ho• raoall ©d
thàt we are here interested only in #^ 0: interprétation of this 
R^fommla either as a rule of cdnduot 'prescriptive* of both 
instrument and method; or* non-normatively# as a statement to the 
effect ’that of all 'possible* instr*#ént**method dbmplexes with 
respect to task-circumstance complex (û,o), is the optimim
complex in point' of efficiency or other asBOeament-factors# On 
either interpretation; however# 'héhèssasy’ and' sufficient conditions 
for the validity of this R-formuia are (i)'that' it be possible 
to nsè' theLasserted Mstrameht# %# do a under c# (ii) that it 
be possible to use %  tO do à /in abbordahoe with b ûndè!^  o# end " 
(lii)\ that the asserted complex he at least aS efficient (or . . 
otherwise 'suitable) as any "other- Complex, which satisfies conditions'! 
analogous to (i) and (ii)# That ie;. , . ,
; [îvâ'^âj >  ly
If^ in our eanmple;. the cdmplbx;(^g#^ is, dete^qained to bo each 
that both y
then the Rt-foimtla ?E|x.^  oTs/cl* can be asserted as a rule of 
coïiduot with,respect to the task of doing a under conditions c# 
or as a statement to the effect that s) is ontimim 
instrwmnt(^method complex with respect to (a,o) #
I want nqw to return to a problem mentioned earlier@.
tlmt of. the xJOBBlbility of infinite regress in oertain accoimts 
of iiimsiMsifôtraimèntalityé. This problem^  it iidll be'moalled#. 
arises out of the view that following -a - rule' -entoila .'.Interpreting 
the .rule to determine how it'is to bO followed;; sinoo ah 
interpretationai sohema ia itself qmsi-instrumentally involved in 
interpreting the rule in aooordonOe with it* it follows that it . 
too must be interpreted to determine how it ie to be followed; 
hence another' interpretatioml aohema is introduced, but this 
al0o must be interpreted**#» TheyfegresB# in spite of its 
.apparent triviality, is not just of incidental signifiqaaice for 
the notion of qqasiwinstrummitâlitÿ@ by disseoting it we may , 
eluoidate both the noh-instrumental aspoôt of tliio notion and the 
relation between u^nderstanding';R* • and 'following R*, It is* 
it must bo admitted* a highly artificial regress in the sense 
that beyond the first few steps it is difficult to make sonso 
of its further development? *. on the other hand* it is neither 
more nor less a mere logomàohy than e*g$ Lewis Cafrpll's puàsl# 
about inferende (to Avhiqh its similarity is. immediately evident)* 
To begin with# I develop à ’double-barrelledkægress, and then 
I oomider regress arguments in Kant, Byle# V/ittgènstëih and .
Leibnis which bear some resemblance to either or both barrels of
........- ' ' (:2(3) - '  ^ '. : .my regress;'' ' ,
[l] I'om,/ ' .
[l] and À #  are . watching q golf match» Alf
haa never, seen golf played; and knows, It. only as. à, ® stiokB-and-ballsl 
game; l6.rry Imows V03:y little about golf*, but he at Iqast/oan 
tell when a player Is making a shot and when he * s. merely 
addressing the ball;‘preparatory to hitting, it p. Dick la more 
knowledgeable;» for he can tell the djffçrmioe between shots im&do 
in acoordanoe with Hogan* e method (ll) and those made in acaordanoe • 
with Jones' s method (J) # but TOm* an eaglef-eyed ,expert at this 
sort of thingp is able to distinguish among shots made by. variants 
of tliOBO methods# That^lP\tô say^ . Tom's knowle^e is suoh. that* 
merely .from . the. way. a ,golfer holds his club* from the slope of 
his shoulders * from ; hie f olloW'^ thrqugh, &o» he can tell whether 
the golfer p lay s\ in aooordance with* say; EL pr R2 .or Eg or J1 
or J2p where *Hn* andiJk' stand f or ! methpd-vBriante. of H and J. 
respGotiveiy» : : . . .
Thie oan be seen from the agent's* as well ao from the 
8poctato3:^ *s point of view# WMt I oqll the 'prooedure-regresê' 
arises on aocount of the theoretical possibility of indéfinltéïy ;
oarrylna^  out procedural sneoiflGationg the sneotator S^ 
speolfioation oonsistlng of further determination of method-yuü^nts 
involved in an agent's performanoe* and the agencé speoifioatlon 
constituted by further variation of. method and mebhôd^vâriants 
so/ , , ■
80 âs to perform Macoordano^ Td.th on optlimm R-rulé» 'Bupposé, . 
for oxample, that # %  norformace Is dosoribablo by '(aJeTn^/o )' ,^  -n-ii J —  y  «¥«« • r Itsii / .9
via; 'using club sc to make eliot &  iii accordance with method-variont 
H2 ■utidor condition® c 'r  now what is  i t  - fo r  1# to follow E9? It • 
is for him to follcxf E in a'particular namely in àccés/dânce
with vaziânt ?2* In other wôrdG* we can writo the ogulvalencog 
. . .::rm4%oari^/ol — — T-r->. ___ I CESaa^'^iMsM f 4  ^ I » \  ^ I «BM man “ \ ^
whore *Mf#,f/c>'' stands for W  ùêrfôzmc#*. under o'* %"I ■ 9 m m  I , , #iù il.>i.il «2=» W^  J
euppoaing now that H2 and J2 have features in ooDmon which warrant 
Gpeolflcàtion.by/variant and extending tliiQ ouppoaition to / 
procedural specification ' of action® In accordance with variants of 
methods E and J* we can say.that actions in accordance with E26 
and Opg6 those in' àocordânçe with JÎ6 have features in common ' 
which jmrient apa'oifi cation by Buh^ ^^ variant "6# Translating this 
from thé spectator's to the agent's point of v:tew*;,we cam say that 
anyone making a shot M  accordance with H26 would be basically 
following method E, but that in doing this he is following variant 
'2* and in doing this he ie following sub-variant, ® *6*; That is* 
we.; can .write the equivalences , ' . !.
^  6/a
Imagine/
Imagine M  addrèGslng thé bail; peeking to - take into aqoowt 
varloug features of the cohditiono'# c, imder whloh hê la to mkb 
a shot 9 ho graêpô the oluh end oets M o  feet in âpoordanoe with 
H, but then variée his grip slightly td take, aooomit of the 
wind* (thereby preparing to malts the shot in eoeordonce with H2), 
and next ehlfta hie hips in takMg àooowit df the slope of. the. 
fal#fay (thereby 'eottiii^ l^ ; to follow ip making thé shot)# But 
there im ho reason for i# to bo .satisfied t/ithH26# if each 
Gubse^ent variant indicates a furiiie:;^  'taking aooomit of\o'^ 
then he imy ( tiiéofétiôallÿ) » cbntinùo hiè' prôoedùial opooifioation 
ad inf initurn einca' there ie (agàin; theoretically) on imlimited 
number of feature®' of ^  ' for. him to take àcôowb of* - , ■
, But . there, is  another version of the regreee* M  wondéro: - : ' ' - ' - ' ' < . ' ^ fry/ ' : -!. \ r- %' ^
whether he is  ju s tif ie d  in  making the shot in  àcbordéhoe w ith  E, 
ra th er than J? hie dohbto are a llayed * le t  ùè eay^ whenhe 
rememberB a n%le to  the e ffe o t th a t H ie  to  be followed in  making. ’ 
Shots euoh ao a under oonditlono euôh as 0, But then doubte ariée  
oonoefni% the v a lid ity  of th is  ru le  o f cohduot, and M  ju s tif ie s  
lis  aoting in  àooordanbe w ith  i t  by another g o lfin g  t ip  i7hioh says ; 
th at the ru le  is  to be followed in  conditionB suoh as 6* But 
follOiTing th is  t ip  hiust also be w arranted; and its  w rm n t ju s tif ie d , 
and its  w arrant's  ju s tif ic a tio n  warranted^ and# »» » For t liio *
the tiUQtlfiôàtion^regreBs®; lej; : ®\ et8nd fpr a ru3,e which /
justiflGG M' in followliig B (in' using qlub % to. Mke shot a uiideÿ / 
ooaditiosie and let ■ '' "/stand:for,.a rule whioîv wa'r.mhtp
W b  acting on TRg \ * The fir^t rule is of the fofm? E ie to he 
followed Core H can he followed) in ming % to do â imder o; 
and of the form# followed (ora can he
followed) in wing % to db ^  wder 0» In making the shot in. 
accordance with . then^ gE is said to he ' RW»jdotifled hy
and Dut clearly there need he:Ao
end to ju8tifi(^tion, just as there may always he fuzther 
procedural specification» . .
The. two sorts Of regress_ can he combined into a 'double- • 
barrelled' fegreee; Bach choice of -method .must be backed by a 
justificatory rule# but each such rale* in turn# requiree a
further justificatory )^e; and so pn»\ Dut also, each procedural,,
specification leads to further spécification*; Take M *  s golf shot, 
for example» _go far it is made in accordance with H26, where '8 and 
"6 are variant of E ând mb'^va^ant of E8* respectively; but it 
is also made in accordance with Eg , v/hozQ 'Ey and -are,
rules warranting or justifying M ' s  following E and. hie : 
justification by of folloYfing E, respectively» Row \ :
justification is also needed fdr gg's followit^ %  and for ^
M 0/ . I r  : .
- ' " 7 0 *
hiù' ' W b ' thèse ' juatlfibatozy ziileê lot lah. -
oall thaà *' aà& ' " * * ^ tbemoel vos m&ot l)o wairèJiteâ
. ■ ■ ■ 11 4I ' : : '
or- hadkod-' bÿ '.fùirthor TtiXos^ - ■ juét- .as ' M d  to ho hacked hÿ * é
And) 6f ' oôürëè^ " "met69d«»vârl^At I% 6 cja% ho further speëlfièd# 
hut 80 far, what %Tè have le 2%  Ri-i- 6%  IL 6 %di p -- Mm 11 .lt„ ib dl^  . ,... - ':' / . 1 2 / -  ;> ^whesze  ^^ !%- le to  ^ ae * *1^ ' lè té  ^èâd * ^ le to '■ " *3 2 ^ îaé le' to *Èg' $ It oàa ho êeeh from thle that, for ah
aihltiêiy'=p&mary'me thodth e fplloel% aôheme repreoeàte the . .
course of this  ^double: harrolled! regàzessq ■ ' ■ . . -  ■ - /
ÿ  ^ , é, ÿ ^ ^ ^ u i m e e ) v ^ # $ method^wrlante of M# ;. 1'. ■ ^ - il ■ ■ • , .
Itlmee);) **(a+ 2  timeeX, tlme8)_
justificatory rules for % *
.r ÏX
9«*'» tlms) ly go,t, # justificatory rules for M*
m(o6) ? irSjj s=|\5î„ % i  % v  ®2i &  %(«. T 1) ®0(ïi -2)*">JL. ., ’ ‘ ' . y ■ ■ îi ' '■ ■'-• v\ '. ' m Z'
.. . ' % - ! )  1 ®n ••*’
A. simiîar êxgpEw^ lôUg- E(oo)g vbuld represent S as (i) (completely^
■ * , ■ . "  - ,  '  '  .
proçedumlly specif i ed^ mid. ( il ) ! completely * justif ie d. Hot '
only Is every factor of ciroumstEmoes o aooomited for - v/here
prhn.nf
stands for ra ther more than simply a immediate environment «« 
hut also a i l  the gaps are stoppad^  so to apeak, through which 
doubts might enter. Presumably^ i f  M s^ perfoniianqe were . :
desorihable by » (gj^a‘^ ïï(oD ) /o ) (  ^ or, fo r th a t matter, hy ((^6^1(0) )/o) 
then he would suooeed in making a holo^ i^n-^one (assuming, of oouree, ■ 
that the h ole is  short enough)# fh ia  is  a l l  subject to  the 
objection tlmt It la aenoeleaa to apeak of anyone except, perhaps, 
God as acting  in accordance w ith  an M(od ) *
[2 ] The examples of regross which follow all bear resemblance . 
to one or the other of the regresses developed above. It seems to 
me that the regresses thi’ow considerable light on the nature of 
q^si^instrumental involvement,- Indeed-, it may be oohjecturad that 
this mode of invoiyement is essentially connected with procédure^ 
and/or juBtificationKcegreseèsI I believe that Wittgenstein* s 
préoccupât io%i with the problem of regress in his discuss ion of 
the concept of (following à rule* supports this conjecture,
(i) Kant draws a distinction^ between thsozy and praotiooi th 
former consists of a body of practical rules which have a certain 
generality; and instances of .practice are operations conducted 
in/
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in accordance with rules,which manifest some purpoeo. An act <
of judgment is needed to articulate the oonneotion between 
theory and instance©, of practices in this act the praotioal man 
(i*e, the HBnwho is to put theory into praotioe) deoides whether 
a given situation fall© under the rule© of hie theory. But 
further rules for the guidance of hi© power of judgment in its 
discriminatory exorcise cannot be given indefinitelyj, for tMa 
y/ould lead to infinite regress# ICant oonoludes £ m m  this that some 
men will be good in theory but unable to put theory into
practice since they lack power of judgment, and this camiot be '
acquired tlirough the conning of rules, Exercise© of Urteilskraft
are, for ICant, ©ubsumptions under rules provided by the concepts 
of the understanding ( V er© tande sbegrlffe ) s if these sub sumptions^  w#'. *i/i ^ I’nig.ijfcfcCi11■ iWi^ iOTp Tiiliiria^
themBolves were rulo-guided then a further power of judgment would 
be required since rule^guidano© consisté in ©uboumptive exercises 
of judgment; but a third-level power of judgment would be 
necessary if thé Bubeumptlve exercises, of ©econdolevel judgment ,, 
were rulO'-guldedg and so oh, Kant ©ots up the regros© machinery 
in the first ICritik but does not explicitly set it into motion#
He hints at it also in Kritilc dor Urtellskraft, when he 
discusses the difficulty of locating a .priori principles of the\ 
facuity of judgment a such a principle must not serve as an 
"objeotivo/
(‘ob jective rule to which i t  jso®. the fa c u lty  o f judgmexi’t j  can 
adapt ito judgment, beoâum for that anotlier faculty of judgment 
would again be required to enable us to deoido whether o r not 
the case falls under the rule*" Very brlefîÿ, ICant puts a 
stop to the regreoG by claiming that for .detemihant (©ubeumptivë) 
judgment, in its' tràneoendental mode •tJrteilskraft.-. is guided by a 
priori principles of the .understandingswhereas in its non»- 
tmnsoendental exercise (e^ g,- subsumptions under moral prlnolpleo 
or empiriqal oonoepts), Kant describes judgment as
,g* a peculiar talent whioh pah be pmotised only and
camiot be taught# I t  is  the speoifiO quality of so«»
callèd^mother^wit§" and its  lack  no school can makegood, US)
In  th is  la s t statement Kant appears to be eelioisig A ris to tle *e
description of as “the faculty of hitting upon the
Y zx'Smiddle term instantaneously*“
(ii) Eyie*s use* of regress as a club over the heads of those who 
support an (intellectualiste vievr of intelligent behaviour is 
well#*known. In (Knowing How and Knowing That* (*KHM<fJ?*) he 
explicitly amiounoes his dependence on the argument “that the 
prevailing doctrine leads to vioious regresses** @^ 4^^  and in 
The ConoQpt of. Mind (Qoncept) he appears to regard regress as “the 
crucial objection to the intolleotualist l e g e n d . I n  what 
follows/ .
foliowB I consider marhily Ryla* a later regre©S'^ argiMent©, though 
I aXBO mention some pointe of similarity between these and the 
versions in .
The first point at which'regress allegedly arises has to 
do with the suitability or appropriateness of maxims, rule© of 
conduct, procedures, &c$ with respect t6 a given practical problem# 
The (legend* is said to assert that “whenever an agent does 
anythix)g intelligently, his act 1b preceded and steered by another 
internal act of considering a regulative proposition appropriate 
to his practibal problem, “ But what guarantees that the agent 
te considers an appropriate maxim# Mustn’t the agent*.s aot of ' 
consideration itself be (preceded and steered by another internal 
act Of considering a. regulative proposition*, namely a criterion 
of àpprop^atonec© bÿ which to .judge whether the maxim io 
appropriate to th@ tabl^  And what about judgment with referenoo . 
to the criterion of appropriateness^ doesn’t this require the 
performance of a further aot of coneidemtion? And so. - on, Rylo- -, ! " ' r f :
Goncludess
The endlesphoss of this impl&éd regresB ehows tWt
the application of the criterion of appropriateness ' 
does not entail the ocourreno^Qf a process .of ■
.. çoàsider#g this priteribii. ■ ^
A/
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A BGcond piiase of the regross--argument concerns what Ryle callo 
(in’KIi&Kf *) the * ©ohlsoplirenio broker* or ’go^ h^etwoen application^ 
process’ which “has someliow to mariy observance of a contemplated 
maxim with the enforcement of behaviour#" V/bile we do not
find this point explicitly set out m  Concept, it seem© nonetheless 
to lie behind Eyle’s query g jix^  to aot reasonAly X must first 
perpend the reason for so acting, how am 1 to mike a suitable 
application of the reason to the partloular situation v/hieh my 
action ,is to meet?’* In other words, the mere aoloiowlodgment of
a maxim does not guarantee its correct anplications maxims are to 
some degree general, so that sultable application in one situation 
may not be saitab3.e in another even though the masdm is appro pria t ely 
applied in each, The * legend* • leads to tho view that between 
aoîrnowledgnient of an app^ zopriate xule s.nd appropriate application 
of the rule there must, be an intelligent acts this act “has to 
imite in itself the allegediy incompatible properties of being 
kith to theoiy end kin to practioG, else it could not bo tho 
ax)plying of one in the other# Summarioing this aspect of
the regress in goricqpt,; ,%le writes#
A s o ld ie r does not become , a shrewd general merely 
by endorsing the s tra teg ic  p rinc ip les  o f ClauewitBg 
he must also bo compétent to: apply thorn. Knowing 
how to  apply maxiins cannot be reduced to , or 
derived from, the acceptance of those or any 
other maxime#(3^)
The/
' . • ■ ■
Thé two prong© of Ryle*s' regyee6v^ 3^?gim@Bt'' rosémblê the
two sorte of regress developed above a •. %1© * s ■ * appropriateness 
of nmxlm* phase oorresponds roughly with our ’.justlfl.oatlon':^  
regress*, and hls *oorreotness of m^im-'applloatlon* phase Is \ 
similar to our (proeedure--r0gre8B*o Two points of oomiection 
between Kant and Ryle are noteworthy# ICn the aiirat plaoe^ to 
stop the rogx^ss botli introduoe modes of "intelligence whoso 
exorcise is pmotloal,in the sense that neiidier Kant*e .ïïrteilskr^t 
(i#e* Mutterwitg) nor Ryle’s Uoaowing how* are reducible, to -, ■ •
theoretical modes of intelligence9 A; second point is that Kant* s.. 
schemata play a role similar to.that pla^d by Ryle’s ’schizophrenic 
brokers ’ which marry theozy and practice* A transcendental spham 
makes possible the application of a, ’ pure, concept of tho 
understanding’ to ’appearances*, thus serving as a ’go-between 
application process* which unites in itself both the intellectual 
(op# theory) and the sensible (op# practice) * U  / This sort of 
tiring is, as Ryle brilliantly shows, a natural progenitor of 
regress*  ^ - -
Ian Gallic raises the* interesting-question whether Ryle’s
 ^ '' !/ V'- ' 'regresses are logipai or oausai*^  Re aSks whether the position 
which they are designed to reduce to absurdity is (a) formulated 
in an analytic statement “to the effect that the intelligonoe of 
am/ . ■ ■
e n
any practical act consist© in or is reducible to the act’s 
depending on an Intelligent cognitive act", or (b) is expressed 
rather hi a synthetic proposition “that no practical act could as a 
matter of fact be intelligent .unless it resulted from an 
intelligent cognitive Gallie argues that since (a)
is “so obviously silly as to be scarcely worth refuting”, Rylo 
must therefore be concerned to show that (b) l.eads to absurdity#
But the rogress argument then loses its force p. for Gallic finds it 
“notê »# self*^0vident that ah infinite causal eyries of rational 
acts could not, logically, bo tho case*,Furthermore^ since 
we can understand the Intel leotvialiot legend* to be “maintailning 
that no 'practical act could be hitolligent in the souse *S* which 
applies to practical aots, without the prior occurrence of a 
cognitive act which was intelligent in a different and Biora 
fundamental sense ’R* it follows that the * legend* escapes
imputation of regress from the very beginning# (Gallic finds it 
“astonishing” that Rylo does not consider the possibility that 
( intelligent * has a different seme when applied to cognitive # 
as against practical, acts# It is, indeed, astonishing#) I am 
intrigued by Gallie*s suggestion that an infinite causal series 
of rational acts is logically unpamdoxico,!, though I do not 
understand wliy such a series is less viciously regressive tlian an 
* infinite/
’infinite logical series of rational acto’ (i.e. a series in 
which the acts are links in an infinite chain of reasons a la 
Leihnis and Wittgenstein) ♦
Let us apply Ryle’s rogress^azgument to Erice’o claim that 
"ihtelligent action depends upon the power of recognising the 
situations to which one’s skill or îmack or expertise is applicable. 
To set the regimess-maohlnery in motion v/e need only asks Isn’t 
recognition itself a more or less intelligent action? If one’s 
.power of recognising* is involved in its oxeroiseo similarly as one’s 
skill or Imaok or oxpertiso is involved in its application, then by 
Price’s diotuxa it would follow that (intelligent) reoognltion 
depends upon some further power of recognising situations to which 
the, first power can bo applied; the same might be said of this 
second«ordGr power, and the regross follows® Price avoids such a 
rœductio ad absurdurA by holding tlmt there is a basic sort of 
recognition (’primary recognition’)^ whose ’power’ is innate and 
is exorcised simply in experiencing recurrence, or in “the noticing 
of .wixit is present and the meDiory of what is On the
other hand, the idea tlmt perceptual recognition is a more or less 
Intelligeht action involving skill just as other such actions 1ms 
0. certain attraction#Koto# incidentally,that Price’s 
analysis of recognition in terms of immte intelligence resembles 
Kant’s/
n(4:
ICant’e réduction of ïïrtQilf3kraft to untGacîmbXe Muttomitâg
Ryle’s ’îmowing-how* ie, of course, distlngiwlBliod from both thoso
counters to the regress in point of its non-immtenoBO# Though
it io not wholly relevant to. the present discussion 1 must makeagainst
the following objection /> Price’s dictum® We do not apply skill to
but rather in situations® If we can be said to apply skill to 
anything (and vdiy not?) then this would be e.g. a problem that we 
try to solve by applying our skill, or a task in performance of 
v;hieh our skill is qua si ^instrument ally involved® (Though, of 
course, as I point out above in introducing ’ taok-'Oircumstanco 
complete* 9 a situation inoludoo a task or problem in ouch a way that 
the latter might be regarded as a feature of the foanor® )
(iii) I turn, finally, to consider Wittgonstein® o treatmont 
of this sort, of regress# The ideas of an infinite chain of 
justificatory reasons and of a peculiar act of ’meaning* or 
’understanding* which incapsulatoe an infinity of rulG-*applioa.tiono 
recur time and again in The Blue and Brown Books and Philosophica.1 
luveetigationsÊ Wittgenstein* s interlocutor seems, at times# to 
be literally obsessed by these ideas j; especially when he discussed 
the notion of ’following a inile’tr
The/
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% Q  ’oliain of reaaqas* 1© micoihotly stated .te :
Thé Blue and Brown, Booko® whore it is linked with remark© on
Î ' -' - ■ ’ - - ■ ■ ■ 'reasons vi8^*vi8 oauQes and on the notion of a “mont$,l aot*Rc$ tej.acnarr?'» ' ' '
capable of orossing a bridge before wo’ve got to ■
Wittgenstein’a argument against the idea of an infinite chain of 
reasons is simply that ’the chain of actual reasons has a begtenteg#* 
It is importait to tmderstand how the regress gets à gspip te the 
first place* Wittgenstein suggests that teaching tho meaning of 
“yellow” can be seen either a# %  drill ® o.® |whicl^ ;causes us to 
as so date a yellow image ^ yellow things with the word .’yellow? 
or as “supplying a reason for doing what one |doe^ ®*f He 
rejects the first âcoôimt oiii grouhde tWt ‘fthé rule which has been 
taught and is subsequently àppUéd Interests us only s6 far as it 
is involved in the application^ U so that “teaching as the hypotWtlcal 
history of our subséquent actions (Wderstahdteg* obéyteg# 
estimating a length# eto# ) drops out of Our oonsideratibns» ” (49)
The point here is that if following a rule were- causally connected 
with being taught the rule# then one could hover know that he is 
folloi^g it slnoo one’s referehoe to the rule would alvjays be a 
obnjeoturo or bypOthesis# In brief# if action"^justlfioation were 
merely cause-adductlon then no aotion could ever be ’ completely * 
justified since every ? justification® would be a causal hypothesis*' 
The/
ai.
The proposition that your aotion has suoh and suoh a cause, is. a hypothesis# The hç/pôthesis ie well*-» founded if one has had à number of oxperienoes which# roughly speaking# agree in showing that 
your action is the regular sequel of certain 
conations which we then call causes of the action®
J . In order to knov; the reason which you had for making 
a certain statement# for acting in a partioular way^ 
etc®, no number of agreeing experiences is necQosaxy,/-^^ 
and the statement of your reason is not a hypothesis#^' ^
Wittgenstein holds that there can be ’ complete * justification 
and rational (as opposed to oauml) explanation for the way one
follows a rule only if ’teaching a rule* is: viewed as supplying 
*a rule which is itself involved in the processes of understanding, 
obeying# etd# $ ’involved*# however# meaning that the o3<3)re88ion of
this rule forms part of these processes®”'*^ Wittgenstein repeats 
this definition of * involve* @
We shall say that the rule is involved in the
understanding# obeying# etc* # if# as I shouldlike to express it# thé symbol/p|s the rule .fdrmo part of the calculation.^ .
His usage of ’involve* is conneoted with a dj.stinotion between “a ; 
process in aooordanoe with a rule” and “a process involving a rulo"#
which gives rise to the pussle that some beimviour<^ instances (e.g®: /
writing “1# 4s 9# 16”) can be described as being in accordance with 
a immber of rule© (o#g* those oxpreesed in *add 2n=*l* and ’square n*)# 
where only one of these rules ia involved in it® ,X digress to make 
a few obeervations about this distinction*
Wi ttgens10 in/
Witt gone tôin ouggoete tliat the raXea of cheee ara ’invol’ved* 
in a game v/hen they are expraeeed in a table correlating types of 
of cb3ss«^ figareB with their legitimate mov3-*patterno, which a player 
followe quite literally by running his finger down it to the 
appropriate ohess«^ figuro then across it to a move-pattern and finally 
moving his piece in conformity with the ^ttern® This somewhat
curious vioT7 «.that “a rule, so far as it interests us, does not 
act at a distance” but io ’involved* in this way « reflects the 
methodological principles when puasled about ’mental activity* or 
about the ’objects* of this activity (e®g® wishes# images# thoughts# 
rules# # one should substitute for the activity its expression
(symbol)® Thus# for the activity of thinking# substitute the 
expression of thoughts; for imaging substitute *a process of looking 
at an object oi\oo painting# drawing or, modelling* ; for a rule#, 
substitute its tabular or graphical expression; and for ru3.e- 
governed ’mental act! vit loo* like calculating# substitute •
* the calculations being done on paper* along'with the rule-oxpreoBion 
as ’part of the calculation® * This seems only to bo a methodological 
principle in Wittgenstein (a ’rule of thumb*)# a procedure whereby 
to loosen ’mental crampe* that lead to (result from) “postulating 
the existence of a peculiar kind of mental act alongsido of our 
oxpreosiono It is not a piece of doctrine but rather# as I see
it#/
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it# a polemical dovioe, designod to rofute the view that mental . 
acts are essentially privateo But Wittgonetein* b teplioit 
suggestion that any jmle«governed behaviour can bo construed as 
aotion involvteg Its rule surely constitutes more than the mere 
* loosening of a mental cramp’# for it entails the doctrine that tho 
concept of nilè^ -governed behaviour (i.e. of ’following a rule’) is 
intelligible only where the opposition ? correct/incorrect ’ gets a 
grip# vi‘^0 in the context of practices* Pérhàps Wittgenstein’s 
distinct ioh bo tween a :eule involved in a perfommnce and the 
performance being in accordance with the rule is meant to emphasise 
the public checkability that goes with the notion of practice® The 
distinction might, incidentally# be compared with Kant’s opposition oi 
action from duty to action in conforrnity with duty? if M ’s action 
involves rule R (is done from duty B) then it is in accordance with 
R (in conf Gravity with D), whereas it does not follow from the fact 
that M ’s action is in accordance with R (in comCormity with B) that 
it involves E (that it is done from One %rther points my
usage of ’ involve’ and ’ involvement’ has nothing to do with 
Wittgenstein’ So
To return from this digression to the subject, of regress, I want 
to re-considGre the notion of rul e «interpra tat ion in the lighb of some 
passages/
paasagG© ih la-motleàtlonGa Tlio latérlooutor at om point
complains 3 ' - ' . - , -
t how oen a %%l0 ohow me wliat I hâve to do at thte
point? 'Wlmtevar ï dô la, oh some ihtorprotatipn, ' inaoôord with the rule.” (56)
Wittgonatoin seek© to disGolya the oonondrnm by pointing out “if
ovoiything can be mado to accord with tho rule,, thon it. can also
be made out to conflict with it» . And so -there oàn be neither, accord
nor conflict-here .The puasle results % o m  our teolination to
aoaooiato an aot of rule^-interprotaticn with ove3:y inetanoe of
mle «involvement I on the contrary ÿ Wittgenstein argue a# if there.
were not “a way of grasping a rule which ie not ah Interpretatlon,
but which ie exhibited in what ,we call ’obeying the rule* and ’going
against it ’ in actual cases^’f thèn not only .would the
paradoxical. oonaequQhCe. (i®e, ’neither,accord nor conflict’ ) follow^
but alao the concept of following and violating anfLee would be
. rendered polntlee©® givep this concept ^gint ie tlie opposition
’obrreot/lncôrrect’, and thio ie grounded in the connection of rule**
governed behaviour with. actlon«deep:^ption8 ^ and hence with uraotioeo#
it ie not based on the .idea of ;eula-^ int0r}p?otation*. A sign^post is. .;
’the expression 6f a rule’# and “a person goee by a eign^post only
in so far. ae there existe a regular use of eign-posts# a custom®
The view that rule-involvement entail© rule-lnterpretation
leadS'#/- _ . . .
leaclB# BS we have alzwxly seen# to regros©a It ie a form of 
Soepticleras the question of rule«interpretation arises only when. 
there is doubt as to how a rule is to be followed# and if every 
behaviour«instaacG describable as action in acoordance with 0. 
rule were accompanied by an act of interpreting tho rule thon 
resolution of doubt would be oosontial to the concept ’following 
a rule* » Wittgenstein deals with some ramifications of this view 
in these passages., of Iiiyeetigationq»;
(a) I said that the. application of a word io not ovoryiThore boimded by riilee® But what does a game look liko that 
is overywhore bounded by rules? whose rules never let 
a doubt creep in# but stop all the cracks where it might? 
can’t WO:-imagine a rule determining the application of a raie, and a doubt which it removes « and so on?
(b) A, rule stands there like a sign«post®, « Bogs tho sign* 
■post leave' no doubt open about the way I have to go?
(c) It may very easily look as if every doubt merely .revealed an Gxip.tiitg gap in th6\ foundations; so that secure . ,
understanding is only possible if ,we first doubt everything 
that can be doubted# and then remdve all those doubts*
, The eigii«post is in order « if# under normal circomstances* it fulfils its purpose®(60)
An example will be helpful* Think of à table consisting of two 
colunms each with n signs: let us call this an n^olement table ©
Various ways to read ouoh a table can be set out in n-element schemata 
here/
(in)s B ^O'l^ ^ 2 if.
'4 4
8 3 ^
^ " 4
here, are three typical 4'^ elonient schematas ■
(I)’ (3A A
S5 — >^5
% e  tahlC) let iiB say g exproosOD a xailo Kj, and its schemata aro 
interpretative rules one of which is involved in any action inisurMÉïâfi» '*'
accordance with R, (imagine 9 for Example g that the table lo a
railway time-stable9 then the question ’’How do you read this table?”
lo answered by “Read it in accordance T/ith (i&Oe interpret it in 
accordance with) schema (l)0”) At this point Wittgenstein would 
ask:
Oan/wG not imagine ' further rules to eznlain these?
Andy on the other. handy was that first : table in- 
oomplete ; wit hoitt'the,, schéma of arrows? And,are other 
tables incomplete without their schemata?
Tliat is9 even if (I)g (II) or (ill) were supplied with the table9
there might still be doubt ad to how to follow the schema; but this
doubt arises only if it is thought that the schema must itself be
interpreted in so far as it is followGde 'While such s^econd-order*’ ^  . • '» *!»^ jiÇT45A«rJsa*«r3(=i»esR,>i'5î*
doubts might indeed arise9 nonetheless if there, were no doubt'-freo 
instances of acting in accordance with R then the table v/ould no 
longer express R§ it plays a rule-expressive role only because there 
are actions in which it is follot7ed in one Tmy or another as a matt or 
of/
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of course g without doubts requiring interposition of oncyyrjT<  rsi#senrTeirrAîejdi#f?53i«'  ^ .
interpretative rule for tliair resolution* V/hat would it ho liko, 
though) to * first doubt everything that can be doubted* about tho 
4«element table, * and. then to remove all these doubts* so aa to
* secure understanding * ? Given the command “Correlate S ’* « once'■' • • ic
having determined (througli resolution of four doubts) that is' ' ' iv
to bo oorrelated with P . thon six doubts must be resolved in 
deteivaining whioh of six echomata are to be followed in carryibog 
out the order* Hence, to * follow R* in obeying the command 
initially involves twenty-four doubt-resolutioneo But a question 
may remain about the supposedly doubt**free schema finally 
determinods can this not be variously interpreted? %%is question 
is resolved by Introducing seconda,3y schemata in accordance v/ith 
which schemata such as (I), (ll) and (ill) can bo interpreted^
In fact, of course, oocondary ochemata must already have been 
introduced, for resolution of doubts about the interpretation of 
prinmry schemata entails consideration of alternative schemata-i. 
interpretations ; similarly, oaoh secondary schema must be. : . 
associated with tertiary schemata, and so on* Here is a selection 
of n-axy schemata and n f 1 - ary interpretative rules for a 
4 e^lement tables
•06«»
n-aiy sohanatan + 1- Bxy in- Int er pre tative mies
1-5 switch”
anInterpretation of an n-ary schéma in accordance with/n+1 -aiy rule 
results in the n+ 1 - axy schema as shown# Incidental ly, a double- 
barrelled regress arises in the case of a table with infinitely 
many correlatable items, since for this table an infinity of doubts 
must be resolved at the outset (i#e. at the primary level) as 
against just twenty-four for the 4-element table#
Wittgenstein is content, however, with a single-barrelled 
regress# He writes, in The Blue Book#
Now there is the idea that if an order is understood and obeyed there must be a reason for our obeying it as we do; and in fact, a chain of reasons reaching back to infinity#This is as if one said: "Wherever you are, you must have gotthere from somewhere else, and to that previous place from another place; and so on ad infinitum#” (If, on the other hand, you had said, "wherever you are, you could have got there from euiother place ten yards away; and to that other place from a third, ten yards further away, and so on infinitum” # if you had said this you would have stressed the infinite possibility of making a step. Thus the idea of an infinite chain of reasons arises out of a confusion similar to this# that a line of a certain/
certain length conoists of an infinité mrnlaer of parts hecauoG it is indefinitely indivisible ; i#e« because there is no end 
to the possibility of dividixig ite)
He goes on then to claim tliat once the idea of an inCinito chain 
of reasons is eliminated - that is^  once it is acknowledged ttet 
the chain comes to an end « then the idea of obeying an order 
(following a rule) blindly, htwing no reason for the way one 
obeys (follov;s) it, is no longer fovmd r^evolting*o Wliat does 
Wittgenstein mean by *a reason for doing what one does*? Ho 
suggests that "giving a reason for something one did 03: said means/ ^ «V \
showing a way wMoh leads to this action" ; ^ and again@ "giving
a reason is liko giving a calculation by which you have arrived at 
a certain result He distinguishos, however, between "toXlibig
the way which one has gone Mmself" and "describing a way which 
leads there and is in a-ccordance with certain, acceptod rules" (a 
* just if ica t ion 330 st hoc * This distinction seems to parallol
the distinction between action involving a rule and action in 
accordance with a rules to * tell tho way one has gone* is to give 
a rule involyed m  a-ction^  whereas in giving a * justification 
post hoc* one may state only a rule with which one’s action io in 
accordance. It is not clear which of these types of justificatory 
rule (reason) io embodied, in the ’chain of reo.sona reaching back to 
infinity*,/
iîofilnityVo Nor, for that matter, is it yet clear hov; the regress 
gets started in tho first placoo
To throw some light on tho latter problem wo must attend to 
a point mentioned earlier#
If.## yoa realise that the chain of actual roaoonG has a beginning, you will no longer bo revolted 
by the idea of a case in which'there is no reason 
for tho way you obey the order#
That is to say, once the idea of an infinite chain of reasons
io destroyed then the "general disease of thinking v/hich always
looks for (and finds) what would be called a mental state from
v/hieh all our acts spring as from a reservoir"is cured# One
symptom of this disease is the view that ’sorno justifying mental
act* stands behind ’the way you obey the order* in each instance
of your obedience (cp# * the way you follow the inxle* in each
instance cf your applying it). This mental act encapsulates an
Infinite chain of reasons, one for each execution of the order
(application of the rule) In a partioular way# This can bo
illustrated in terms of an argument in The Brown Book# • Wittgenstein
invites us to suppose that a pupil, in executing the order "Add 1",
begins doing what we should call ’adding 2* after passing 100
and begins adding 3 after 200, &o# Wittgenstein saysg
we/
9^1'
We might in ,suoh a case, say that .this person 
naturally under stands (interprets) the rule (and 
examples) wo havo given as we should understand 
the rule (and examples) tellix^ us g "Add 1 up to 
100, then 2 up to 200, oto."(^^)
Next the question is raised8 What ie it for eomoone to follow 
the order (rule) correotly? The interlocutor’s suggestion "the 
correct step at every point is that which is in accordmico with 
the rule as it is meant# intended" (so© by tho p03?rjon who issues 
tho order "Add 1") provokes Wittgenstein to ask "But how did you 
do all these acts of meaning (l suppose an infinite number of them) 
when you gave him the ruloT"(^^) Alternatively, how could all these 
acts of meaning follow from, or he embodied in, tho single "act of 
meaning which allegedly accom}xuiios giving the rule? The interloouto: 
is accused of «lystery^ mongorings
ToUr idea, really is that somehow in the mysterious act 
of meaning' the rule you made the transitions v/ithout really 
making, thorn, were
taki em. You crossed all the bridges before you rer  there*v7 /^
Again, Wittgenstein attacks the interlocutor?* s. suggestions
The expression "Tho rtilo meant him to follow up 
100 by 101" makes it appear that this rule, bb it was 
. \ meant, forGshadowetl all the, tranaltions wliich wéro to be, 
imdo aocordlngTbp it# But the assumption of a ohodov; of 
a transition, does not get us any further, bemuse it 
does not bridge the gulf between it and the. real transition* If the mere wprds of a rule could not antioipato a future treahoition,' no .mord could any mental act accompanying
these words
This mental act is correlated \7ith "an act of Inai^tt, Intuition, 
whidi makes us use the rule as we do at the particular point of 
the series"s'  ^ this is the act of understanding or interpreting 
or grasping the rule (order), the * justifying mental act* standing 
behind action in accordanoo with it# Wittgenstein makes tho 
point here, and also in Investi gâtions * that "it would bo less 
confusing to call it an act of decision"# on the other hand, 
"nothing like an act of deoision must take place, but possibly just 
an aot of writing or speaking#"^(Compare Ryle’s ’gOf^ between 
application-prooGss’ # ) In concluding his argument Ulttgonstei:a 
assertsg "We need liavo no reason to follow the rule as we do© Thei  #11- wag #»Ju«K'-'nrMusv«v<'MWW  ^ * r .« 3£;# «Rrmfa»
chain of reasons has an end# " (
If one denies the necessity of an infinite chain of reaoono 
then one must admit the possibility of a case v/ithout even a 
finite chain of reasons# for if the chain of reasons has an end 
thon one may have no reason for the way ho follows a rule 03? obeys
an order# But to have no reason is to follovr the rule as a matter
of course in on© way father than another?# Becsitso' it is a matter#:#^ »'nra* »vn< ?.r.*'E^ .'h'aÉgcaiaS^  r , t
of course to continue the, series *100, 101, 102,.##* rather tlmn 
*100, 102, 104, f, # *, the brdcn? (rule) "Add 1" may "seom to produoo
( 7 Wall its conséquences in advanceil* ’Doing something as a matter 
of course’ plays a pizominent role in Wittgenstein’s Phenomenological 
analysis/
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analysis of the concept ’following a ralo’§ it is, in a way,,
the bo.sis of v/imt he calls "this ctirious superstition# « « that
the mental act is capable of crossing a bridge before we’ve got 
(7b)to it^^P ' for we fall into this deliision in seeking to account 
for our ’matter of course* attitudes and activitioo but failing 
to see the bedrock of conventions and practices the "forms of 
lifo" - tlmt underlie them# ^ "One does not feel that he has 
always got to wait upon the nod (whisper) of the zulo#"' ' ' ^ To 
account for this phenomenon \p suppose thjit ’all the steps are 
really already "kaken* and assume that "the rule, once stamped with 
a particular meaning, traces the linos along which it is to bo 
folloY/ed through the whole .of space# In doing this, however,
wo are looking precisely in the wro^ direction, for it is in 
’agreement in foiM of life’ rather than in mental àdte 
incapBulating ’the unlimited application of a rule’ that the 
concept ’following a rule*. finds its Heimat#
low am I to obey a rule?" if this is not 
a question about causes, then it is about the justification for my following the rule in tho 
way I do#
If I have exhausted the justifications X have 
reached bedrock, and my spado is tiirnod# Then I 
am inclined to says "This is simply what I do# "(79)
The chain of a/easdnB has an ends it therefore need have no
beginning# Except in non-wormaX oases (i#e* oases whore there io
genuine doitbt) there is no question of justification, and hencel%Xfeamr^trt=Tm-y.K9evA ' V *
no/
no question of a ’justifying mental aot * 8 justif ioati ono 
are, :ln Wittgenstein’s sense, ’.post hoe’ in that they refer 
to ’certain accepted rules* and not to ’the way v/hieh one has 
gone himself® ©
(iv) In conclusion I want to raise the questions Is a 
justification'>rogross necessarily vicious? Ian Gallie, it v/ill 
he recalled, found nothing paradoxical about the notion of an 
’infrlnito causal series of rational acts* $ here I want to 
enquire into the regresBiM ad infinitum associated with an 
infinite logical serieog i*e. an infinite chain of reasons* G.IL 
Grant assumos that suoh o, sez^os of justificatory rules (or, 
perhaps p. procedural %uleo) is viciously regrasslvog "a âùIg does 
not require for ito application a further rule; to supposo that 
it did would be to generate a vj.cious iufhiite r e g r e s s * " ^ But
suppose that the infinite rule/z'oason-'Serieo ôo/"'E. #' 1 P n
where H, somehow’ requires * H,, , » for its applie^ ation, is analogous3. .L 4" r
to a convergent infinite Berios such as 1 -f 1  ^ 1 _1_ .i-*,
2tl 3#2%1 n!
Then we might say that the regreoB of rulos/ceasons is; not 
vicious, since action in acdordahoe v/ith the zule/reason-sorioc 
would quasi-insts/uraentally involve the Supar-^ rulo, H, on which 
the series ooavergos* It has been suggested by Eoschor^^^^ that 
Leibnia’s doctrihe of contingence depends on preoisely this 
analogy;/
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oaaXogîTv Bad, thoagh it may legitrbnateXy be ob^eotod that to 
make the notion of a convergent raXo*‘»serioo Intelligible for 
God io not to make it Intelllglblo for man, yet I thinlc tlmt 
hesoher^o interpretation of Leibnls is nonetheleoo interesting 
as a suggestion of how a justification^rogress might not 
constitute a reductio ad absurdum, For this reason® and for the'  Uk.:aaai!» <iu4'^xiit'vai>snj^-'uaxi7:n^7K9 \  ** • .
further reason tliat no discussion of the * chain of reasons ^ 
would be complete without mentioning heibnig, I want to sketch 
HeBcherts argument,, •
Ho starts from the premise that Leibniz distinguishes between 
the morel and the metaphysical perfection of God. The former io 
Gxprossed in the Principle of Porfeetion, that God, selects the 
best of all possible worlds or that'Hie adto (thé sphere of his 
activity being the world) are the best possible. God’s 
inetajpliysioal perfection, His possession of the maximum amount of 
essence, follows from God’s necessary existence which is proved,
He sober argues, not by the Anseimio«Oartesian Ontological 
Argument (which promisogs  ^God* s perfection) but by (v/hat Eescher 
calls) the ’liodal Argument*,. God’s moral perfection io
contingent (since His choice.of ’the best pf all possibles’ is 
not necessitated) while His motapîysiçal perfection is neoessarty 
(beihg/ . .
(beluga consGQuoncQ of His neoessajy. existence)But God’s 
moral perfection must thon have a (sufficient reason, and this 
in turn another, and' so on (;o infinity g the truth of the 
proposition asserting God’s moral perfection is established by 
an infinite analysis of the notion of God, for this notion 
comprises an infinite series of reasons for H:îb moral perfection
. . f -similarly as the notion of Caesar comprises an infinite
series of réasons for his crossing the Rubicon rather than stopping
at it9 Hext Resoher claims that this series of suffiolent
reasons converges on God’s metaphysical perfection; his support
for this a,ll-4mpo:cto.nt step is that "the (infinite) analysis of
the contingent ig^t ultimatoly lead to the necepsa^y, ioOa to God
(85)metaphysically perfect*^' ' ^ Thus, God’s action in aooordanoo 
with the Principle of Perfection is ipso facto warranted by an 
infinite series of sufficient reasons g but since this series 
converges on Hie metaphysical perfection, it follows that His acts 
in accordance with the Principle are logically intelligible while 
not logically neoGssitatodp In this vmy, incidentally, Resohor 
claims that BeibniR can maintain, without contradiction, both the 
contingence of God’s goodness and the necessity of His oxistencQ© 
Hescher attaches considerable importance to the place of cpnvorgonoe 
in Leibxi.ia’s philosophyj  saying that BeibniK "had mastered
a/
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a lesson which philo soply was slow to learn - that infinite 
processes are not ipso facto vicious « since convergence is 
possible." ^^ 4)' It is not alto gather dear to me, however, 
precisely how the convergence of this infinite olmln of reasons 
is analogous to imtheniatieal convergence, - unless it be that each
reason is correlated with an amount of perfection bo that the
.       , *
’sum* of reasons converges on the maximum amount of perfection as 
found in God’s luetapiysical perfoctioha Hor àm I clear how to 
understand this analogy in terms of acte other than those of Ood.(G^ &)
IV.
The concept of application is associa ted with a mode of 
involvement that cute across instrumental and qiiaBi-^ inptrumentaX 
involvements This mode wo call ’applicative involvemont’, and 
we talk of items as ’ applicatively involved * in actions and 
act! vi ties* In addition to an element of ins t r imental it y, or 
qimsi-instrimientality, this mode of involvement embodies also 
an element of ’referantiality% Both aspects are evident in the 
grammar of the verb ’to apply..© to^ o.."o To give some idea of thé 
scope of applicative involvement and hence of the concept, of 
application « I append a tripartite list of sentences exemplifying8 
(l) application of words, expressions, predicates,to objects, 
persons, events, actions, &c® ; (IX) application of concepts, 
criteria, standards and legal rules to objects, persons, actions, 
cases, &o, ; and (ill) application of theoretical, mathematical and 
logical systems, and their components (i.Oq hypo the seo, laws, rules, 
&o# ) to objects, events g phenomena, calculations, &o.
( l )  (cl) The peouliarity of dispositional predicates is that they 
seem to bo applied to things in virtue of possible rather 
than actual occurrences ■«*»
(b) Aiid the only relation of a term to a thing is that of applicable or not applicable#
(o) Such is even the word whiteness, in. respect of the 
diff©rent shades of whiteness to which it is applied 
:in common;
(d) The word ’table’ © © © denotes the objects to .which it is applicable*..
(XI)/
(il) (a) V/e muBt bo able to show how pure conoopto ^  the 
understp.nding, can be applied to appeara,noofj©
(b) Like verdicts, both,moral and non-moral appraisalo 
usually consist in the application of accepted 
rules, principles, and criteria to a particular 
. 'oase.' ' -
(o) Finally, and generally, a particular evaluation is 
the application to a particular case of a standard 
of proferenco. '
(d) If he [sc® à policéïimn] did apply thè no* parking 
rule to the motorist, M  v/ould be applying it whore
does not a,pply,' because ' this is one of the 
recognised exceptions which are part of the rule.
(e) The latter [so® * law-applying organs Q by their acta ' 
croate indivildual norms, thereby applying the gonoral 
norms to concrete cases®
(ill) (a) The lowest-level hypo the Bio Ilia, is tested by 
dpply:Uig it to a. particular case*
(b) Classical physics ,is so general that no conceivable . plwsical event falls outside the domain of its 
applicabilz ty ®
(c) Every logical formula, being an unequivocal statement - 
about situations of a specifiod sort, already ’applies 
to the facts’ in the sense that it truly.desoribeo the 
facts. If we are to use the formula in thought and 
discourse, however, we must ’apply’ it in a further 
sense,
(d) In our century advances that had boon made, not only . 
in pure niatlekatids, but also in the applying of 
mathomatico to what happens, could not but strike many ' as,, 9
(g) a more reasonable courso would be to regard geometry 
itself as an abstract calculus, àpplicablo (more or leso 
roughly) to the physical world but not descriptive of its 
properties,
(f)/
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(f) For rUieta-BOGp a mathematical examiner oritieises the performanoG of a oand/idate by applying certain 
mathematical ixd-nciples to the work before him; when ha himself is engaged in calculation, ho writes down mmibers in accordance with those same 
principles®
For cased exemplified in groups (l) and (Xï)§ and for some 
exemplified in group (ill), it is not difficult to specify 
activities in which items are applicatively involved® Terms, 
predicates, words, &o, are thus involved in what may ho called 
’verbal performances’, @,g* referring (to), naming, describing, 
characterising, evaluating, sig;iifying« Activities in which 
concepts, standards, criteria., and legal rules are applicatively 
involved may be compendiously classified as ’judgments*, q.^ g® 
evaluating, appraising, assessing, deciding (a case), and judging 
(in an opistemological sense typified ju Kant)# Such activities 
as explaining and predicting (phenomena, events, &09) applicatively 
involve physical theories § la.ws, hypotheses, &c,, Some pMloBopliero 
would claim that physical theories are applicatively involved in 
describing, and not just (if at a^), in explaining and predicting® 
Philosophers have also claimed that abstract qyotems and their 
components are thus involved in describing (’facts’ or ’the wo5?ld’), 
though others would be content to say that, logic and mathematics 
are applicatively involved only in what we may call .’reasoning about
the worlôi (including such aotiviticQ as counting and measuring) 
and in assessing déductions and calculations for •logical and 
mathematical oorreotnesso
|%l] Before oomiaenting in detail on types of applicative 
involvement as, exemplified in these sentences, however, 1 want 
first to connect the applicative mode of involvement with the 
instrumental and quasi-instrumental, and to develop schematioàlly 
some features of a ’basic applicative formula* &'■ ■ ’ . . . -
Here is a goneml characterisation of a ’basic applicative 
formula’j, or ’baf% in terms of and ^ -buts*
Certain performances doeoribablo by one or another 
■ of the.bufss ^
’using 3c to S y’V ’using x rn c:uig % ’
’ Sing y in accordance with %’ '^  • ? . «sa» K ^  X ’’in acting in accordance with,Xj) oing v 
. otc^ o ' ^are instances of the S-spplicatipn of x to y, and are doscribab] by the bafs ’ §-applying % to
An interesting question is why only certain bufs that exemplify on© 
of these buf-forms can intelligibly be replaced by a cor re sp onding 
baf#/
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bafa For instance, mb do not talk of. ’applying a boo to a
garden’, ’appl#:b:?g a pan.; to a letter*, ’applying a score to ci
guitar’, even though the hufos
using a hoe to dig a garden
using a pen to write a letterplaying a guitar in accordance with a score,
exemplify one of those forms® Another question concerns what
wo are to say about such sentences as
They might become recallable if psyc-hosiimlytiGaX methods were applied to him,
whioh contain ’apply* but which do not fit one of the three
groups of sentences listed above# An answer to both questions
lies, I thinîc, in the fact that none of thaqe cases exemplifieo the
’referential’ aspect of applicative involvement® That io, neither
hoes nor pons nor scores nor methods can be said to have referenco
to that to which they are ’ applied’ in the sense in which this
can be said of words, concepts* standards, legal rules* theories*
&o# This point will* X hope* be clarified in the course of the
discussions whioh follow# .
With, respect to S^application of x tqjg;, we refer to g 
as ’ 6p*applicant (to y)’ @ and to ^  as ’§-applicato (of x)’o 
BafS; like bufs, can bo ci rcumstantially specif led g that is* wo 
apeak of 8-duplication of % to y under conditions o* or of 
8 ^applying % to y^ imder.a# It will bo recalled that wo distinguish
Ï
particular/ .
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partioular oonditiono from condition*^  types § this distinction 
is made more precise by distinguishing occasion- from typo-factoro® 
0?ho former are exemplified in the baf ’ $ -applying x to y; at 
(j3*j5)*5whGre ’CSft)’ stands for spatio-temporal co-ordinates of an 
occasion on which x is (being) S ^ applied to y;; the latter is 
expressed in ’ 8 -applying % to y under oj * where ’jg* stands for a 
condition-typo under which x is (being) 8-applied to Occasions 
might be regarded as instances of condition-types* whereby the 
baf ’ S -applying % to g under jq’ would mean ’ 8-S'ppl.ying x to,% 
at (p,*^  à (j3*t) is an instance of condition-typo jc’® IVhether 
or not this analysis is feasible* we henceforth mention only bafo 
specified with respect to condition-type® The question arises 
how these bafo are to be symbolised® In v:lew of the relation of 
baf8 to burs* it might be suggested that ’ 8 -applying x to ^ under 
o* 3lmia bo oymboHsoa eitiier by '(%w(%)/«)' or by «((8y)''%/o)', 
depending on whether % is an instrument or a quasi^ u^notiniment® 
Rather than do this* however* we adopt ne\T symbolism to represent 
baf 08
*(xSy/o)’ stands for the baf ’ 8 -applying % to y under o’
A good reason for preferring to adopt new symbolism rather 
than to adapt the old is that correlativo formulae for bafs differ 
in/
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in sense from the R- and P-foraiulae defined earlier for hufs©
These formulae* it will he recalled, are intended to exprooo 
correlo,tion of an instrumont-mothod complex with a task- 
circumstance complex® But in defining similar formulae for 
a.pplicativQ involvement we ,a:ce interested rather in correlating 
applicant with applicate or* more prooisely, in matching applicant 
and tcLBk-applicate-oiroumstanco oomplox® Wo oymboliso the 
sentence *2c is 8 -applioahlo to y under c’ by the P-forraula 
’P r% 8y/ol ’ 6 and .the sentence ’x S-^ applieo to y under c’ byI tla» ifsj «ca# I y- ^  *.i4 trtt» ^  ^
the R-formula. ’Illx Sy/el * s the former expresses S-aypplicabilitv’ 
of X io y under d, while, the latter expresses 8-^ validity of x for 
y under o® One striking difference between these correlative 
formulae and the, others is that there deems to be no difference at 
all betvreen assorting the applicability of sc to y end aff Irming. ■' ' ' ,  ^ ,fW •?. V j  fcisar' '
that SE applies to y© If predicate-P applieo to s: iiien* we wanttLî> - _*r *- fcva ^
to say* P is applicable to %; conversely* if P is Applicable, to 
X then P applies to %*. Similarly for lawss to, oay that 1 applies
to a case s just is to say that L can bo applied to to affirmf.jS»K¥«Ss.V‘.?#a ^  4* «L. .
the validity of a law is to ilmply the legitimacy of its. application, 
and convereoly* a law can be applied to a, case only if it may be .
•iv.' ■ ■said to apply to it® While lingi|'iBtio usage does not* apparently*
warrant a sharp distinction between the senses of P- and R-foiraitlae 
for/
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for applioative involvement* nonetheloso it is useful to keep
open the possibility of such a diotinotion* in case a situation
presents itself in whioh applicability and validity are 
plausibly distinguished®
Several types of range are associated with 8-applicability
S-validity® (i) Unspecified ranges are defined as followss
X 8 s/y ) ’ (range of ^ -applicability of 
** (range of 8-validity of %)
That is« ’P(x§8)* stands for the sot of all w’s to which x isV y f «tac* wwt
S‘»applicablo under some conditions and ’R(x,8)* stands for the 
set of all s’s to whioh x 8-applies under some conditions'tV;tfa# * eça —  .0
(ii) There are two sorts of specified ranges (a), that for which 
some particular condition-type is specified g
■ X"
* (c-range of S-a/Pplica.billty of x) 
’ ( e-rango of 8-vàlidity. of x) ;
*p(x,8)( for (d'v) ( F SJpSi® tWis/
*r(x *S)’ for '1 ]"3 'y) ( s I
s)* for * â 'picSa/è"
’H(SrS, for ■I h #m/&
and (b), tlmt for which any condition-type is specifiables
*p(x*8,t): for ’Ê>r«» y  <«WÎ>'
*R(%,&pt)* for *BT fc»is»^  »rt«i •^ ù^ / CwOêxjtg$ MiLxf m m W  *?iw»
’ (t»rangp of S-£ipplicability of %) 
* (t-range of &  validity of %) ©
T-ranges might also be introduced non-speoifically* since the 
set of all b’o to whioh % is 8-applicable under tautolggous 
conditions is identical vdth the set of all w*s to whioh x io 
S-applicable uiides? all^  eondiijionsj and similarly for jk^ rcanges 
of/
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of v£v3.id:ltyp That ici*
- i  [(-y) (p
[(W (a= s
S.Sl/'Y.
X  S  w / y
It may seem odd that* having set up this symholio imohinezy*
I make no use of it .in the discussions which follow© My aim in 
schematically characterising the baf * 8-applying x to y under 
is not, however0 to design a symbolic devico for use in 
examining concrete cases of applicative involvemonts it io 
rather to suggest some features common to these cases, and to 
construct a ’picture’ of this mode of involvement®. This ’picture’ 
should bring into sharp focus the referential aspect of 
applicative involvement* and if the symbol ism does this then it 
will have served its purpose^
[2] Activities in whioh verbal expressions are applicatively 
Involved ban conveniently be distinguished into (A) reference and 
(B) predication» Wîmt I hsve in mind is illustrated by Strawson’s 
list of "phrases*.# used to express jthe] distinction between two 1 
complementary activities or functions involved in the complex 
activity of asserting# « @ a singular proposition of a fundamental 
sort#"
,.107'
A
referring to something 
naming some thing 
indiGating something 
deoigimting something mentioning bomething
an.clttnu«
B
describing it 
charac be rising it 
ascribing something to it 
predicating something of it 
saying something about it
The conjunction of any A-oxpression with any D-expreselon "might
servo as a description of the complex activity of making a
certain sort of statement, a description which distinguishes two
(86)moments* or éléments* or functions in that activity©"^  ^ In 
terms of applicative involvement* .we distinguish between the 
A-uotivltys ’rf-applying x to where stands for a
referring expreession and ’y’ stands for that to which x is
r?»«appli©d; and the B-activltyg ’pr-àpplying x to * where 
stands for a pïredioative expression, and ’y’ stands for that to 
whioh % is pr«applied. For instance* the assertion "Socrates is 
a philosophai'" consists of the pr-application of "(is) a 
philosopher" to the man. to whom "Socrates" is.(being) rf-applied*' 
and the assertion "Peter plays polo" is made up of the
pivappllcation of "plays polo" to someone to whom "Peter" is (being)
rfrapplied# I shall speak of pr-application both of single . 
pnredicatiyo and, classifioatory, expressions such a.b "red" and 
"cow", as well ELS of verb phrases such as "(is) red" and "(is) 
a cow"# lo/ber I distinguish application of eva3.uative expressions 
,from/
'«‘10
from that of non-evaluative expressions* hut for the present 
this distinction is not important®
Ï want to begin my examination of rf- and pr-application 
by assorabling some lexicographical reminders concerning usage of 
the verb ’apply’ in this context © Then I give some instances 
of its employment by various logicians* and finally I address 
myself to the question vhether, and to what extent* an instrumen’ 
’ picturo ’ is apjm^ opriate for rf- and pr-application©
A. An early usage of ’apply’ iss ’give (to a general * 
theoretical* or figurative statement) a specific reference 1;o 
a particular instance g use it as relative or suitable to ’ ©
Among examples given in the 0E13 ares "Whioh dialogue I woldo 
applye unto this noble prynoes®©©" (1509) and "To apply all 
this to the Boeotian writers, © ® " (1749)§ a modern emmple ios 
"As applied to the future, the supposition may be taken to 
state,,," (1955)f This* however* is not the usage of which if-
and pr“application are instances* though it is undoubted3,y
conneoted with the century usage in which wo aro
interosteds ’to make use of (a word) in a special reference to*
or/
or to describe or oliaracterioe (a thing)’© Bosio oscemplifioations
of this usage are3 "Regardant©©® is*** only applied.to a
villa.in®" (1628) ^ "He that applied the wo 3/do© # # to ileao different
to those to which the common use applies them**©" (lügo)* "Tho
wored fell^  is applied to rocky heights* peaks * and cliff a©" (1077)'
(For modem exemplifications * see sentences in list (I) above® )
Another important usage of ’apply’ as a semantic expression
is its :lntransitive usage* whioh the OBÏ) cites as first
thappearing in the XVIII—  oenturyg ’to have practical bearing 
upon* a valid or suitable reference to’* Only the second part 
of this definition is pertinent here® It is nowadays an 
éxtromoly common usage* as typified in thoso sontencoos.
(a) Those names (or descriptions) which don’t apply to anything are all names of the same thing*##®
(b) A hnique description is prosumably one which applies 
only to à single entity*##
(o) To say that an expression applies to certain
occasions is just to say that it has a descriptive 
meaning; ( 8? ) >, '
Fiimlly* there is the adjective ’applicable’ * which the OPR)
misleadingly defines by '%bapable of being applied; having
reference’ * It seems to me that ’capable’ is not right here*
sfor it fails to convey the idea of propriety or suitability 
or ap propria tone s s of application that is normally implicit in 
’applioablo’# If ’capable of being applied’ is understood 
as /
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as equivalent in force to ’legitimately applied’ or ’^correctly 
applied’ * thou X have no qu.ar3?el with the OEB® As to the second 
half of this definition* it is evident that ’x io applicable to yj 
has the same sense as ’% applies to jJ * if the so are undor stood 
to he equivalent to ’x has (suitable) reference to j K  As v;g 
sliall see later* this ambiguity between transitivo and intransitive 
usages of ’apply’ leads to some interesting logical problems#
(The pqeqibility of confusing ’% applies to and’x can be applied 
to appears to be a mark of the concept of application#,)
Bo . . Locke malces interesting use of ’app3.y’ in Book III of the 
Essay* He there adopts an extreme, version of the view that meanings 
are ideas or concepts*- and* indeed* seems to hold tlmt in using 
words (yooes) meaningfully one applies them to, his ideas© My spec oh 
is understood* according to Locke * "when $ by use or consent* the 
sound I make by the organs of speech excites in another man’s mind 
the idea I apply it to in mine when I speak it#"^^^) To the 
question "To what it is that names* in the use of language* are 
immediately applied, " ( )  Locke 3?oplless they aro immodlatoly
Iapplied to the speaker’s ideas*
Ttot/
ail.
That then whioh words are the marks of are the ideas of 
the speakers nor can anyone apply them as marks* immodiatoly, to anything else hut the ideas that he himself hathg
On3.y i:? tbs speaker as it were attaches his utterance to the asmiG
ideas as those excited in the mind of a hearer * is ’the end of
speech® oo that these sounds* as marks* may make known his ideas to
the hearer’ attained. In their role as ’immediately the sign of
men’s ideas’ words serve as "the instrument's whereby men communicate
their conceptions,In the light of this* we hagai'd the
following guess as to why Locke talks of applying words* or sounds,
to ideas § similarly as we might view ’ rf-applying x to ao
equivalent to ’using x to refer to y’ * so we might take ’using %
to signify y’ (brs ’using X as a sign of %’ ) to be equivalent to
’sg«applying x to y’, where ’y’stands for an idea which the word x
is ’made to stand fo3^  or signify’* But ’to signify’ is not at all
the same verb as Jto refer (to)’, and ’sg-application’: is not at all
like ’rf.-application’ g it is appa?7ont that Locke fails to
distinguish between them; only with Mill’s (revival of a)
denotation/ooimotation disthiction is the importance of this point
(again) graspod* ,
Both.Mill and Be, Morgan exploit ’apply’ as a semantic 
expression® . The former v;reites* for oxample*, "all names whioh can 
be said to have any signification* by applying whioh to an 
individual/
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individual we give any information respeoting that individual *
may he. said to imply an attribute of some sorti" Since Mill
is willing to say that we predicate proper names of their
bearers* he can be said to equate ’a,pplying % to_%’ with
’predicating x of @ Thus* the expressions "SophroniBOUs"*
"the father of Socrates"* "a man", "a Greek",, aro applicable
to Sophronirjcus* though the first, is applied to M m  "merely to
distinguish him from other persons vho are spoken of" whereas the
others are applied to him "to indicate a fact relating to hinu"..^ "^ )^
Despite Mill’s distinction between connotative and non-connotative '
teiTiis.rt he fails to distinguish between the modi apulicandi of terms g
in asserting "Sbphroniscus is a Greek" * one does not predicate
"Soplironiscuo" of the individual of whom ho predicates "a Greek" ;
rathes?, one rf^applies "Bophronisous" to someone to whom h©
pr-applioB "(io) a Greek'!* Hor does. Do Morgan draw such a
distinction when he nmkes ’applicable’ the basic semantic oxpresaion
of his ’onymatic system*® lïo states that "the only relation of a
term to a thing is that of applicable or not applicable" and that
"the relations botwe'oa temis* the only ones admissible because theyÎ
are toims®,® are those of applicable to some the same object and 
not applicable to any the same object®" In Do Morgan’s
onymatic system, terms and their complements are conjoined by ’have 
jorUrk/
*113"
joint application’ and Uiavo no joint application’ into "purely 
onymatic onunoiationo" euoh as ’X and Y have no joint application’ 
(i.e. Evoiy X is Y) and ’X and Y have joint application’ (i«G,
Some Y’b are not X’o).
The suggestion is made, in an article written for Baldv/in’a 
Diotionaiy by Peirce and (in part) l\!ro 33add-Fraul:lin, that 
’application’ and ’ signification’ be iioed in place of Mill ’o
(95)’denotation’ and ’ connotation’ # An interesting ground for
this suggestion is tîiat "these words may be a.pplied to the 
corresponding properties of propositions as well as terms." Tims, 
the application of a tezm is "the collection of objects which it 
refers to" and its signification is "all the qualities which aro 
indicated by it", while the application of a proposition is "all 
the instances of its holding good" and its signification is 
"all its different Mplications". Later, hov/everj* the ’complete
I '
application (or range) * of a proposition is defined as "all those
descriptions of. circumstances under which it holds good - tMt is
/to say, all its suJ?fioient antecedents. " It io important to note 
the difference between these two definitions of the ’application* 
of a proposition. Take, for example, the proposition that John is 
a son of Henry § on the first definition, its ’application* consists 
of sets of individuàl-pairs (x,y) ouch that "Jolm" is rf-applicable 
to/
—Xl/j***
to "Hemy" is rf^applioablo to y, and x stands in tho relation 
is a son of®,*" to yi on tho soopncl definition, houevor, 
its ’application’ consists of dosoriptiono of ooncUtions imdor 
which it can truly ho assorted tlmt John is a son of Henry# In 
other words, if* for individual-pa,ir "John" is rf-applicable
to % and "Heiny" is rf-applicable to g;; and if for some w to which 
"Bill" is rf-applicable* % stands in the relation "«.♦ io a
b:fX)ther of**®" to m  and u stands in the isolation "*«• is a son of •*•'. . . .  ■?
to y; then X stands in tho relation "*** is a son of,* *" to y; 
and (x,y) falls withiiz the ’applioation’ (in tho first sense) of 
the proposition that John is a son of Henzy* (instead of saying 
*x stands in the relation to y’ we could also have said
is pr-applicable to o:c ’"^1***" is pr-applicable to y*.)
Frege writes, in ’On Sense and Reference’ 8
A proper name (word, sign, Bign-coîAbinàtion,oxprespion) .expresses its sense, stands for or designates its
express its sense
Frege’s uoo of ’express’ and ’designate’ in tho first sentence 
exemplifies an ’intransitive’ usage of semantic expression#; his 
use of these words in the second sontonoe exemplifies a ’transitive’ 
usagp* Many semantic e^ cprescions have both transitive and 
intransitive usages, as this list indicates#
Transitive
r rez or: to xnamo %
"A" is used to< dooignate. x , I denote %
Intransitive
fexers to xnames x 
"A" K designates %
denotes x
"B" is used to'^
f chamctexUsG x 
doscribe x
signify y express ÿ ■ 
connote y
r oliaraoterlGGS %
dGseuibes %
srjpj K signifies % 
oxpressGs g  ^connotes %
It might be argued that intransitive usages of semantic expressions 
collapse into transitive, since it could not be said of an 
expression "A" that it So x unless "A" is (correctly) iiood to S x. 
It may further be suggested that logicians have traditionally 
followed intransitive usages merely on grounds of eimplicity, 
and that they would, if .pressed* assent to substitution of ’ "A" 
is (can be) used to 8 x’ for their intransitive locution *"A" 5o. 
%’# Some contemporary logicians, for example Strawson, might 
readily endorse this suggestion* aolmowledging that their 
intransitive locutions aro ellipses for transitive, I do not 
venture to guess Tiiether other logicians would accept such a 
proposal 5 though later I mention grounds on v/hich the non- 
oollapsibility of intransitive into transitive locutions might 
be defended*
—While there is little danger of coafuslnjjy transitive mid 
intransitive usages of the a.bovo'-liotod semantic expressions, it 
is otherwise for the oompondiouo expressions ’apply’ and ’predicate’* 
The reason for this is, as I see it* that an expression of 
InstrumontaXity, whioh is oharaoteristic of transitive semontie 
locutions (e*g. ’ "A" io (correctly) used to Sx’, ’x is (correctly)
Sod by (means of) "A"*), is oxtornal to the abovo-listed verbs *e/ \  f 0  w  L* I u jin 11 III N y
whereas it is© as it were® built into ’apply’ and ’predicate’© In 
consequence, a transitive /intransitive dist:lnctlon is not mirrored 
in the gramriiar of these verbs* and the two usages aro apt to be 
confused# ’"A" is predicablo of x ’ (i.e. ’"A" is correctly 
pz^ edicated of x’ or ’"A" can be predicated of x’) and ’"A" is a 
predicate of x ’ are* like ’"A" is applicable to x* and ’"A" applies 
to %’ * apparently equivalents for it seems that if "A" can be 
predicated of x then "A" is a predicate of x© and vice voroa* (Thisr ii'i «ft36e**^ .-*re»nrA^  >
is like saying ’This is red’ and ’This oai be described as "red"’ are 
equiva'lent# ) It Mil perhaps be, objected that to call an instance of 
this ambigiiity a ’confusion’ is to make a mountain out of a mole hill# 
To the extent that transitive and intransitive locutions are 
intorcMngeablo, and in so far as tho latter collapse into the 
former,, this objection must bo granted# It may, on tho other hand, 
bo of some interest to examine a couple of instanoes of the ’ confusion’ 
and/
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and to enquiro into the plausibility of maintaining a sharp 
tranoitive/teJsranoitiv© distinct ion©
A good example occuro in C.I. .Lewie’s définitions, :Lai terms 
of ’apply’* of ’denotation’ and ’term’© Lewie farst defines 
the ’denotation’ of a term as "the olo,ss of all actual things to 
whioh the term applies", but he later calls it "the class of all 
actual or existent things v/hioh the tom correotly a/cplios to ore 
names» % am pu^gled by the word ’corroctly’ in this
definitions it seems to me that a tezia may bo corroctly or 
Inoorcrootly applied to somothing* but that _it does not itself 
correctly or iaoorreotly apply to anything;© Just as I find 
’corrGot3.y’ pusBling in this context, so the word ’capable’ 
perplexes mo as it occurs in Lewis’s definition of ’term’ as 
"an expression oapg^le of npplyin^  ^to a, thing or things of some 
k i n d , I t  will be recalled that the ÛE.0 defines ’ applicable• 
by ’capable of being; applied’, and that, as I suggest above,
’ capable’ is misleading Wre unless understood to have the force 
’correctly’# But ’capable’ in the Intransitive locution employed by 
Lewis, ’capable of applying to.#®’, seems entirely out of place, 
though perhaps in a secondary sense ’capable’ can be used in 
similar contexts# If, for example, we talk of tho ’jobs’ or 
’functions’/
—XJLBii» ,
’fimoüiono’ of Qxpz’osalons, then to closoz'ibe "A" no ’oapablo of
applying to’ (ors . ** of naming * *©# of referring to, # # © of
deoc^ -'ibirg* #.o of oxprossing, &o#) suoh-and<^ eizch* is to mention
one of the ’ jobs’ which "A" can (be used to) do - somewhat as
deeoribing a type of steam hammer as ’ capable of driving pilings
into olayV amounts to epeoifying a ’job’ whiah it can (be used to)
( *i 00 )do©^ *"  ^ Bat this secondary sense mitst itself bo explicated in
terme of a transitive locution, and when a logician says ’capable 
of applying to’ or ’can app3.y to’, ho must surely be understood 
to mean ’capable.of being ap-plied to’, and hence ’applicable to’, I 1   1.1 0  I I Ifw mriw» , ic ■
or ’correctly ap%)lied to’ 'ore ’would be correctly applied to’»(I80a)
.5 . VIt is interesting to observe that Lewis employs •=* ostensibly as 
synonynous semant io expressions ■!? the follovàng variations on 
’ajjpiy’s ’ie applicable to’, ’would be oorroctly applicable to’ 
(eiol), 1 would oorreotly apply to’, ’is capable of applying to’, 
’correctly applies to’* and simply ’applies to’,
Ciiiinton* in a a/eoent essay* introduces ’re^ a^pplicability’ 
to explain tho funotion of general terms# His uoo of ’apply’, 
however, exemplifiea tho same confusions that we find in Lewis; ' . 
it also hints at a defence against the view tlmt intransitive are 
collapsible into transitive semantic locutions. (Quinton begins 
by stating that a ’ predico/bively used general term’ has "a class 
as/
as its extension, the range of its gorget application" g a 
few lines later, though, he assorts tlmt hmai’ and ’featherless 
biped’ are terms whioh "apply to just the same things®"
This suggests that a general term ’applies to’ items which fall 
within its. ’ range of opr3?eot application’8 but the range of 
cor root application of "A" must ouieely be the olass of objects 
to which "A" is correctly applied, or to whioh "A" , can be aunlied# 
In the folloY/ing passage Quinton introduces ’re^applicability’ #
A general word io one that applios to a iviultiplioity 
of things .Sind the special * problematic feature of 
general words is their re-applioâbilitÿ# ' This means 
that if someone is shovm a few instances of the 
application of such a %7ord, ho can go on, without • 
hesitation and In agreement with .the preaotioe of othors, to identify other instance^# \10/t)
He re'ournsp two pages later, to elucidate this notions
■ • ' • What creates the problem is simply re-applioàbility, .
tho fact that predicative terms can apply to an 
Indefinitely large number of individual things* (lot, 
of 0ÔUT80, that they always or nooossarlly do*) How is 
. it that WQ can attach meaning to and mako use of v/ordo 
which apply to things wo lia va never enooimterod before? 
Wg ordinarily do, not*, and indeed very seldom can, leami hov7 to use them by being introduced to the Y/holo range 
of their application. Even if vie liave in fact met the 
whole range of application, our Imowledge that we have 
done 00 is likely to be pretty inaebure. \ )
lotG that Quinton' hare refers to ’range of application’ and not, 
as beforeto ’range of correct application’e this is botter, for 
’range of application of "A"’ means simply the class of things 
to/
to whloh "A" annlloB* Mote,too* IrXs pliraeo "*.o terme canKA%K^#!aRWBS*M#«m30 <» iT -U frîï*.i#.T23
apply to,oi>o”§ It io not cl oar to mo jnot how thia  ^oan* 
conneoto with the modal foroe of r^O'»appllcable*, imIgsb Quinton 
Y/antfj to fjay ***, terms can he applied tOoo,** On the othor 
liand, if I understand hie argument rightly, Clinton would not 
agree to substitution of his intransitive usage of * apply® by 
the transitive usage, V.liat he colls a (natural class® contains 
items to which a predicative general term applies, whethor or not 
they have as yet been encoimterad and identified ds members of 
the class, because '^A** pr*^ applieo to 3: i,e# hecauso :: is af t r :>
momhor of the natural class Gi"A*' - it can he said that "A" is 
pr^ 'applicahlo to %, or that ’^A*® is correctly pr-applied to 
But whether "A" pr^ -applios to :E does not dopond on the nr- 
applicability of "A" to :c, since sn is (is not) a member of 01 "A"V  >  r TxàÊBt»
whether or not it liao been identified as a member of that class# 
I'ho fact stated in * "A" pr-^ applies to is, as it were, a fact
®about* the world, whereas the fact that *^A" is pr^ a^pplicable to
% is a fact * about* the expression **A" rather than * about*
This is a osTUoial point, and difficult to express coherently^  ^
To say that “A’* is pr^ a^pplicable to % is to say tWt, usage of
being what it is, it is (would be) correct to pr-apply "A" to %g
but to say that "A" pry^ applies to % is to say that, the world
>.g/
being as it is« % Is a rmmber of the natural oXaoB OIW?#^  «S‘,49 . . .  , V f%!»AwK ■
Oa the other hand* if % le a member of Oi"AV tMh it is (ivouM¥  e«aaçr,-sap ' «sssSsisa 6 4 ^  ’ , ^
be) ooriceot to pr^ a^pply "A" to %; and oonvereely, jf W' io 
(would be) correotly pr<*applied to ^  then % is a moDiber of 
In spite of thlè'apparent eguivalenoe, however, we eoy something 
different in aeoertihg that "A** pr^ppllee to % and in olalmlng
pi^^applimbillty of ”A*’ to %s for we might deny that there are ' '■ * • * - “  , ■ IKSjajp'SiCSiil, Cl»l!jt«S^
natural alaeeee snoh ae 01"A**. or deny their neoeeelty forfcssfjK*» r • w  w  . • - k
explaining the pr*applicab 11 Ity of general terms to an Indefinitely 
large number of thlhga# Since Qnihton bollevoa both that there
. X  ' \ - (10are • ôudh olahees and that they are neoêssàiy for this. explanation, ^ 
he might want to ^ètin^lèh between aeoertlan-of memberêhlp in
01J*A” and assertion of corréotness of application of anà 
this amount p to a distinction be tv/eon  ^**A** pr^applies to x* and 
* *'A** is pr*^ &\pplicable ■ to à* @ \
Go . I want noi7 to examine the view that rf-* and pr-appXiecl 
expressions are Instrumentally involved in performances of the 
®tasks* of refemtag (to) and describing,. We find Strawson 
explicitly oharaoterislng reference and predication in terms of
®tasks*8
The task of forestallihig the first question [soo ® What 
(who, which ono) are you talking ahoivb?®] is tho 
-referring (or identifying) task a The task of forestalling the second [sc^  ® What are you saying about it (him, 
her)?*3 is the attributive (or desorlptivo or cltiosificatory or ascriptive) task* )
But he Æater eayos *’to uoo a separate expressiéh to perform the
first of these tasks is to use an expression in the uniquely
referring Wo are apparently to say that * referring
to X* has to do both with the performance of a in which an
expression is instmtnientajjÿ involved and, at the same time, with
the wogr in which this expression enters Into dis course » Thus, the
baf ®rf«-applying "A" to x* is oonstruable either as the (X«buf
* using "A" to refer to or as the phrase * ref erentiaily applying
**A" to|:*§ 8tmwBon*o talk about using enqxcessiono kreferfingly*
and his identifioatlon of the * uniquely referring use® with ®a
way of using expressions® are ref looted in the latter interpretation
of rf^application, while his talk about the ® task of referring®
fits the former# Wittgenstein, in The Blm Book, also muddles the
®taak® and *way® terminologies* He says, for example,
When something seems queer about the grammar of our words, it is because we are alternativoly tempted to use a “word 
ii'i several different ways. And it is particularly 
difficult to discover that an assertion which the metapl%rsiol makes expresses discontentment t/ith our grammar when the 
words of this ' assertion can also bo used to state a fact 
o:k experience # f /
Again, V/ittgonstôin asks whether "the person who ta lk s  both 
of consoiouG and imconscious thoughts thereby uses the word 
®thoughts® in  two d iffe re n t ways"; subsequently
comparing ®\rayo o f using a word® w ith ®v;aye o f using a hammer®, 
ho seems to be ta lk in g  rathei* about t asko ih  pOrfozmanoo of 
whloh a hammer is  inst3?uniemtally invclved#
C onflation of *way o f using "A"* w ith  ®task fo r  which 
"A" is  used* is  considered in  two recent a r tic le s  in  Analysis,
In  the f i r s t ,  A,R, White distinguishes between ®how® and *what«*for® 
Questio:<iG8
Mow I  b e lieve  th a t, although we can c e rta in ly  and 
:hnporta,ntly d istinguish  the "how" question, th a t 
is , "the way, method or manner" in  which an 
expression is  used, and the "what‘-for" question, 
that is , the purpose fo r  wMoh an expression is  
used, these .are both parts of the use of the expra selon, (^^9 )
In  a discussion o f Militons d is tin c tio n , Caton d iffo re n tia to s
between t\ïo types o f *whD,t-for® question, the f i r s t  type
represented schematicshlly in  *Miat are X®s used for?® , and the ,
second in  ®Vdmt d id  Ï#  use th a t X for? * He claim s, however,
th a t typo '^ono ® what-Tor® questions, co nstitu te a species of the
®how® question schematised in  ®How are X®B used?®, fo r  tho oaee in
which X is  an expiression-type ( i f  not in  a l l  cases).
Questions/
24»^
Questions about the use of an expression,., are about 
tilings that are regularly done by us:liig the. expressioa «00 Thus the same kind of question about an 
oiqiroGslon E can be raised by asking ®wliat is E used for?*, 
*v/hat is the function of K?®, *how is E used? *, *hotj 
do WG use E?*, or * what are the.uses of E?* * (OAiio shows, incidentally, that the .distinction on which White says, 
he agfeos v/lth Ryle should be between *how* questions
Caton lis ts  * re f  erring* and (describing* among *a o tiv :lties  v/Molx 
are normally conducted by using lin g u is tic  expressiono*, along 
with * expressing our fe e lin g s , assorting, questioning, promising, 
swearing oaths, etc©* He also says th a t typo-one ®what-fpr® 
questions, ('when asked about lin g u is tic  expressions, are c losely  
s im ila r to  the same typo of question asked about n o n -lin g u is tic  
things#" (112) ^0]iQY;s, then, th at the question *Vdiat is  "tho
M ng of Franco" usod for? * is  lik e  the question *Wlmt are Mmmoro 
used for?*,  in  th a t by einewering ®For referring to a man who*.. * 
to  the f i r s t ,  and ®For d riv in g  n a ils .. © * to the second, we 
mention a funotion of the oxpresBion(-type) "the king of France" 
and o f haiMiers© But i f ,  as Oaton claim s, tho point of asking 
*?/liat is  "the king of France" used for? * is  subsumed under tlm t ' 
of asking ®How is  "the king of France" usod? * , than we should 
expect the point o f ®How are hammers used? ® to be c lo sely  related 
to th a t o f *Y/hat are hammers usod for? * ©
Our/
Our Q2£peotdt,ioBQ are, naturally enough, dloappointedo 
The ®ho\7® question sake cl of. hammers, is ino.onrp^ te as it 
stands, for unless we have in mind a task-type or particular 
task, the question 'How are hammers used?* is nonsenses ®How 
are hammers used for doing suoh‘^an(l*^ BUch? *, on the other handÿ 
makes perfectly good eense#,^  But the 'how* question aàîœd of 
expression^^types is not, in this way, ihoomplotég indeed, the* 
question 'How is "the king of France" used fOr referriaig to a 
man who**#?® is as odd as the question 'How are hammers used?®* / 
On thé other hand, both the question ®How do people refer to a 
man who*.**:?® ^nd the question ®How do people drive mils?® are 
intelligible; as are the questions 'What do people use for ' •’ 
referring to a man who* * * ? ! and 'What do people use for driving 
nails?®; but the% are obviously different questions from the ; 
others* Somebody might Imow that hammers are (cam bo) used to ’ 
drive nails without Imowing how to use a hammer to drive a mil, 
and in learning how to use a ternimer to do such a task he acquires 
technique for the exploitation of a capaoityg this teohnique is
ôorrelàted with a method, which may or imy not be an outimuii^  .
method for using that type of hammer to do i#3,t type of task*
On the other hand, it is difficult to conôëive of someone knowing 
that on expression**type is (con be) used to refer to a man who*** 
without/
without Imowlng how to use such an expiesslom to refer to 
ouoh a mans this is, as I see it, heoauoe the idoa of ooming 
to Imow how.i) or of learning how, . to uee on expression 
^  SB, J g a m # W  fails to «gat a s®ip«. Are there
methods and toohniques of rf^applying rni expression to soiaething, 
similarly ao there are methods and techniques of using a hammer 
to drive nails? The idea is ludiorous*, "But," it will be 
objaoted, "surely it's possible to go v/rong in referring to 
something; to rf-apply an expression to something to which it 
is rf^inapplicable*: As Stmwson says,, the meaning of a 
(referential) expression oonsists in 'rulesi, habits; conventions 
governing its correct use, on all occasions; to refer®, and 
to give its meaning is tb give ®general directions for its use 
to refer to or mention particular objects or persons' 
someonb who misapplies these directions is in the position of one 
who fails to observe instructions in using a do vice; he goes
wrong by not using the (verbal) device in accordance with tho
• ,vproper and hence optimum method or technique# And Evhne
suggests that ®we may regard words as the tools which we use
to do a certain job ®, and that a
The tools can be badly handled and hence fail to do tho intended job,, but in that casé we should not describe the tool b a a improper but rather the using of them*!! (H4)
Against/
Against this objection I would urge# In the first place, 
that the 'picture® associated, with (manipulative) Instrmientality, 
as it is developed in this paper, does not support an analogy 
between %7ords and tooloo Oonvehtione which oirou$scribe. correct 
pr-* or rf-application of expressions are not like methods or 
teohniqnee for efficient use of a tools the question of 
'efficiency' in the case of words and. expressiono collapses into 
the question of 'correctness' or 'propriety®, and this latter 
question does not arise in the case of instruments and tools 
(though it might!) © (For some further objections to the 
instrumental I refer the reader to artioleo by
L*J* Cohen and G.K* G r a n t * T h o u g h  the dovioo analogy 
comparing words m%d esgi^ssione to (non^anlpùlated) devices « 
is less objectionablo, again it seems to mo that Ijnguistio 
conventions differ in important respects from instructions for 
the 'correct' operation of a device© Finally, it may perhaps be 
helpful to think of linguistic conventions rather as C^ -ruleç of 
linguistic practices than as H-sules in aocordano& with which 
verbal performances are carried out# That is, we might say; 
by following conventions of r^>appXication of "A", we correctly 
rf-^ s/pply "A" g rather thans if we rf-apply "A" in eiGcordano© 
with conventions of rf-application of "A", then we correotly 
rf-apply "A"*
In/
In the preceding diaouBsion Ï have hot acmpuloualy
taken aooquht of the 'typo/tokon* distinction# In general
I have argued that expression-typea are not appropriately
aaaimilated to instrumenta, and it might ho sixggested that
this analogy is felicitous in the case of express!on-instixnoes©
In this connection it Is interesting to read what the psychologist
Skinner sayo about 'using words® s
#**although the formal properties of the records' of 
utterances are interesting, we must proservo the 
distlnoiW.on between an aotivity and its traoeo* In 
partimMr m  must avoid the umiatu#! ' formulation of ‘ 
verbal behaviour as the "use of words"* We have no 
more reason to say timt a man "uses the word water" 
in aeking for a drink than to say tWt he "uses a reach" in taking the offered glass* (Hb) ; ..
(I take it that by ®the word water® 8kinner means 'an uttezmice
water® or ®an expresaion-lnstanoe water®, for comparison vdth
®a reach® would be odd if he meant 'the word-tvm water®•# )
Oohen also orltioises tlie phmee 'using an 0%pre88ion«instance® e
The use of a word**lnstm%ce just ^  its sole and single ocQurrenoe, and wo cannot therefore ' regard the verb ®to use® when we speak of 'using a word-instonce® as functioning in the same logioa-linmietio category aswhen we speak of 'using a tool®*(^^7)
■
But the DBP gives a sense of ®to use® in which 'using "A"® means 
®speaking or writing "A"® or, In other words, simply 'uttering "A"®
VlhBZœ/
where «’’A"* presumably staitde f03? an ex|>roosioiv>t^ p^efe It 
follows that we ean regard the pteise Hxslhg "A" to refer to 
lÿ as a deeoription of an uttoranoe of "A" whzloh, in view of 
cirouastancoe and oonventlono of rf-application of "A", Is 
imderetood to oonstitut© reforenoo to That is to say# M  
ro'fers to x In uttering "A" if, and only if, his utteranoe to 
some degree satisfies tlB.BO oironmstantial and conventional 
criteria# Mote that we also sayg gg/o utterance of "A" refera 
to X© And that we say; "A" refera to x# But we oan any tliis 
only because of the oirGumatantial and conventional criteria 
whose satisfaction by someone®s utterance of "A" suffices to make 
him understood to bo referring to xg Saying.of a word that itifWA «/ W  • «$:trr£9
refers to (desorlbes, oharaoterisos, names, &o$) something is 
like pointing to; the heart in an anatomist's drawing and saying 
"This pumps blood# "
[gj Turning now to the type of applicative Invoivemmt 
exemplified in sentences of group (ll), involvement of concept à, 
criteria, standards, and legal rules in activities compendiously
called ' judgments'9 I first consider two theories of concept- 
application/
^130-
application and then deal with some qneetlono oonoornlng
application of standards and legal rules©
A® . Geaoh# in M e  recent book Mental Acte, bolds timtV  *!s«t»tsWi*w*i?2tf5*aai te^ s?|5OT=«i«aff '
concepts are applicatively Involved in 'acts of judgment'$ he
oxplioitly denies that ' concepts are somehow exercised sdngglz.
TrXthomt being applied to anything® # Concept s are,, for Goa oh#
mental capaoitiea 'exerolGed in aota of judgment® * The
relation of concepts to an act of judgment in which they are
exercised (i*e, in which they are applicatively involved)
resembles the relation between "a number of simple# previously
acquired, skills" and an appropriate ohess-mpva in which these
skills are exeroised^^^^^^ Geaoh employe another chess analogy
to explain his denial that concepts can be 'exercised elBffly
without being applied to anything's
*,* ill 0M 88 one can practice the moves of a solitary man on the hoard, but I think there Is.no analogous exercise of a single unapplied concept* \
This analogy mi^t be misleading, her/ever# for it eoeim to deny 
the exictehoe of acts of jud^msnt in which only concept is 
applioatively invclvêd, whereah I believe Gëégh mean*) to claim 
only that no matter how many concepts are involved in an act of 
judgment, they must be applloatively involved,. i*o* concepts are 
'applied to® and, not simply fexercised'* (On tho other Imnd,
Geach mag[ wa^t to emphasise 'single', rather than 'unapplied', in
his pMaae 'single unapplied concept'#)
Geaoh talks of applying oonoepts to# inter q,iia^  ® the 
material environment®, 'physical things®, ®thinga®, 'human 
beings and their natural àndjronment®, ®an oartMorm®, and ®a 
supposed dléembodiod exietonoe® » While he eays that a sighted 
man is able to apply his colour-cOmoepts to 'visual experience®,(i^)
Geach nonetheleoB denies that ooaoepts are fundamentally *or 
primarily applied to senso-experiences or sensations* Involvement 
of 'sensory® coheepts in acte of judgment about sensationa is# 
he olaime, "secondary to the application of 'aensozy' concepte 
to the materiel e n v i r o n m e n t * In arguing a^inot the view 
that concept a are formed by ®abe traction® from expérienoe, hei
asserts that à .non-éxpericntial bEisis.of concepts "does not in, • 
the least prevent us from applying concepts in our sense
oxpoMenoe and loiowing sometimes that we apply them rightly* In
' ^ . - (32:@11 cases it is a màttdr of fitting a cqneept to mÿ experience*,*"
He repeats this 'fitting® metaphor later;
In all oases it is a matter, of fitting my conoopt to my experienoe - of oxeroising thé appropriate concept - not of picking out the feature I am interested in from among others simultaneously given in experience@A^^5)
But data, of exporfence are not themselves involved in aots of , 
judgment;
ïto/
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The content of the judgment is always intelligible 
and conceptual - acquaintance with a particular 
sensible thing is no part of the judgment itself - 
but an act of judgment performed in a particular 
sensory context, may thereby be related to particular sensible things# (1^ 4)
Hence, we should not speak of non-oonoeptual factors as 
hwolved in acts of judgment, for the content of each acts^  ^  essyr-xaretestsFiiavaeWB:»
consists solely of exercisGS of concepts and relations among“  tCTS«»aeQS8fa»<#W6»=B:<B6ia>wia-s* ^  ^
these exercises© For example, judgments encpressiblo :ln the 
assertion "That flash was before this bang" have - the same 
(intelligible content*, namely an exercise of the concept flash 
standing in a relation § (before) to an exercise of the concept 
banp;8 but individual judgments stand in a apooial relation to 
particular 'sensory contexts®, and G each warns "it is a great 
mistake to try to bring in these contexts into any setting 
forth of that which is j u d g e d © H e n c e ,  objects to which 
concepts have application - whether primary ('the material 
environment* ) or secondary ( * sehSG-exporienoes* ) - are neeeoearily 
external to jud^penta about thorn. Consider a judgment exprossible 
as "The cat is eating the livor", made in a partiou].ar * sonoory 
context* of seeing' a oat eating livers according to Geaoh, tho - 
concept cat eating liver, as exercised in this judgment, is 
applied to a cat eating liver (ore8 to a cat and a piece of liver) 
in/
In BO far as eeeing the cat eating the liver constitutes the
®sensory context® of this judgment© This, at least# is mÿ
interpretation of these remarks of Geachs
Mow when I make this judgment about the cat and the 
liver, it is not the cat and the liver that are parts 
of my sensory experience j but mgr seeing the cat and the 
liver* The concept of oat eating liver is exercised, 
then, in a context of sensation^  my judgment is a judgment .about the oat and the liver because I see
It can be seen timt I take ' judgment j is about object to bo 
equivalent to * some concept 0 .# exercised :ln J# is applied to 5c' =
This inborpretation seems to be supported by another of Geach'e 
examples*.. A parson \?ho says, while looking at the moon, "This 
looks like a yellow disc one foot across" is said to have the 
thought (of) a yellow disc a foot across; "the concepts exercised'*“• \ f Aa# XJb»«fehKJ*fse*ai¥:y!r$y fee-s^ ss^ ysasvrr^  <Ss5» »a»t^.wg»*iiraqT»s# ^
in this thought are primarily applied to physical objects g and 
what gives his exercise of the concepts a particular application 
in a certain, bit of his sense-experience - of his visual sensations." 
Mote that G each talks here of the exerolsO of concepts as having 
'a particular application* t this is odd, for he has heretofore 
talked, only of concepts themselves in terms of 'application* # and 
hao intimated that to exercise concept 0 is to apply 0 to something* 
Leaving this quibble aside# however, Geaoh's point in the present 
example is that concepts acquired "in their application to the 
physioal things around us" are analogically exercised in a judgment 
expressible/
— 1 5 4 * *
Gxpa^ esBiblo as "This looks like a yellow disc one foot across",
111 so far as they serve here "to describe the seaoatlon itself 
That is to say, :in a sensory context constituted by seeing a yellow 
disc a foot across (i*e« constituted by these visual sensations)» 
concepts GxeroisGd in a judgment expressible as "This is a yellow 
disc a foot across" are therein applied to the , (seen) yellow discsi i#,ii ,,i % f t /  7
v/heroas in a sensory context constituted by seeing the mooh 
(i«Go by these visual sensations) # concepts oxer diced in a 
judgment expressible as "This looks like a yelloY? disc a foot across" 
are thorcsin applied to visual sensations constitutive of thoIII TÎa#ri'< I in I a inf
sensory context# this application# however# being * transferred or 
analogical® with respect to their priinasy application to a (soon) 
yellow disc (i©e@ with respect to their exorcise iln a sensory 
context constituted by sj^Uig a yelloiy disc a foot across)©
In contradistinction to Geach's view that concepts are
primarily applied to 'physical objects® and only secondarily
applied to ®sense-experionces® stands Kant's view of concept-
application, at least as he states it heres'
Sinco no representation# save when it is an intuition, 
applies directly to an object, no concept is ever: 
directly referred to an object# but to some othos:* représentation 6f it, bo that other ropresontation 
an intuition, or itself a concept* (1^ 9/
It/
It sIioMd be noted that I depart from Kemp Smith® b tj^ anslation 
in rendering 'auf© © © gehen® by 'apply.*© to® rather than by 'is 
in relation©*© to® and# more importantly# in rendering ®wird© * * 
aufpoo besogen® by ®l8** * referred to® rather than by ®i8©* * 
related to ® # My reason for these, tranelatione is that they 
emnhaeisG a distinction between Intransitive as against transitive 
conoept-applicate relations© This contrast is srepoated in two 
other sentences from the same page of ïCritils© First, 'warden 
besogen®, expressive of a transitive relation, is set against 
(gelten®, which oxpsressea an intransitive;
(a) In every judgment there is a concept which holds of many representations, and among them of a givenrepresêntation that is directly referred to anobject ©(3*30)
(strictly speaking, Kant does not here contrast ® gel ten®
('holds of®) and 'weydon besogen® (®is,*. referred to®) with 
respect to concept-applicate relations# since the ' representation 
that is directly referred to an object® is an intuition* 
Nonetheless, in the two passages so far quoted Kant has employed 
transitive and intransitive locutions with both types of 
'representation®, concepts and intuitions*) Immediately foilov;ing 
this sentence, Kant writes;
(b)/
-A
Thus in thé judgment 'all bodies are divisible®, the concept of divisibility Is related tb various other oonoepts, but is lie re referred particular to theconcept.of body, and this,concept again t6.certain 
a,pp0àranoes that present themselves to us#(^^0). .'X' r . . ' ' : . ' - .
Here the intransitive relation expressed in 'besieht sich© auf ®
('is related tp®) is contrasted with the .transitive relation 
expressed, again#.in 'wird©,* a u f b e g o g e n ® .('is*© referred©©* to®) 
Kemp Smith's translation of the latter by 'is*©.* applied to® 
is perhaps preferable to 'is*©©. 3?eferred».© to®,^but % ivant to 
reserve 'apply® for rendering ®ammnden®, whicdi Kant employs to . .. 
express the transitive relation between pure concepts (categories) 
and appearances or 'objects of experience ®
The heading of §22# of the Second Edition tisnsoehdental
'
deduction ise
The C ategory has no other employment in knowledge 
of things than its applxcation to objects of, experience; ' (3,51)
and that of §24* is;
. . .  ' ■- The application of the categories to objects of the senses in general© (15^ )
At one point in §22* Kant concludes "the pure concepts of 
understanding, even when they are applied to a priori intuitions^ ‘ . 
as in mathematios# yield knowledge only in so far as these 
intuitions - end therefore indirectly by their means the pure
concepts/
concepts also - can be applied to empirical intuitions © " (
Hero MQ find Kant talking of intuitions# as well as concepts# 
in terms of 'anwonden® © Both are# as we have seen, representations 
fVorstèllungoa) which stand to applicates in both transitive 
and intransitive relations g this raf loots the two aspects of 
applicative involvement, instrumentality (or, in the case of Kant's 
quasi-instrumentality) end referent lality@
Representations are,'involved in mental (cognitive) stots# but they
also have reference to 'objeots®; that is to imy, they are.;
^  iji oomiit^ve "The concept of body, "
Kant writes, "means (bedeutet) something# for instance metal# whieh 
can be loiown by means of (duroh) that concept* %  u m  the
concept of body to know that which the concept means;; this can be 
put also; ®We apply the concept of body to that to which it 
applies** It is.interesting to note that Kant introduces the 
problem of a transcendental deduction both Im terms of justifying 
"the pure a priori employment" of certain conoopto among those 
which "form the complicated web of human knowledge," and also in 
terms of explaining "the manner in which concepts can thus relate 
a priori to objeots#"^^^"^^ Ageing he brackotG suspicion as to 
* the objective validity* of pure concepts together with suspicion 
as to * the limits of their own employment# 1 In sum, Kant * s
Bpgrifflehre is pervaded by that tension between instrumental ity 
and/
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and referential ity which# I have auggested# charaoteriàee 
instances of the concept of application©
This comes out strikingly in his doctrine of transcendental 
schematism* Transcendental philosophy is paid to have "the 
peculiarity that besides the rule (or rather the universal 
condition of rules), which is given in the pure concept of 
understanding, it can aloo specify a priori the instance to v/Moh 
the rule is to be applied#" (3,3/) But the olmptor on Schematism 
treats of "the sensible condition under which alone pure concepts 
of the understanding can be employed#" ( 38) the difference,.
incidentally, between apsoifying 'the instance to which the rule 
apnliod®, as against specifÿihg * the conditions under 
whioh alone the rule can be employed! j Kant reformulates hisfcac)B5fa?Éasg tsx^ sssta •
problem, in terms of the latter;
How, then is the subsumption of intuitions under pure 
concepts, thereby the application of a category to 
appearances# possible?We muet be able to show how pure concepts can be applied to appO0.rànces®(3-39)
But he then proceeds to characterise transcendental, schemata in 
terms both of (a) conditions under vhidli categories can be applied^ 
and of (b) 'mediating representations® which make application of 
categories to appaarancos possible^^
(%)/
(a) Tiie sohemata of the pure qpnoepto of understanding .are thiis the true and sole conditions under which those obtain relation (Beaiehung) to objeota.and so noeeeeo
si#ÈgÉ2%om (SÊÉmÈmm) «:
(b) She schema is(, iwopaylyj only the phenomenon, orsensible oonoèpt, of an objeot in agreement 
(nbereinBtipmmig) with the category# (MO)
Heree, as so often in reading Kant# 1 fail to comprehend# I can 
only."remark the differeno® between saying .(a) 'Unless % is given 
in oonditiow 6, then qonoept 0 oannot applied to x® @ qnd saying 
(b) 'If X is given throufï^ zQiwesentation/R© then concept .0 can bo 
applied to^® © I would(, if spaoe. and comprehension permitted, 
enquire both into the difference between (a) and (b) and into the 
nature of the 'objeot® to which lihnt's concepts and ihinxitions
related; tMs would, however, involve .lengthy/ exogosiC: of suoh 
topics as * synthesis ®, an undertakings into which I feel ill-equipped 
to venture# — ,
Before turning to consider application of standards and 
legal rules, 1 want to mention tv/o further points opnceiming i 
oonc^plk-applioation, (i).. It is interesting: tlpt Kant is the . 
first writer oh epiotem'^  logy to talk extensively in terms of 
'using® or .i'applying® oonoepts; in genera), eaq>irioal philosophers 
had spoken of the mind or miderstanding as operating on# rather 
than With, ideas or concepts* There are, of course# notable 
exceptions,/
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exceptions, Gog# la and Hme'a dlsouoolona of
general words and i d e a s # ( l i )  VAiile Geadh regards ooncepts
dispos it ionaliy ( as capaoltioo exeroieed in aote of judgment), 
Kant views concepts in ternis of a legal analogy (as rules under 
which objects are subsumed) ; it is also plausible# however# to 
compare ooncept-applioation with the application of predicative 
expressions# i.o# to correlate concepts with pr-applied words# 
This analogy is' exploited by Komer in M s  book OonoGptml 
where he defines 'concept® in toms of 'sigh* as follows;
By adding a synonymity rule to the rules wMoh govern thé use of a si^i as à predicate we again ohange its use* The sign is then being used no longer as a predicate but as a concept#(142)
tiKorner, it may be added, conduct a his enquiry in terns of 
'applying concepts to bases':#
B# In dealing with application of standarèls,! distinguish between 
GW, and ne V-applioat ion ; the baf ®ev-applying S to x® is equivalent 
to the p -buf 'evalmting % in accordance with (by reference to) 
standard S', and the baf 'nev-applying S to x® is equivalent to the 
& pbuf ' (non-evaluatively) classifying % in acoordancd with 
standard 8®# What I call 'raiiking standards', whether ev- ÿr 
newapplied, are formulated in %potheti#l sentences of the formé
(8)' "Ÿ" l8 applicable to on oondltion that g is
aWjudgqd to satisfy criteria (a ,B#o). to degree 
' a# ' ' '
What I call ?hon-mnking atandar#', on tho other hand, are
formulated in hypothetical oentenoee which stipulate merely that 
a certain expression is applicable to anything adjudged to 
satisfy certain criteria* While evaluations ordinarily involve 
mnking standards, non-avaluative ciassifieations may involve 
either ranlcing or non-ranlclng standards© For instance# classifying 
a horse as to sise consists in nev-applying a ranking standard, 
while applicability of ifemale*' to a horse is decided through 
nev-application of a non-ranking standard; evaluating a horse, 
on the other hand, invariably is done by ev-applying a ranking 
standard. It will be convenient to distinguish predication - 
pr-appli cation # from vaïus-prédioâtion - vpr-applioatlon*. Fr­
aud ypr^applioation are modes of expression^-àpplioatlon associated 
with ev% and nev-application of standards; pf»-appliosbility is 
determined by nev-applloatiqn, and vpr-applicability is decided 
through ev-application of a standard, (I do not mean to suggest 
that pr-application.must be associated with nev-applioation of a 
standard# for obviously there are many expressions whose pr- 
applicability is determined without hev-applicatlon of any standard;/ 
on/
on the other it Geemo to me that thevo are no exprosGipne
whoso vpr-appllcabilIty is detemlhed without ov-application 
of some standard# This also raises the question, whether 
( evaluating* names a speeèh-aot or a 'mental aot'é tho answer 
is# of cours©, that it can he used to refer either to a speech- 
act ((vpr-application* ) or to a 'mental act* ( *ev-applieation* ) « )
The logic of eV- or nov-àpplioatlon of standards is quite 
simple# To apply 8 to where S ;ls a ranking standard# is to 
determine the degree to which x satisfies the criteria of 3# G(8); 
the conjunction of 8 and a statement that x eatiofiec 0(6) to degspse 
m entailo, by moduo.jgone^, applicability to % of some expression
"Y Similarly for tho case where 6 is a non-ranking standard* .. % ' ' ' ' ' '
On this levelp at least, there is apparently no difference between 
eÿw? and ne v^appli cation © Wo must go outside logic to find a 
relevant point of differentiation# One such point lies in the 
distinction between pxv and vpic-applicationg ' as Urmson says, "to 
describe is to describe, to grade is to grade, and to exproso ■ 
one * 8 feelings is to express one's feelings, and _ none of these 
is reducible to either of the others® Since pr-applioability
follows from nev-application, and vpr-applicability follows from 
ev-application, we can distinguish between modes of standard- 
application in terms of a distinction betv/een modes of 
expression-application, /
Another point is aptly stated by 
Baior, when he eaye that in ev-applioation ."we are concerned 
not merely with the xmw;ee of the thing in question, but; also 
with how well a thing of this nature can minister to our wants, 
doeiree, aim,, 3ieed8, ap9i37ation8# ideals, and the like*®*(^^)
The interest in, or .purpose served by, ev-applioation la uractioal 
in the soEoe that it connecta with giving àdviôo concerning - 
courses of action# This is not to :%iy that evi:'apnlioatlon Isoueo 
in commendationp for vpr-applioation of expressions is no more 
a oommendat03:y use of speech than is pr-applioation of expressions 0 
to vpr-apply 'good® is to rÿpord the outcome of ev-applying some 
standard, and though someone may take it ao a commendation it need 
not .be meant to be more than a valuo^predioation - it should be 
remembered# inbidentally, that pr«*applioatiôn of 'big® in a 
certain tone of voice might sometimes bo understood to bo a 
commendation, A final point at which ev- and nev^applioatlon are 
distinguishable: is that of the relative olmXlengeability of 
ev-applied as. against nev-applied standards# Suppose both 8@ which 
embodies criteria and T# which embodies criteria
to be conjointly mev-applicable to an object § such that nev- 
application of 8 entails pr-applioability of m% expression that is 
antithetical in sense to an expression whose pr-appliqability is 
entailed/
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entailed by nev-applioation of T; in sttoh a. case we would 
nomal]y remark eimply that S and T are, after all, different 
standards© But imglne an analogous disparity in the case of 
two conjointly ev-applicable standards 8 (whose ev-applica/bion 
entails vpr-applieability of# say, 'good*) and T (whoso ev-
application, entaile vpr-applieability of, say, 'bad*)# in this ,
;
.case a dispute may arise conoemlng the ' appropriateness * of 
on© standard as. a^inst tho other© An argument of this sort isa . . ' ' ' ' . -itself, evaluative,' in that vpr-application of 'right® and 'wrong® 
to S or T implies ey-application of some standard to those 
standards* (  ^ This is not to claim either that nov#pplied
standards are never contrasted in this imÿ'or timt a conflict of 
ov-applied standards may not be dismissed simply as a case of 
'diffei-ënt standards/, for it is indeed true both timt evaluative 
arguments sometimes arise over the merits of conflicting nev- 
applied standards and that im sometimes fail to argue over 
conjointly ev-appliosblo standards which entail antithetical 
vpr-applicab 11 itles (saying, o,g$ 'Ohaoun & son goût*)# On the 
other hand, it could be suggested that disputes over ev-applied 
standards are in principle, rationally irresoluble, whereas 
disputes over nev-applied standards - even evaluative disputes - 
must be rationally resoluble# X do not enquire into the merits 
of tliis suggestion here#
Op, lu la p02?lmpë tempting to thinlc that legal mileo ai^ e 
involved In deciding cases and in ispuiiig verdicts' similarly 
as standards are involved In making evaluationso. Orimt :suggests 
that verdiots and appraisals "usually consist in the application 
of accepted rules/ principles and criteria to partimlar case* 
And O'Conner claims that many legal dispûtes "are carried on and 
settled by methods of ri^soning \7hich are typical of disputes in 
valuational matters in that "here too we have the task of 
judging particular oases by reference to standards » in this case,, 
statutes9 legal rules and precedents, On the other hand^
it seems to me that legal rules and ev«*applied standards differ in 
several respects* Whereas interpretation of law h is generally 
involved in deciding upon application of Lg ov-^ applicatlon of 
standard 8 does not® in this way® require interpretation of 8* 
Furthermore® what is at stake in ev-applying 8 to % is the 
vpr-applicability of some expression to 3|.® whereas coming to a 
legal decision consists in declaring that a oaso hub ^udice falls 
under$ or does not fall under a certain laws the jury in a 
criminal"*law trial does not weig^ ovidenoe similoriy as the judge 
in a flower show assesses oriterial oharhcieristioa^ - of a 
pot/
pot of begonias® and the jazy^foremah?8 "GUiity" playe a 
co3?ràopbndiiiglÿ different role from tliht played by tliG flowdr^ 
judge 8^ "Excellentes ( "First Prise" uttered by the flower-judge 
playe a role more like the juzy-ohàirâàn's "Guilty" s both arc 
verdictivè performatory utterances#) What follows.froA the 
foreman's utterance of "Guilty" is that the law ih question 
is applied to t M  case (defendant)® for only when It Ims been 
decided that law L is valid for (applies to) defendant.% ^  i*e# 
only (^ Cter performance of the irèrdlctive aotivily - can L 
( properly) be applied to whereas a flower judge appliee 
standard B to begonias % in appraising them (i^ e* he ev^applies 
8 to y)p for he knows already th&.t 9 is valid for (applies to) y 
and hence that S cân ( properly) be applied to ;yy
It will be objected against this view - vis* that law L ds
applied to case 0 only when h has been found to apply to 0 and
not in deciding whether b applies to Q -/ that it. oonstitiitea a
perversion of the ordinary usage of 'apply' in legal contexts#
If Hart'e use of /apply' in;the follbvdng passage exemplifiQp
tliis usage then the objection mUet bp granted#
Most of the difficulty in applying legal rules to oonorete 
oases arises where (a) there is no difficulty in citing 
clear of standard cases to which the rule undieputabiy applies, but (b) in a given case a difficulty is
Hart/
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Hart apparently thinks of 6 aë' itself applloatively involved
in the activity of deciding whether h applies to Oo But if L
were involved in this activity similarly as "a standard is
involved in the activity of evaluating in accordance with it® '
then we might expect to he able to says standard 8 is
applicativoly involved in deciding whether' S applies to x# Oh
the other hand® suppose we think of I*' as applicatively
involved in the activity of deciding ivhether "Guiliy of delict B"
is applicable ' to C ® where L* is of the forms . ' :
(h' ) "Guilty bf h" is applicable to 0 on bondi.tion .thatG .sati8fi0s_oiiatêriâ\Ao B)\O«
Since - application of "Guilty of 3D" to .0 by the appropriate judge
or jmy-foroman' ls tantamount to a declaration , that 0 is duly
found to have committed D® we. can refo3R#late 'h/ _asa »
(l*M) 0 is (duly) , found to have committed 3) on
condition that 0 1s (duly) found to satisfy criteria A® B® O#  ^/ .
And since I*@ of the (over-simplified) form$
(h) Sanotlôn 8 is, to be executed on x oh conditionthat X is (duly) found to "have ''committed delict D®
can ba said to apply to C when 0 is (duly) found to 'have committed 
3)I it follows that whether I« applies to 0 is decided by apply:mg ^ 
to G® where (the outcome of) this decision is expressed in 
"Guilty^
"Guilty (not guilty) of But low B itself is not
applied to 0 in determining whether it applies to 0 imlesa
L is of the form I*' ' * ®
where oôimiOGion. of ]) is defined bynoriteriaA® Bp Op
though even here I should want to say that I?"' is applied to 
0 in a primiy sense by the judge when he directs sanction 8 to«aiteaf^*Kay#*çl w  ^
be executed on 0 if 0 1ms been found guilty of 3)#
In t W  preceding analysis I Imve followed Kelsen's 
conception of legal rules as norms obligating execution of a 
sanction on condition of commission of a .delict#. ICelsen argues 
that legal rules: immediately regulate verdict-issuing and 
sentencêvpassing aotiyitiea of legal organs and only secondarily" 
regulate the behaviour of oitisené# Ho accordingly distinguishes
between 'seconda^ r^' and 'primary' legal nozms$ the former of
■ ' *.: - # 'which prescribe "that a certain individual /oi|ght' to observe
\ • - 'V*ï'
certain conduct" ® and the latter of wMch Stipulate "that another 
individual ought , to execute a sanctioh in case the first notera is . 
violated#  ^^49 ) Thus ® correspOndiiig to the primary norm I* is 
the secondary norm$ 'Bo:Wg 3) io forbidden' (l.e# 'B ought not 
be done')# Keleen further, distinguishes between 'applying' and 
'obeying'/
' obeying' a légal role g only the ' law^applying organ' for 
whioh a primmry nom :lo 'valid' is m i d  to 'apply' this norm 
by Issuing a directive to thé effect that a sanotion is to be 
executed on a eubjeot who hao 'disobeyed' a secondary norm#
It follows that the primary norm is 'valid' for oiti^ene only 
indirectly and that® in consequence® they can only indirectly / 
be said to 'obey' or 'disobey' Whim strikes me eiB a
neat probably much too neat - \my of explicating the relation 
of (criminal) law to oitisens for whom it is 'valid'« 1*J# Oohen
criticises Kelsen^s theory on grounds that it involves 'linguistic 
reconstruction' and "surrendering any attempt to stay close to 
thé normal range of uses in law of key words like 'rule'® 'create'§ 
and 'apply' # I do not Imow whether 'rule' and 'apply' have
'a normal range of uses in law'® but it does not seem to mo that
Kelson's usage of these terms is e^foeptionally odd® at least in
. . (151a)the context mentioned above#
An example of confusion in usage of 'apply' with respect to
legal rules occurs in Baler's discussion of similaritiee between
laws and customs® Claiming that one of the dimensions in whioh
types of rules differ is 'the way they are applied'® he writes#
®3bcer© are no important differences, in the way laws 
and customs are applied# It is part of the content of a law or custom to specify the groups of persons to whom it is meant to apply# Militaiy draft regulations * # # ^ the custom th men should take off their hats in lifts#. # from their veiy. nature apply to certain groups of persons only# (152)
Baler's/
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Baler's point that customs and laws both 'apply to* specifiable 
groups of parsons is® of course® imexceptioimble if understood 
merely as a claim that both customs and laws are 'relevant' for 
a range of persons mentioned in their formulations@ But the sense 
of 'relevance' in the case of laws is quite different from its 
sense in the case of customs* Laws are applied to those for whom 
they are 'relevant'® but customs are not 'applied' in this® or 
any other® sense to persons expected to follow them. Moreover® while
laws are 'meant' to apply to certain persons, it is not clear to me
that customs are 'meant' to apply; nor for that matter® am I clear
that customs can bo said to ' apply' to persons expected to follow
them* There is some resemblance between 'following' customs 
and 'obeying* laws® but I am not sure whether this similarity or the 
'relevance' similarity mentioned above® or indeed both, is,what 
Baler has in mind here# At all events neither has anything to do with 
the 'application* of customs and legal rules ^ in either a 
transitive or an intransitive sense of 'apply'#
One final point® concerning constitutive legal rules#
Without a framework of Jegal Institutions there would be ho 
sanctioUf^ stipulating legal rules cf the form schematised above (L)® 
since spécification of sanction to be executed (i#e# sentence- 
passing) on condition of delict-oommieeion is a legal activity 
onl^
î 'only to the eactoht that it is carried out by an authorised
içOo within a legal system* Hart talks of "oonetitutional 
rules providing criteria valid for the ayatem for the 
identification of rulee of the eyatem" g auoh rules are 
constitutive of le^^l institutions® since identification of 
précepte ae ruleo of aOme legal syetem depends on the 
exiatenco lof an. inetitiiticnal framework within wW.ch they are 
enacted® applied® repoinded® &c,; Hote^ f incidentally® tho 
oimileirity'of Hart's eharacterisatioh of conetitiitiojml rulaa 
to my formulation of the notion of O-ruleo in terras of 
deaorih&bility (ident if lability) of behaviour-inatances in terms . 
of practice a* On the other band® in so far as coha ti tut ional 
rules delimit procedures in accordance with which legal organs 
carry out their fdnotiong® they serve also as R-rulee^
[4] Sentences in group (III) (p# 99$ above) exemplify 
contexts which have to do with applicative involvement of. 
theoretical® mathematical and logical systems® and corapohento of 
these systems (e#g$ laws of nature® hypothèses® mathematical 
theorems® logical theses® theoretical and abstract concepts® &o, ), 
In this section I deal only with application of theories and laws 
of/
of nature to events and phenomena, and with application of 
matheriiaticB to ohjeots# In Chapter V® I touch upon applicative 
involvement of logical theseso
A@ Predicting and explaining phenomena, and events are foremost 
among activities in which (physical) theories are applicativoly 
Involved, If .we think of ' predicting, event E in terns of theory 
T' and 'explaining event E in terms of theory T* as analogous to 
' evaluating z in terms of standard S% then we can introduce 
'prd-applylng T to S' and 'exp-applying T to E* as analogous 
to 'ev-applying 8 to %'o According to the 'iiypothetical-deduotive* 
(hereafter 'H-D' ) view of explanation and prediction® these two 
modes of theory-application are distinguished 'pragmatically''and 
not 'logically'g in Popper's words® "The us© of a theory for 
predioting some spécifie event is just another aspect of its
use for explaining sû^h an e v e n t " # and Gardiner'% "The 
'logical structure * of explanations of this îdjid is the same as 
that of predictions," where by 'of this kind' ho raeane an 
explanation that consists in "(l) stating a universal law® or set 
of laws, (2) stating the existence of a set of initial conditions 
80 that from these two statements a third statement
describing the event in question f o l l o w s # Here®, in terms of 
prd(,/
px’d-à end exp^ a^pplication® le a Bchematio outline of prediction 
and explanation as seen by advocates of the H-D view;
(od) %  prd-apply T to E is to deduce E', a statement
predictive of B® from T and S'® where S' is a set of 
statements of initial oonditione S©
(A) To e%p-apply T to B is to detesmine Initial conditions S® stated in S'® such tlmt E"® a statement descriptive of E® is deduoible from T and S' ; in such a case we a m  said to explain E in terms of T by adducing S as 
'determining conditions' of E#
It can be seen that in both (cx) and (jS), déduction, from T and S' ®I ' ' '
of a statement descriptive (predictive) of E is of primary logical 
importanoo* H-i) theorists sometimes talk of another mode of 
theoiy-applioation* Sentence (a) in group (ill), for example® 
is "The lowest-level hypothesis Ilia, is tested 'by applying it to . 
a particular case"# Popper follows this usage of 'apply' in 
characterising theory-testing) i
A theory is tested not merely by applying it,o,. bût by applying it to very special cases - cased for which it yields results different f3?om v/lmt wo 
should have expected without the theory, or in the 
light of other thoorios. (^5^)
It is evident that in both prd- and @xp-applying T to E, T io 
applied® in this third sense® to 8# Suppose® for instance® that T. 
is of the form -.(x)(fe O  Gx)® and which states 8.® is a
statement 'Fa' § then to apply T^  to 8 is (i) to Infer, by 
universal instantiation on T^ , the statement 'Fa 0  Ga' g 
and/
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and (il) to infer® by modus voneuB on iFa D Ga' and S'® the>  f  Jf V  eîX«e:sacÎB*5pse=s5» &iasie23SMi*.'ei»2sn^ cc=#?aw» &«::*)=# I  *(15?)statement 'Qâ'
Proponents o f what I  shall c a ll à 'q u a s i-in e tru m a ta lls t' 
view of theozy-applioation hold, as against the H-D view® th a t 
( in  the words o f Toulmlh) % ’ :
laws of nature do not funotlon ae wremiGOo from wliioh' **•     rMii"iilMdeduotione to  ohoeryatiom l matters are made® but ae, . rules of iîif oyenoes 1» aqgogaaasi. gi# ompirioBl  ^ ,
GonolusWiB' may be dm m  from em pirical p3reaiiseo« :
But it should not be thought tMt the tpaBl-lnBtmmontalist 
differs from the doduotivist merely in holding that prd-appllcation 
of T to E consista, in inferring E' from S' in aoqordénoo T* 
and that exp-applioation of T to B oonsiats in detemining S suoli 
that E' ' is inferable from S* in accordahoe with T@ On the 
quasirinstrumentali8t view® a, theory provides not only 'inferring 
techniques ' in aooprdaiioe with whloh events are predicted® but also 
'models* and 'methods of representation' in terms of v/hloh events 
to which the theory is @:^-applie,d are rendered Intelligible - are 
escplained# As Dmy sayes
? Some thooriep® WQ must admit, may bo just inferring
teolmiques® since they mdy lack a model* But 
i f  there are any ouch® perhaps w© should, th ink twice 
about c a llin g  theia ’oxplahatory theories) a t most they 
' Gxplaih' in  the teolm icàl sense# ( )  >
For theories qua predictive devices® ' inferxring - techniques ' ara
. . V  .. . Y
of primary importance ® but for theories qua devices ■ for making
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data intelligible g what la important is that théories provide 
"an intolligiblOp ayetematlo® conoeptiml pattern for the 
observed data®" whose mine "lies in its capacity to unite 
phenomona which® without the theory® are either surprising®
"(160)anomalous® or wholly unnotiood#  ^ * This pattern may bo
pro'ridod in a. 'pictiimblo' model (a.o o,g* in the kinetic theory
of gases and in geometrical optics), or® where (as in elementary
particle physios) there Ip 'unpioturabllity-iu-prln(>iplo' ® it
may bo provided by sBthomafieal techniques and symbolism, Hanson
remarks, apropos of the latter sort of * pattern* e
Mathematical toolmiques' more subtle and powerful than the geometry of Kepler, Galileo, Beeokmrm, Descartes and Hewton are vital to to-day's physical thinking. Only these toclmiqixes can organise into a system of , o:cplahâtion the chaotically diverse properties which fmidamental particles must have if observed phenomena are to be explained# ( 1%)
The quasi-inotrivaentalist holds, then, that to prd-apply T to E
is to infer E* from B* in accordance v;ith-T§ but he denies that
QXp-appllcation of T to E is merely p3?d-applicatioii ' upside^*down',
for he claims that T's explanatory power is, to a certain degree,
logically independent of its usefulness as a predictive device#
In view of this fact, it is important to distinguish the 
quasi-lnstrumentalist position from the view labelled ' instrumentalis'
w
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by Popper# He accuoes proponents of thio view of caring about 
nothing but "(a) . masteS S& i# o@
of the instrument® and (b)
Instrumentalism thus aubverto the Gali3.ean doctrine that 
theories are "not only instrcumpnto but also (and maj^ i3,y) 
desoriptioxaB of the w o r l d ® f o r  it regarda 'laws' ao "nothing 
but computation ruloo (or inference mleo)® fundamentally of tho 
aamo. character am the computation rules of the so-called ' applied' 
sciences# WMle the qimsi-inatrumentaliat nay, as wo hBYO
Been® thinlc of theories aa inference rules rather than ao 
true-or-faloe premiaaea from which empirical otatpments aro . 
deduciblo® ho cannot bo aocuood of roegardlng theories sololy as 
pradictivo devices g ; for hê insists that tho or les ehould help 
to rendor obseon/able data intplligible® as well as sub servo 
prodiotlVG Inferenoa# Poppor, on tho other hand, would (po:t?haps) 
arguo tlmt tîiio is hot enough® that theories must bo rogarcdod 
ae tri^-gr«fa]^ doaoriptions of the world, and not just as Xooi; , 
of conoGptrial patterns whex'oby data are rcndezeed intelligibles . ,
He statesÿ for oxomplos
■ The. soiehtiBt aj.ms jit fiWg% a true, thoq^.or desW^^t^ of. the world (and ospeciaîîy of its régula#ties or 
i^awo^ )-® which s M J  also be mi j^pWm;blgn of the 
observable facts# (This means that a description of these fapt0 must bo,"doliupiblG from the theory in conjunction 
with certaiii statements, the oo-callod ' initial 
Gonditiona' *)(
An/
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An argummt between Popper and a wuaoi-inBtximmtaliGt 
concerning the relative importance of the desorlptive® aa * •' 
against explanatory, function of a theorymi^t degenerate 
into a quibble over the meaninga of klescribe' and 'explain*.
For surely, in providing a oonceptual pattern for the ordering 
of phenomenap  a theory can be said to plày a descriptive role; 
and to carry out wtmt Popper regards as the scientist' a aim 
is to construct theories which help explain - in thé quasi- 
instzûméntâlist ' s sense - phenomena# Nonetheless, if one 
begins by thinking of theory'^ oonatraotion in terms of formulating 
'conceptual gestalts/, then he is unlikely to view theories as 
primarily descriptive in functions emphasis on 'models' and bn 
the orderly colligation of phenomena is apt to prove an 
insurmountable obstacle to regarding theories in this way* This 
is not, of course, to say that quasi-lnstrumentalists deny that 
theories have a descriptive function» as Toulmin says,, "tho laws 
themselves do not do anything: it is we who do things with thorn, "
Fhysicists use Newton's Laws "to describe, say, the way a shell 
moves" # the 1mm® however, "do not sot out by themselves to tell 
us anything about the actual motions Pf particular bodies, but 
rather provide a. form of deooription to use in accounting for 
these m o t i o n s . it is likely Poppér would argue that, on 
the/
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the oontaaasy, Ilevrtosi^ s Laws do jg iLteigjlveo àesoïihe 
ooï'talu. of the T,m0.d’s ■*regulas?itioH os? iixm't
Philosophai© of soienoo some times talk of the 'zâhgd or 
'ocopa* of application (applicahility) of theories and laws# 
ToulBiin makes much of a diatinotion between statemante of 
scop© and statements of the t3ieory or law itself ® claiming that 
this diotinctiorji is oharaoteflstio of all physical theories and 
la%78. It l8 worth notioing variouG ways in whloh he disouseee the 
notion of ' scope ', Statements of a cops are aald to be of the 
form "X'a lat7 has been found to hold, or not to hold, for suoh- 
andrsuoh systems under aùobwahd-suôh olroumstahqes# Lsiws
of nature "are the , sorts of statements about whioh it ie 
appropriate to ask, not "Is it true or not?* but rather 'To what 
syatema oan tills be applied? ', or 'Hnder what olrqumstancos does 
this hold? Toulmln notes a "division of labour
in plysioB, between laws themsolvos and statements about the 
ways in whidi, and tb© ciroimstanoeo in i^oh ImTq âre to bo 
applied,"(^70) igQ say that a theory has a limited scope is
to say that "only a limited range of phenomena can be explained 
using that t h e o r y # " We should distinguish between talking 
about a theory, e*g, , "recognising a situation as one in which 
a imrtioular theo^ qua bo employed," and talking ^  #*7#. of 
a theory, e.g. "employing the theory in that situation on the 
assumption/
aesimptloa that It has been- oors^eotly Identlfled#
Toulmln repeats this distinction, contzBstlng "idontifylBg 
a system as one to which [a theor^ applies" with "applying It 
to oacplain or foré toll the pliénomenu ooourrlûg jhi suoh'^ and-^ migh 
a Finally, the phÿeloiét's predilection fo^
mlcWg "à limited humbercOf observations covering' à wide range 
of olroimetmiceo" is eald by Toûlmlâ to manifest hie aim "to 
dieoover the of the theory, not its degree of truth or
tho 'conditions bn whloh it can be accepted as true# "("^ 4^)
Séveml omblguitiWe are evident in these statementse a statement 
of scope ie mid to mention both 'syetems® or 'phenomena* for 
whldh®. àe well ae toircmmstoncesÀ or 'sitûatlènë* in whloh, êl 
theozy or law either 'holdo* or 'can be employed^) etatOmente of 
écope are also said to assert 'tW Wye? and 'oircimstanoee* in 
iThioh laws 'are to be applied!' # Note too that eubh a stàtëmGhk 
asserts both that a law has been foiihd to holà® and that a law 
does holds the first is, X should have thought# a different 
statement from the second, since it merely reports an experimental 
discovery vaiereg&s the .second, makes a claim apropos of a proposed 
application of the law#. Against tMe® .Toulmin wmild argiie that the 
fact that a law L; has been found to hold for systems of type S under 
conditions of type C ' is prima' fa.cie a good reason for presuming 
that it does hold (can be applied to) system S' under conditions O', 
where/
where 8* and O' resemble 8 and 0 in 'pbyaically eignifleant* 
respecte. The astrophysiolet® for ineWioe,. presumee the some 
laws to be exp-applioable to motion of tlie pearte of a double-star 
%8 have been foiind to exp-apply to snoh phenomena as the motion 
of falliing npplee and of tho satellites of Jupiter: he makee this 
preemption on the strength of what Toulmiai describes 'as * stiuotural 
resemblances' between systems within wMoh® and conditions under 
whidh® phenomena aré. observed to take place# This is to follow 
the methodologlqil preceptg "Unless there is some reason to 
suppose that a novel phenomenon oannot be explained in terms of 
the theory which it is natiirai to turn to first, there is every
3?Gason to tiipi fi3?Bt to tlmt theory# As Toitlmlu justly
remaiks, this is not a very dangerous prooept*
Popper, as mW%t be e%peoted, attacks suoh a oonoep'oion or 
'scope'# He argues tlmt since, "for instrumontel purposes of 
praotioal application® a theory may oontinue to be used s]mn after 
its refutation# within the limits of its applicability®" it 
follows that "the inotrumenl^liet interpretation will therefore 
be unable to account for real tosts, which are attempted 
refutations, and will not get beyond the assertion that different 
theories have different rangee of application»"^ Hence
iristmmentall an/
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instinmientaliSBi oamiot accomit for soientific progroeop and 
"may well be responsible foz* the reoent stagnation in(176a)theoretical physios. " Quoting Heisenberg as leaving said?
We do not say any longer# Newton* a meohahica io false.. @ 
Bather v/e now use the following formulation: * Classioal meohanics... la overyivhero oxaotly 'right* whore ita 
ooncopta can be applied* ®
Popper ooriffiBnts?
Since 'right* here means 'applicable', this assortion amomite precisely to saying 'OlaBaioal meohanioo ie applicable where its conoepte can be applied' - which is not saying much* ^ 7^/)
Uhfortunately, hovmvor, Popper misquotes neioenberg® and it
seems to me that what the latter actually sayo cannot be so easily
turned into a truism#
Olassical moohsnics# * * is everywhere a strictly 'correof 
description of nature® where its concepts can be applied#
Heisenberg goes on to explain that the clause Wiere its
concepts can be applied" is meant only to Indicate "that we
consider the rang© of application of Newtonian theory to be
limited# This is surely unexceptionable® and not so
trivial as Popper's comment suggests* Indeed, it is not, on
Popper's own showing, an 'instmmontalist* remark at all, for
Heisenberg is not saying that Newtonian physios may be used
'for instrumental purposes of practical application* within
limits of its applicability? he is rather asserting what I
should think Hopper would vholohoartodly endorse that 
within limita of its applicability (l#eo applicability of
its concepts)® Newtonian plweioo gives a true description of thef 4» V  V  iesrS-Gtitt=3tt±ii r”iT.>,ifi"ifi,:j "' v*
world;
B* Philosoph03?a frequently address themselves to problems 
which fall under the heading 'applioation/applicabiliiy of 
mathematics to the world (reality, facts, oxperionae, &o# ) ' & Here, 
to supplement sentences of group (ill), is an assortment of 
remarks concerning these problems#
(a) This transcendental principle of the mathematics of appearances.,.#. alone cen make pure mathematics, in 
its complete precieion® applicable to objects of , experience# (Kant)
(b) The laws of mmber® therefore, arç not really
applicable to external tliingo; they are not laws of nature, They are® hov/ever, applicablo to judgements 
holding good of things in the external worlds . they are laws of the laws of nature. (Frego)
(o) Wliether a geometry can be applied iio the actual
(d) It is a mere matter of fact timt a certain system of arithmetic applies to the world ^  a 4 1  A É â
another system of arithmetic could have boon applied 
to the world without tho world' Q being different in any other way# but it would have applied differently# (Britton)
(®)/
» X 6 5 ' ?
(g ) Thtio the problem of applioatlon of euclideangeometiy to physical space turns out to be illusory® and it mist be replaced by the wider problem of application to the physical world of a comprehensive 
f ormalism wliloli covers both geometry and meohanioo - the formalism of the.theory of relativity, for example. (Kneebono) \*79)
It may also be useful to give examples of statements whioh 
mention mathematical dovioos (i.e. systems and components of 
systems) as instnmentally or quasi-instja^entally iiwolved in 
activities in which they might be said to be applicativoly 
involved# for example, talko of "the use -of mathematiCQ
in describing nature";^ Popper observes "the caloulus of 
natural numbers is usod in order to count billiard balls," whereas 
"the calculus of real numbers provides a framework for 
measurements of continuous magnitudes such as geometrical 
distances or velooltiGs"§ ( ,  Ayer éaye "we can uso a geometry 
to reason about physical spaoe'Leinco, qfter interpreting its 
axioms® "we can proceed to apply the theorems to the objects which 
satisfy the axioms" g end Gassiap deso^bps a mathematical 
thoorem as "an instrument facilitating operations with factual 
statementsp namely, tlie deduction of a factual conclusion from 
factual premisses# ) NeOdless. to say, mô3.%r more ^ examples 
of such statements could bo adduced# .
w
In the epacG (and time) now at my disposal I am unable
to deal adequately with this vast topic# T w  general questions
are of epeolal eignif ioance in this context# One oonoerne the
relation of Interpretation of mathematical systems to their
applications this is particularly important with respect to
geometrical calouli (rathey? oalouli interpretable ae phyeical
geometries)# The other, a Gomewhat loss technical and more
philosopMcal ieme, oonoessm the Khntimi wwmdrom'g Why io it
possible to apply pure mathematioe to the world (experienoe,
reality® &o*)?;. Many intriguing remarks have been made,; by botii
matliomatioians and philosophers® about this second qiieetion  ^for
exemple, Gollingwood'o remark apropos of the 'Ronaissonco
conception of nature's
Thus, the poseibility of àn applied mathomatico is on expresGion, in terms of natural science, of the
Christian-belief .that nature is the creation of an omnipotent God# (
Rather than pursue those interesting and important questions®
however® I comment briefly on the applicative involvement of
arithmetical propositions#
According to Frego,‘the propooitioh ' if we pour .2 unit 
volumes of à liquid into 3 unjt volumes -of a liquid we .shall have
7/
7 imita volumes of liquid* ia "an application" of the 
proposition *5  ^2 » % b h  tho same point is made
y Popper® who says timt '2 4* 2 » 4' can be 'applied' in t m  
senses to objects such as appleb#^^'^^ In the first sense,
"the application is not real but only apparent" since "we do 
not describe here reality® but only assert that one way of 
deBcribing reality is equivalent to another my#-" This mode 
of 'applioatioh* io exemplified in the etàtemmt *8 apples 4- 8 
apple0 o 4 apples' (A). I)i the seoohd sense, on the other 
band, "the statement *2^ 2 » 4  ^helps ua to calcul ate ® i # e # ® to 
#soribe oertaih pliyeioal facts, and tho symbol otemds for 
a pliyeical manipulation - for phyeically adding certain thihga 
to other things," Thio second mode of application 16 exômplif led 
in the statement 'If somebody has put two apples in a certain 
baoket, end then a^in two, end has not taken any dppleo out of 
the basket, there will be four In it* (b)© Ko&m makes a 
similar distinction between the two statemaita (l) 'Two 
shillings plus two shillings equals, four shillings' and (XX)
' If you put two shillings in a purse oontâining two shillings 
then you will have four shillings in it's he calls (l) "an 
application of '2 t 2 # 4' in very weak sense," and suggeoto 
tMt "until the words 'plus' and 'equals' in (I) are given a 
physical/
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pb^ 'sioèA ïïieaning or repla-cement. * * the etatoment (%) is, oo 
to speaîcp a mongrel«oBipirioal® not a purely empirical statement $ " ( 
Popper's 3’oasôn for oailing (B) an 'application' in. a 'real' eenso 
of *2-}* 2 ss 4* is similar to Keene's reason for ao cording this . 
status to (XX)s Popper claims that *2 t 8 ^  4' as interpreted
in (B), "becomes a pl^ rsioal theory® rather than a logical ono,"
We find Bimiyn arguing alo% the same lines as Frege, Popper and. 
Keene# "How doee '2 2 * 4 ^  have an application? Surely by
enabling one to derive mioh statements as 'If you put two apploo 
with another two apples you will get four apples' What
does Hamlyn me# by 'derive' here? Ho later writes?
There is an essential connection between "2 4^ 2 4" and
its application* It is because the formula "2 + 2 4"must hold that we can say that the statement which
comprises its application must be true, (3.89)
Bince he also talks of 'oontlngenoies in v/Moli the formula does 
not apply'*, we mig^ reformulate this otatement$ If '2 4? 2 « 4^  
applies to (holds for) X'e then the statement 'If twoX'o are. 
put with another two X's you will get four X'e' must be true©
The fommla does not apply to drops, but it does apply to apples) 
therefore it can be applied to apples but not to drops, To apply 
'2 4* 2 4' to X'b may be either (1) to assert that there will bo
foui» X's if two X's are put wi# another two X's, or (s) to infer 
that there will bo four X's on grounds that two X's are (have been) 
put/
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put up with another two X's. Eemoe® to say that the foimla
can be applied to apples is to say that (l) and (2) are 
pemitted In oase X'b are apples; and to deny its applicability 
to drops is to deny that (1) or (2) is permlttod in case X'o are 
drops, Tho relation between (l) and (2) ±b that of Infosrenco- 
warrant to infGronoes to justify an inforenoG that there will 
he four X?8® &o,® one may appeal to the 'fact*/'rule' that 
if two X's are put with another tm X's® &o«
Frege argues that 'the laws of number' (e*g, '2 + 2 *a 4'
Interpreted rule) "assert not oonnections between phenomena® 
but oomieotiona between judgments® " though oinoe "among 
judgfiionts are inoluded the laws of nature," and sineo "every 
proposition of arithmetic a law of logio® albeit a derivative 
one®" he concludes that "to apply aritlmetio in the physical 
sciences is to bring logic to bear on observed facts. "(iGpa)
Frege's contrast between arithmetical laws and laws of nature is 
represented in this diagram;
assG3?t connections between phenomena
laws of nature
aritlmetioal laws "
are applicable to external things (phenomena) 
assert connections between judgments
 ^are applicable to judgments
How®/
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Now® in line with this distinction® we might expect Frege 
to argue against the analysis of the proooding paragraph;
'2 4 2 4' is not 'applicable' to apples and 'inapplicable'
to drops® for to apply '2 4* 2 - 4* to X's is really to apply 
this Saw to (1) judgments that there will be four X's if two 
X'e are put with another two X's, or to (8) judgmonte (a) that 
there will be four X'o and (b) that two X^s are (have been) 
put with another two X's®, whore judgment (a) io mado on loho basis 
of (deduced from) jud^ent (b)# And, Frege might go on to say®
'2 4* 2 q, 4' ' aoGorto thp donneotion bot^Wn judfpento (,a) ond\
(b) in #rtue of which (a) io (cm bo), judged on the baGio/of , . 
judgment.,(b)*.:.. it;fo).low8 that in applying '2 t 4\ to (1) or 
to (2) o^ pe io 'bringing logicto bear' Oh 'obseryod, facts'® for 
tho judgniçnts’ which comprise, (l) and (2) can be said to %old 
good• of;things in,the. external world*, namely X's# But® -pf course, 
à propoaitioii tl#t,e]q>^esa08 the, ,cb#ent of (l) is tzue only 
if X's are G#g# apples® tntrue if-X's are e.g# drqps; 
deduction, of judgment (a) from judgment (b) is m l  id only if 
X'o are o,g# apples® invalid if , X/é. are e#g# dropc^
In the first of the two following essaya I supplement 
my disGUBBion of the application of arithmetical formuiao and 
laws by oonoidoring Wittgenstein's views on this and other 
dosely related topios* In the second essay I deal with 
some problems conoezning the application of rales of inference#
[l] Arguing against the formalists in GrondgesQtso. Frege 
claims that "an arithmetic with no thought as its content will 
also be without possibility of application*" He goes on to argue?
can no application be made of a ooiifigoration of chess 
pieces? Obviously® because it expresses no thought* If it 
did so and every chesB move eonfoxming- to the rules 
corresponded to. a transition from one thought to another, 
applications of chess would also be conceivable* Why can arithmotloal equations be applied? Only because they express 
thoughts* How could we possibly apply àh equation which 
expressed nothing and was nothing more than a group of figures® 
to be transformed into another group of figures in etocordtmod : 
with certain rules? low® it is applicability alone which elevates arithmetic from a game to the rank of a science*
So applicability necessarily belongs to it* Is it good® then® 
to exclude from arithmetic what it needs in order to be a 
seience?
Froge admits that the formalists® Thome for e3Eaï%>lé® oontrast 
"the arbitrary rules of chess with the rules of arithmetic";
but ho complains that they do this only in terms of bho 
applicability of arithme.tio® whereas within the domain of formal
arithmetic/
aâdtîÉietiô -’H'üa miles apgoaÿ an azbltcazy as those of ohssa," i'^9'^)- . ■ 
#he formalist* iii effeot* shifts this problem * thé appassmt
noa=arbitr&rl&GBs of arithmetic * "to the shoulders of his
• (iQla)oolleaguGSÿ the geometers $ the phjeicist e and the astronomers 3" ^  ," .
Y/ho rightly decline to attack it oinoe* in viet/ of the
manifold applications of arithmetical formulae^ "it is likely
that the problem of the usefulness of arithmetic is to be -
solved independently of those soiencGa to trhioh it is to be
applied»" So it is that^ ^in order to bridge the gulf betvTOon '
arithmetical formulae and their applications g it is néaeaeary 
that. fornmlae express a sense and that the. rules- bo grounded • * '
in the reference of the signs#"
It is noteworthy that Frege frames his quarrel with the 
formalists in terms of the meaning of mathematical formula©».y  . w„ Kij- ^
What distinguishes mathematics from a mere game»: he claims^ , is its 
applicability^ and the only way to aodoimt for this difference ; 
is to remark the difference in signifioanoe between formuJao 
and calculations as against cheea configurations and chess moves; 
it can bo seen that Frege locates this difference in the fact 
that, the former * express thoughts' whereas the latter do not#
Frege contrasts ’meaningful* with ’formai’ arlthmotiog^^^^^ the 
latter* since its numsrioal signs have no reference (Bedeutun^). 
consisté/ . :
consistB of truth^ ^^ vaiuoleas and senseless formulae^ for 
oiily signs \vhloh "baim'beom ^ von a lefeionoé oah bo ùsed 
'hi sentence# expressing true thoughts*"^ ) Compara .Frege’s 
Interest In the memilngfulness of matbématiôal propositions 
T^ith Wittgenstein’8 diotume "Vfbatmathematloal proposition^ 
do stand in need of is a olarification of their gmmmr# "(^^4) 
Significantlyp this comes as ah answer to the quostloh "What 
does mathematios need a foundation forT"# That imthematios
does need a^oundation # a foundation in logio is* of oourso,
. . .  - / a sta^^ting pojnt of Frege’s piX)g:mimo8 Vfittgenstein’s answer
here is* in offeot* a repudiation of ihé programme# Typical
of his arguments against it is: -thiss
5 redaction of arithmetic to symbolic logic is supposed to shOTf the point: of application of arithmetio^ as it . were the attâc#ièht by means Of whiph it is plugged into 
its applibhtiph# ** i, , But the attachment,.#, is on the one . hahd too harrow* on the other hand too wide; too genezal and too special* Thoùalôulatioh tàkôs/ôarê of its own application* (195)
Wliioh may be understood to be dirootod against Such rÔBiarks as
Frege’8$ ' • ■ ■ ■
Arithmetic thus becomes simply a devolopmont of logiq* and every préposition of arithmetic a law of logic, albeit,a derivative one* To apply arithmetic in the physical scienoes is tq bring logic to- bear on observed facts; calculation becomes deduotionyw^)
Frcllmii$,ry/
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Preliminary to oonsidoring the. views of Wittgenstein himself*
I want to give a brief exposition of Walamami’o objections to the 
above^quoted argument of Frege© Yfeismann aqknowledgea indebtèdjiesB 
to Wittgenstein for at least one of his objections* and it seems 
to .me tliat the latter’s influenoe is evident in others as well©
Waiemann applauds Frege’s attention to the question of 
application of arithmetical formulae* but gives his plaudit© a 
oharaotèrietically WittgenBteinoevn twist by claiming "if one 
diseagagas himself vAolly from the applieatioas, ffiâ if 9SË. tendra 
§ii MSa E4B. ' # 9^  svffiely one is merely playing ,
a gams."h90 ''tt© otijaots^  howevery /eo Sl’age's inslstGacç tîad'b 
behind the applicability of nmthematios lies the fact that 
mathematical formulae exprésp /bhovighta# When asked for the meaning 
of a formula wo give examples of its appXicatidnr:and render the 
formula verbally; if it has neither applioition nor verbal, 
expression, then Waiman!^^ says we should seek to incorporate it in 
some ’wider syntactic oontext!^^^^^ This means* 1 think, that 
wo should give it a place in some ’ langiisge^ g^ame ’ either by 
extending an existing’game’ or by crbating a new one (though Waiémann 
wotild perhaps.claim that extension just is creation in this case).
As to instances of the first type in which the meaning of a 
formula is' explained by giving examples of its applloatidn and 
■by/
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by rendering it verbally Waismami asko whether a child
taught the meaning in this way doesn’t yef grasp the ’proper
sense ’ of the formula and is able to make only ’modhanical’ use
of it* It is somewhat surprising, as Buimett notes in a review
of Waismann’s book* to find Frege aooused by implication if not
explicitly .# of ’ psychologism Waienmm uses the phrasesand *eih Vorgang des Yersteiiens’’ein geietiger Yorgang’/in disoussLng Frege’s ’expreBsiosi of
thoughts’, and he writes;
But w%ien someone asks, me what "1 + 1 «» 2Y means* thon I won^ t answer with a description of my montai condition, but with an explanation of the sifm*^ ' ^
To interpret Frego’ s'phrase ’escpressioh of thoughts’ as
symptomatic of psyohologism is* I think* seriously to misopnstrue
In dealing with the passage quoted above*, wherein Frege 
contrasts arithmetic with chose and conoludes that tho latter 
lacks application because it expresses no thoughts* Waismsm argues 
that, on the contrary, application alone accounts for the 
signifioanoQ of arithmetical equations as against oonfiguràtlons 
of ehess'^ men# Thus we should not say; ’Since a chess configuration 
expresses no thought, therefore it lacks application’ ; but rather, 
’Since we have provided it with no application, therefore a chess 
configuration expresses no thought, If arithmetical equations
did not subsorvG laforenoo from on@ (non^ arlthmetloal 
proposition to another, then aritlmotio would be a more. game*
Chess ooiifigurations might Wvo appli<mtion* o#g* à general 
plan a battle on a ohess board* and in. aioh a casé they are not 
mere positions in a game# but oan be said to have sense. This . 
shows, Vfaismom. olaims, tMt application alone aooounts for the 
significance of orithmetio as against oheos* (The idea that 
’matheimtioa3. propositions subserve inference ’ is pervasive 
throughout Wittgenstein’s Remarkq© and is* I believe* aoknowledged 
by Wàifôiiiann to be duo to Wittgenstein, )
The RomosAie bn the Pbundations of %thematios containsn in 
bits and piooes* Wittgonstoin’% philosophy of mathmatios (more 
precisely* perhaps* it contains Wittgenstein’s attempts to clarify 
his dictum that what mathematioal propositions need is a 
clarification of their grammar)# !% primary aim* in what follows* 
is to discuss the r8le Wlttgenstein assigns to ’application’ as a 
deteminont of the meaning of mathematical propositions; in the 
oourse of my disoussiqn* liowever* I consider other central themes 
of Roimrks* in nartioular the relation of ’proof’ to the ’grmnmar’ 
of mathematical propositions*
Mathematics* according to Renmike# is "a motley of techniques 
of proof*" and upon this fact "is based its manifold applicability 
and/
and its importances^ for it Tteaoheo us to" operate- wl#. 
concepts, in a new 'Wy#S It -concepts" 'oM/"fptme a netwp#c
of norms"; vjhere "’to give a new_concept!'.pan, only mega to introduce 
a new employment of a concept#. a new practice." and ’’concepts
correspond to a partioulçvr vmy of dealing wlüi situations*
Contrasting mathematics and games* Wittgenstein says# "it is the 
use outside mathematics a and po the meaning of the signs* that • 
makes the slgn^game Into mathematios"; this connects with his 
remark "It Is essential to mathematics that Its signs are also 
employed In that is to oay, ro^@ma$|oal. fomilae
sub serve non-mà themati cal Inference* @,g. In making prediptlons* 
building bridges and measuring distances; they play this role 
because they are regarded as rules or standards* and their statue 
as rules or standards derives from their having been proved© HenceI , . ; i ' ’ eaiear*:it«.^«aa.ns%
the notion of proof Is crucial in Wittgenstein’s philosophy of 
mathematlosg the ’must’ which a mathematical }p?oof introduces 
is said to correspond "to a track which X lay down In language," 
and’tiathematiqal propositions are instrimiento taken up into the 
language once for all - and their proof shews where they stand© 
(Seveml paragraphs later# however* the phrase ’Instrument of 
language’ Is applied to M S B Â  und to palculatidng Wittgenstem’s
tendency to throw ’mathematical proposition’* ’proof’ 
’calculation’ all into the same basket is perhaps a reflection 
of/
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of his dlotum; "In mathematics j^ 'ooess and roehlt are 
equivalent
Ooncorning the nature of mathematical proof, WittgenBtein
oays "proof must he a procédure 'plain to view," "what io
proved by a mathematical proof is set up as an internal relation
and withdrawn from doubt" ; he warns against regarding the
proof as "à procédure that compels youo" sup:geeting that it is
rather a procédure which "guidoa#». your conoention of a (particular)
situation"; "the proof as it were guides our experience into
definite channelsp" in that it "moulds our language" and "leads me
to aeyg tliie must be like thi8q"(^^^) Proof connecte wiih
’application’ in thie ways
The proposition proved by means of the proof serve a as 
à rule w and bo as a paradigm# For we go ^  the rule#
But does.the proof only bring ua to the point of going by tills rule (aoceptihg it), or does it also shew us hogwe are to go by it?
For the mhth^atioâl proposition is to shew ue vhat itmakes SEliBB to say# ;
The proof constructs a proposition; but the point ia how- it cohetruotb it* Bometimea, it first construdta a number end then cornea the proposition that there is such à number# When we say that the construction must convince US or the proposition* that means that it must lead ub to 
ap>ply this proposition in suoh-^d^suoh a way* That it 
must détermine us to accept this as sense* that not#(209)
It can perliaps be gathered from the last two sentences of this 
paragraph that application of the proposition in euoh'^ and^ s^uoh
V
& \7ay is manifested ia acoeptaace of this as ama®. ‘ttet as 
nonseme#: Wlmt det8a:W,nG# how we apply the propoéltlon (what 
%?e aooept aa eenae, %Yhat not) le not tk^ the proposition is
proved, hut rather the way ixi whioh, or how# it is provèâo
Proof * one might eay* does not merely shew that it iB like this# but; how it is like thie*
The proof (the proofi^ pjlotiore), shew# ue the result of a procedure (the construction); and we are 
convinced that a procedure rbW,atéd : in ' thie way 
always leads to this picture# v-lv;
% a t  convinces no (i*e* what makes th-G proof**picture a
picture for uo) liée open to view; "We eee in the proof, the reason
: ' ' ' ' ' (913) 'for eaying that this must he the result* " It is not thatV  ' ' *««jïrrâÉs.rÿ3iirts»
the proof^«pioture is like thie vhioh lead# uô to aooept the
pioture as a proof, but rather how the ploture yields the result*
When, for example* we regard Figure (a) ào proof that a rectangle
can be made of two parallelogmma and two, triangles* we do not
see it merely as a picture of two parol lelograme and two triangleo
arranged to form a rectangle» we rather see in it how a reotan^o
(2191 "is to be (can be) oonstruotod from ouch shapea©^  . That is 
to say, we grasp a tecbniquo or procedure whereby to oonstniot a 
rectangle, from triangles and parallelograms © Our conviction that 
a reotaag^ ,e can be so oonstruotèd derives from our seeing 
,a/
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^ reprqduoible in the proof«*pioW7e; in seeing how
to malce the cone tract Ion in (a), we eee (a) ae a nroôf#;nictùre 
of the possibility of (making) each a construotioh for m y  
reotangle (where ’any’ aignifles that this poesibility ie a
maxic of the concept of rectangle)*^ '^ '^^ ^
Figure (a)
The ’ inexorability ! of this .proof-piolmre « that it leads us
to Gay ’ and regard it as .established that a reotan^e can
be oonstruoted of two parallelograms and two triangles * derives
from our giving it proof ^status*, and this is manifested in what
we do with the result#
Here we have something that looks inexorable **©, And. yet it. .can be ’ inexorable ’ only, in its •conBoquenoesI For otherwise it is nothing but a .pioture#,(^14)
Wittgenstein urges in another context, that# as regards the
difference between certainty "that "I cannot ’know" what io going
on in him" and certainty deriving from mathematiosl domonstration,
(215)."the kind of certainty is the kind of language game.’’' *
(Another/
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( A x i o h h s T instance of this .lias of thoagsit le the .ciueBtioa 
YEow is...’the certainty that this is the .case! nimifested ;lii. 
himmn a c t i o n ? T h e  point here * mid a. leading theéis 
of. RemigcB ** le that to undarstmid the certainty. Wi'^ 'h,which we 
regard imthematical propositions one. should look at the 
application of these propoaitiono w the langw^ge^gèmeê and 
activities p the forms of life in which they play a }prt and whiqh 
they actually aha^ « rather than at psyohologi.oal concd[^tahts 
of accepting a proposition as proved* Certainty appertaining to 
màthematioai propositions is distihguished in point of these 
factors from that appGftaihihg to such statements as "I pannot
know wimt is going on in h W ’# and not in point, of psyohological
factors# Dut ;ln both oases oonviotion is manifested in what
we regard as sense,, and what as nonsense, in what we regard .as
possible, and what as impossibles .this. detqzm.inati0h';of. our,.
concepts'.comes out in. the application we make of the propositions*
Here once again we cqmo to the expression "the proof' convinces us"» And what interests .us about oonviotion here is neither its expression by voice or gesture#,: nor yét the feeling of satisfaction or oiQrthing of that IdLnd; but i W  :mtifioation in theemplpy^ento.f is proved#
\ -
hemsrkà V/ittgênstein coiTLSiders what it is to
Tmderstand the proposition ’proved’ by a non«"Oonetruotive 
existence proof, e*g* "a proof jtha-Q convinces you that there
is/
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l8 a root of an eqimtlon (without giving you any idea where) * " 
While, he says* you may "he ooavinoed tMt the appliostlon of the 
proved proposition will turn up*" noaetheleaa "you do not 
Tmderstand the proposition ao long ao you Imve hot foimd the 
applioationg" He repeats this Q, slightly different way# saying 
that one imderstando a mathematical proposition formed "la a 
grammatical ly correct way" oiO-y "whm one can apply it^" But 
thie awwer la twice again reformulated; first, "when one has a 
clear picture of its application"; and eecondly# "when ono 
conmande a clear view of ite application," Wittgeasteln le 
dissatiefied with the first reformulation because "it is not 
enough; to connect a clear picture with it," and he considers the 
second reforrailatiosi to. be "bad, for the matter is simply one of 
not imagining tîmt .the ‘ application is,-where it is not, of not 
being deceived by the verbal form of the proposition©" By ’verbal 
f03331 of the proposition.: he means the sehtcnco "there lo.© © " 
whioh is the l%rtausdruok of what the/exiptenoe'wxiof purports
■ I \ yto establish# Returning to this question In IVvlio# Wlttgenste^ 
aslm whether "1* understand the nro'Doaltlom ’There Is* ©*© ’ vlion I 
have no pooslbllliy of finding where it exists," mid answers;
"I understand it so far as I can explain It" (l^e* so far as I 
con explain It grammatically oomect BiKglish sentonoe); but 
since/
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sinoe I cannot do with it (so* vâMi its proof) "what I can do 
with a constzuotive proof," and In. so far as ^ ’what I can do with 
the proposition 1b tho criterion of tmderetan,ding it," it foil0X7a 
that "it ie not oloar in advance whether and to what extent X 
undorstand it," What can be done with (a proposition proved by) 
a conatraotlvo exietenca proof is to ’locate’, through application 
of the proof-pro oedure, what it convinoes ,U8 that there is*
For example, s'appoo© a proof % 8tabli8h08%: that the pattern ’pf’ 
occur8 in the expansion of tr but does not show, where (ioQ* does. te?5W6i|«sWpssa»d»- ^
not give a procedure for ’locating* lt),(^^^) Hot oven God,
Wlttgenstoin olaims, could know x?h@ther this pattei%i ooours at, say,
the n ~  p'osition of the expansion; even He cannot see in the rule
of 0Xpa%islon alone that *^ * does (does not) ocour at t È e É ^  place,
since "even God can determine something mathematical only by .
mathematics#**(^ ^O) argument *=* against the ’picture* of
thoccurrence or hon-^ocourrenoe of a pattern at tho n ™  place of an 
expansion being already settled in the rule of expansion ? connects 
with Wittgenstein’s disoussion of ’understanding the meaning of a 
word’ g as the ’mere rulo of expansion’ for tt does not tell 
us whether or not ’pf’ is to bo written at the n ^  place, sc tho 
future employment of a word is not somehow ’present’ in an ’act’ 
of grasping its meaning# In Investigations Wittgenstein warns
against inferring, from the premissea (l) vze oertainly understand
}a/
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a word and (2) its meaning lies in its employment, the 
oonolusion (3) its "future development, must in some way already 
be present in the act of graeping the employment and yet isn’t
p r e s e n t S i m i l a r l y ,  he would wa%s% against infer#ng from
ththe fact that given a rule of expansion we can determine the
place of the expansion, to the oonolusion that this do termination
is somehow already present in the rule, as .it w^re, so that to
thdemonstrate the existence of some pattern at the n ™  place is 
to make a discovery of what is already settled in the rule© What 
we are given in the rule of expansion for IT, and what we have . 
in understandiig the meaning of a word, 1$; a teolmigue# Only
by applying a oalcuiati*%^teolmique do we establish that oomps
th “ .at the place of the expansion, and only by exercising language-
techniques do we manifest our grasp of a word’s meaning*
To return how to the problem of understanding a non-
construotively ’ proved’ existential proposition, we recall that
Wittgenstein sets out the criterion of understanding a mathematicel
proposition in three ways*
(1) One understands P only when ho ’can apply it’ (wonn man ihn
(2) One understands F only when he ’has a clear view of its application’ (wonn man ein IdLares Bild von seiner àmmnàmw:<$*te69Mteg8 ,!« r.'. « tosevSisSWti» ' ç2tjivsè£W15roeiRR*Va^lWaie4fhat)*(3) One understands P only when he ’commands a clear view ofits application’ (wenn man oine ld,afo ubersioht von seiner•A* •*' >  feciigcuBaa^ «t*^-«ap«a#wrK5«X» #eB5éMi;«FSW^-wtaWe:**«ss3fti^ f  j.-uüxvK'tAnwendung hat).
V/0 re call, too that he saya "what I can do with the proposition 
is the oritorioii of understanding it." But in so far aa the proof 
of P determineB what can he done with P, the question ofLunderstanding 
P is hound up with that of proving IH indeed, Wittgenetolia seems 
to hold that the proof ^ glvee P its meaning. To illustrate the 
interconnection among ’understanding P%, ’ proof of P* and 
* application of P’ ", let us suppose an intititionist mathematician 
to ’go through’ two proofe of P@ he claims not to understand P as 
’proved* hy the first, a non-oonstruotiv^ proof whioh Imolves ah 
Axiom of Ohoioe at some stage; hut he claims to understand P as .
(constructively) proved by the second,; which does not iiivolve an 
Axiom of Ohoioo*(^^^) The question is# in what sense is the 
’application^ of P made clear by the second proof# but not by the 
first? Or, alternatively, in what sense is one ’in a position to 
apply? P as established by the second proof in contrast to the 
first?
Wittgenstein* s answer to this question would@ I thWc, 
involve tM. difficult notions of * perspicuity* and ’reproducibility* 
of proofs#, and the view that imthematical propositions lay down
, ■ IÎ’conceptual connections* (Be^riffGverknuufuimén) in virtue of 
their proofs. With considerable diffidence I try now to outline 
Wittgenstein’s treatment of these ideas# thereby to throw light on 
*application * /
■s» . 1 8 4 » ^
’application* déterminant of the memiing of mthomatioal
propoeltlong# Several paseagee from Remascke are pertinent;
(a) How far, does the applioation of a mathomatical proposition depend on what io allowed to count ad a proof of it and what id not?
(b) For ie the sense, the point, of a mathematical
proposition really clear as soon as we can follow 
the proof?When two proofe prove the oame propo8ition.itia pDS8i‘bi©é ©, to imagine the proof e without the organism of applicatione which envelopaa and oonneota the two of them, *,
(o) She proof IB part of the of thoproposition.
(d) And why ia it mathematics? # JBeoauao it ia a game with signs according to rudes?But im* t it evident that thezé ara oonoepta fozmed hero - oven if we aro not clear about their
application?
' But how ie it possible to hâve a concept and not beclear about its applioationtv?^^)
lyittgonatein is euggesting# albeit more by innuendo and pointed 
question than by statement or argument,' that the meaning of a 
mathematical proposition is essentially connected with its proof p 
for our understanding shows itself in thé concepts or pictures which# 
in accepting the proposition as proved In this way# wq adopt § 
and our adoption of these, in turn# is manifested in our granting 
tlB proposition ’the dig&ïity of a r u l e * i s  to soy in our 
acting
aotine uoon It# Tho intuition!st olaims to fail to«i-.:*=ÏSÇîîSia «Witsa.
understand F as ’proved’ by the f!r$t proof# in spite of his 
being able to follow the ’proof* and de spite the faot that he 
understands P as proved by the second proof| he makes thie 
olaim on grounds that the proof does not present a ’ procedure plain
to viewdiis it laclm ’neropicuity* # and hence ’reuroduoibility*#
'4 ' ' - ; '
since one cannot ’see in. the. proof the reason for saying that this 
must be the result’ and hence "a doubt can make its appearance 
whether this is really the pattern, of thie proof* ». we are 
prepared to doubt the identity of the proof and so the derivation
*• (OPK)has lost its proving power*
When I wrote "proof must be perspicuous" that meant# causality plays no part in the proof, Or again; a proof nidst be capable of being reproduced by mef(^
The ’proof’ involving on Axiom of Ohoice lacks reproducibility 
because it lacks perspicuity; it is impossible to m y  of an 
alleged version of the ’proof’ that it really proves P, for it 
cannot be guaranteed that a set postalationally selected in one 
alleged version plays the same rôle in it as that played by a set 
similarly selected in another* Working; through such a ’proof’ 
would be more like going through an experiment than like chocking 
a calculation; and arriving ât its outocmo# P# would 130 
oorrespondingly/
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carraBpondingXy similar to making an ©xpariraental disoov@i!y,(32?) 
If P vexQ :Ui thie way loroblematio them Wittgeneteim would demy 
it status as a mathamatioal propoeitiom, for it them laoïm am 
essential mark of such propositions, vis* it does not play a 
oomoept^'mquldimg rSlo#
IWheniatioh toaohes us to operate \7ith oomoepts im à,mew way* And heme© it can he said to change ths %my wworkiTlthqoncepte*
But only à mathematical proposition that has heem 
proved or that Is assvjiod as â postulate does this, not a prohlematiq proposition® (220)
Thé question of what Wittgenstein means by "concept" in this
passage and in others where he coimients on the concept-moulding
function of mathamatioal propositions is exceedingly important -
and difficult» Here I merely quote a hint as to the answer*
’Oomcept’ is something like a picture with which one compareB Objects*
There is'of Course no ©Imrp, dividing line between 
 ^languagergamee whioh wozk with concepts and others* 
WImt is important is that the word "Concept" refers 
to one kind of expedient In the meohanlom oflangitago-gamess» ( 229 )
The second# constructive# proof enables an intuitionist to 
got ’a clear view of the application’ of V since it does not lack 
reproducibility ft Whereas P seems to be the outcome of a psouliar 
experiment when it ie ’proved’ by the first proof# it can bo . 
regarded as similar to the outcome of a calculation when it io 
demonstrated by the second# This proof incorporates only 
such/
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such procedures as. aupporet the ideas of correctly going 
through the proof and mlcing a mietake in going through It^
There is no quoètioû as to \7%mt oplUitG as a reprbduotion of t W  
proof, ho room for doubt ’whether this ie really the pattern of 
thle proof’, since the proof involveo only procédures tliat ore
'■ I -’plain to view’ in the sense that they are not, ae it v/ere, 
private»' Agreemont in the teohnigueè to he 6W,ied in constructing 
the proof is poscihleg to :#ster ihe proof is to master the 
teohiiiques* and once mastered they do not become someone ’ s 
techniQUGS (like M ’s deft techniqu® with a billiard cue) any 
more than someone’s mastosy of the multiplication tables iWces them 
his tables«( In view of this possibility,of agreement#. P as 
proved by - the. second .proof can be understood, as a oonoèpt-mçulding 
proposition ^  and hence as a mathWktloal' propbsitlohv^'^^^)
-f ' >>. >
I want to oonsidor# in^conoluslon# a passage In R e m ^ o  .
Y/hich I fhid, somewhat pusgllug* Wittgenstein says#
One application of a mathematical proposition must . always be the calculating itself, That détominés the relation of the activity of calgulating to the sense 
of mathematical propôsitionsÿV 231)
In tliB next sentenoe he malces the important point tlmt since 
"we judge identity and agreement by the results of o w  calculating" 
it follows that "we cannot use agreement to explain calculating»" 
Bearing in mind that, for those who understand it, "the
imthematl cal/
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mathëmstloal proposition determines' a’ path* »'# is a rule; H we 
may perhaps reforaiulat© these .remarks in this %my§ Amy 
mathemtioal p3?opooition must ser^ as a rule, one application 
of whioh is ca3.cula.timg the result stated in the proposition*
Biioh am eqitatipa as ’I46 z I76 w 29,696’, to be understood ao a
matliematical proposition# must serve as the standard of (correctly) 
multipiyimg 146 by 176# But this is not mou^, for Wittgemstein 
seems to cast tMs equation mot merely im the rdle of a standard, 
but im the rôle of a rule# teohmique or procedure which is 
involved multiplying 1 #  by 176* It is perhaps conceivable 
that e.g. the equation ’2 x 2 ^ 4* (regarded as a rule) should bo
proçedurally involved in multiplying 2 by 2# as well as being
the standard of correctly multiplying 2 by 2# What does this 
moan? Simply that in oaloulating ’2 times 2 equals*©o’ we follow 
the rule implicit in *2 'z 2 6 4’ if we calculate correctly# 1*0®, 
if we get 4 as tbs result* In* the same way there seems no reason 
why we should not,says in multiplying I46 by I76# the rule 
implicit in ’I46 % 176 Ç? 29,696’ is followed the multiplication 
is correctly oazr^ .ed out, i*e* if 25,696 is tho result*:^
It might be suggested that to say the rule ia ’followed’ in such - 
a calculation is simply to spy that# as assessed by reference to 
the standard implicit iji the equation# it is a correct calculation# 
and/
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cmd that therefore equatiohe need not he opnstrued ae .prooedares 
involved ^  oaloulotiono* On the other band, Wittgenstein gives 
another Gocount of oalmlGting, %?Wrein lie aeserte timt 
’oaloulating ie a technique’i,
he prophecy dose not run, that a man will get this reoult w W n  he follows this rule ih mldAg'o: ^ti%mofo%imtion hut that he will get this reeult when v/e way tlmt he io followin/z the rule.What if VG' said that matbematioal propôôitioiiG were pmpheolOG in tMs henee; tliey iwediotwMt remit moAors of a society who Imim leamt thio technique will get in agreement'with other mènîhers of the Gooioty? ’85 k 25 (3 625’ wou3,d thus me^i that men, if we judge them to obey the rules of ml'tiplïoàtion, will reabh the remit 625 Wien they mp.tipiy 25 % 2g# - TIAt this ie à Gorikgot psi^dictiOn is beyond doubt; and also that, oaloulating ip in eeeenoe founded on mohprMiotiono. V^mtie to èày, we should hot oallsomething ’ Calculating’ if vm could not make ouch a prophêoy witb-'-dertainty* Thie really meonsii caloULlating io a technique* And vrhat we have said pertains to the • essence' of a technique %))' ■
Vfittgenetein’ e use of the word Teolmik is sometimes a bit
. . . .  -.ujm, w,u. ,,, . ....
pua&iings for example# he calls mathematioe %  motley of 
teolmiquQG of proof’ and he aloo says "to understand à language 
ie to be master of a teplmlque*"^^^) Hie ueo of Reehileh 
pusslings rcmomber that ’o m  appiicdtion of a mathematical 
psApbeition _iomt âlŸAyo be the oalchlating itself’. (dag %obnGn 
g^beg), and we also read "Oaloulating is à phenomenon which wo 
know from calculating» Aè language iè a phenomenon which we %mow 
from our language* At all events# X think the boot way to
interpret/
interpret Wittgensteiii*s identification of ’oaloulating’ with 
’a toolmiqu©’ ie to say; to calculate is to engage in a • 
praotioe* But that does not mean; to oaloulate is to folloi/ 
conventions upon whioh people have come to agree (scy# ho cause 
of their usefulneae)# For this Yfquld he to ejcplain oalmlating 
in terns of agreement# wheroao# as Wittgenstein pointe out# what 
wo oa].l ’calculating’ sorvee aa a oriterion for what wo osill 
’agreement^ ^ On thie interpretation of the Reolmen-TochiAlc 
idontifioation# wo may regard mathematical propositions as O-rules 
of praoticos; qw. 0-mlos# however# they are not quaoi-instrmientally 
involved in oaloulating as prooedureo and techniques (in the 
ordiimry senso), since the latter are R-rules* Thus we say;
In proceeding in accordance wi#i (rules implicit in) mathematical 
propositions# we calculate; and-^mtB In calculating# wo proceed in 
acoordanoé with these rule a# As to the important connection 
between calculating' -gjim  practice and the sort-of ’ prophecy with 
oertainty’ mentioned in this paeaago# I only offer this suggestion; 
thpiiT^ s^  possibility of m #  piophocies marks the existenoe of 
praotices (e*g»^oaloulative praotioes) , and marks the oonoept# 
moulding function of their 0-rules (e*g# of mathomatieal 
propositions qua G-rules of caleulatlva .praotloeo) ®
[2] The relation between i n f e a  - by whioh X mean' - ' -^ v, . . >
both ruleo foromClated in theses of the olassioal propositional 
calculus (0B3) and ’snilos’ implicit in dotezmlnate liyppthetioal 
sentences * and arguments or inferences is of some interest to 
a study of thé ’application’ of logio^  hogicai theses serve' both 
as standards of valid (deduotivo) inferonoe end as 0^ 3ZulGS of 
the praotice of making suoh infezenoes; in pLleying this dual rôle 
they resemble mathematical propositions whioh# as I suggest above,' 
function both as standards of correct calculation and as O-mLos 
of the praotioQ of oaloulating» Xn other words# z^es implioit 
in logical theses (mathematical propositions) can be regarded 
both as (i) applied# gga standards# ^  doduotive inferences 
(calculations)# and as (ii) applied* qua, O-rules# in (valid) 
doduotive inferences ((correct) oalmlations)# - As O’Oomier says# 
"the standard of a valid argument in logio is# in an important 
way internal to the argument, In the following diocusslon
I enquire into the sense in which irfofenoe-rules are ’internal’
to arguments#
Ryle’s contribution to the symposium vvJhy Are tlio Oalouluses 
of Bogio and Arithmetic Applicable to Reality?’ sèrveo as starting 
point and guideline of tlifa discussion* His essay is noteworthy 
botli for h distinotion among "relevant notions of application"
for/
wigs*
for a clear statemmt of the view that lnferanoe*rales are 
involved in arguments and - iiKferenoo^perfoammoeo similarly as 
e#g# rules of cliees are involved in ohe8s*^ movea& Ryle âistingiiielioè 
among tlwee basio sensos of ’apply’ and ’application’ as 
relevant to the oymposium-queetipna
(l) The ’apaèlfication’ sense# in which "a meatyhypbthetiodl : ie en application of a bony hypothetical e,g# ’Ifp given that to-day ie Monday to-morrow io Tuesday, then given that to-morroYf. ig not Tuesday . to-day is not Monday’ io a ’ specifioation’ of the theoio ’GGpqOHqHp!*. - . , .
eaid to be apply^g the rule"; .e*g» a person who conpludoG that to-dây io not Monday Upon hearing that to*morrow ie hot Tuesday *!io conjointly applying" both (the rule formulated In) the theoie ’COpdOIgMp’ and (the rule implicit in) tho epeoificatioh of thia thèeig; ’If^ given that to^ d^py ie Monday to-morrOW, (eio) ,
(3) The ’fit? eêiiee# inwhich a police-desdriptionof » à wanted man may apply or partially opply to eoBKOone elee* (Ryle diotih^iàheç also a dezivative eenee# in %7hich the'deeori^ "may not be intended to
apply to
Byle makes this diatiotion beoaitBO "some people have worried 
themselves by speculating how or why the rules of inferenoo 
apply to the world", and they have worked themselvee into this state 
of perplexity by confusing the ! observe’, or ’specify’ sense of 
’apply’ with the ’fit’, Gonae»,^ ^^ )^ That la, they fall to 
reoogàisè that logical rùlee are oonneoted with ’realily’ only in 
80 far as they are ’observed’ in making and in crl^^ioising so-oallod 
’ substantial/
’substohtlài p w  In so far as tliey àre oxemplifiod in
’ Bpooifloationa^ » - %rle argues that those "who oonetrue loglcions’ 
ru3.e«formulae as deaorli^tiona of the splsie and rlhè of the world" 
are misled by tlie ’fit’ eonse of ’apply’ into "oommltting only a 
m03X3 embitiouG form of the sane error ae that" oommltted by those 
who construe these %%le-formulae ao. pouemieseo requizdng to he 
intellectually acknowledged before intelligent pezfozmanoee omi 
b e g i n * T h i G ' e r a s e r  is to ’asGume that a-logician’e rnlô« 
fomula "says’ something informative’» But êuoh fomnlao' do not, 
aooording to Ryle, ’gay’ eometliing uninformative either 8 they are 
oodifloatione of etandandp of deduotivo. inference, and are hence 
as much ’Proormtean’ pesrfomanoe^ ruleg as ’ the rules of the road, 
of bheae, cricket, gyllogietio reaeoning end rlfle-mnge practice’, 
’Prooruetean’ are to be dlotingûlâhed from ’canonical’ perfomanoe« 
rules; the latter are uncodifiable and leamt by practice rather 
than by drill* PrinolpleG of inductive inference are comparable 
to canonioal rules such as tactical and strategic maximg of chegg» 
But for either,
it is nongenee to àek liow or wlqr ipilee of logic apply to the world* Both the Prooruetean ; and .the canonical ruleg of logic arc performahoe*' rules, Only.' pcrfomhnqçé can be or fail to be In 
accordance Tfith thW, . If tlïeÿ are applied, that is à faot about theJ..effiôien(%r and .intelligence of theorietc^ nota fapt.about any radical docility of the woz'ld# ( 840)
V
A convenient way to oliioidàtè the ? epeoiflcation’ sense 
of ’application? - the aense in whioh @*g, "If John la not 
unhappy then John la happy" is an ’application’ of the formula 
’ pMpp’ « will be to disousB comment a on Ryle’s argument by bio 
follow-sympooiast LewFo' Ono point on whicA Ryle Imlste# that 
determinate hypotheticalo are not opfiseg^enpeg, of the formulae 
of whioh they are opeoifioationo# ie attadced by lewy* Ryle had 
contended, ' , . ,
A logioiàii’a oloBed hypothetical otande to thé
Before timiing to léwy, 'however, we lim remark Ryle’s mnd^é here 
in confaei}ig theeee of the ORQ with Inférence'^ r^ule o formfLated in 
them; this ie hot bp W b h  Donfdbion on %|lG’a "garths fàilnre/to 
make tMe dlstinotlon (e,g* he later talks of y  applying the open 
hypoihetlosl’ when he Gurely meahe to m y  ’applying the open 
inference-rule.’)q In itself this ie a trivial point for', ao 
Popper points out in hie contribution to the symposium# evezy thosle 
of t W  OPG oan be interpreted eio an inference-rule But in
vievf of l^ rlo’a diotlnotlon between the ’ specif 1 cation’ and 
’obOermnoe’ seneoe of '’application’# it seem to be-important
for him to distihguish carefully between fozmula^; and rules» The 
latter are ’obeerved’' in inforenOe-perforBKmoes# whereas do terminate 
hypotbetioale etond to the former* ao ’ specifioatiohs’# andc 
not as ’déductions’*
ou tîiQ other liamêp hold b that "by 02splain:hig this
tlEW2 (U&3yp]Ll<3eLtliD2%* Ipg 3%9/VG) ELleX) eCKp]L€Kl%W&tl o n e  IW&O {Odf
’ ooBSQCitieno© * § for In o m  of its nsosg the esqxeession ®P is a
oo&BGg&enoo of Q* meano, I think* prooiGoly that P is an
application of in this oenaG of applioatioa*"(^^^) Big
general formulation of neoessary and suffi oient conditions for P
to he an application ('apooifioation^) of prinoiplo % las
there is a pro positional schema P* such that (l) P 
l8 a y&luG of P* and (2) Q asserts with regard to 
any proposition B that if R Is a value of# then R 
is true,
Rot ice that !Wwy sneaks of Q, both as a nrinoirle and as an 
aGsertign. Ho holds that theses of the OPO are to be Twnderstood 
as universally qLuantified propositions whioh assort tlio (logical) 
truth of all values of some proposition&l sohema, Por ozample, 
the determinate hypothetical "If John is not unhappy then John 
is happy!' would be m% application ( ’ spécification® ) of the 
tlKmls slnoe *ORRoq® is a propositional schema of which
"If John ie not unhappy then John is happy*' is a value* and 
W ppMpp® (&Gsea*t8* E&(X303%%jLi%z -bo jLoTBgr*; tCbeit j&a&ar ipsCLuG cüP ®0RRqQ 9^ , 
is (logically) true* Hence* Lewy argues* we can say that "If John 
is not unhapuy then John is happy®* follows from ®IîpCRIpp®oWS> kw 4^ *k V  *a4eis*4**.-«y-etie«*lrtS>-»ü65îù te®sÿso«» »3»-\>sfc»
Against Iiswy's claim I offer the following ohjeotiono; (i)
It/
It is not clear to me that theses of the GPO üi'SSert^ ' what 
iLeogr fSEgre; "klasgF (&C»* 3)ÔQ8BL#i; *npORRpp' * dTos? (%B33aa%%LG# *2teH3Süei&* 
lajjBjplgr "bhctl;* 3%D3? ewogr :Lnrp]Lie8 %ÿp JEhron :lf lïhwsEklQ
(& ifore tw) *(&8883T&# tdbs&t cilJL i/BdLtwDS <)j? i%e(%p()8dLt;:lt>Bw&]L *3c#ic%nsb laarG
(logically) tme* it is false to say that P follows from Q* for 
P follows from Q and a statement that P is a value of ft» (ill)
It might be urged that theses of the OPG do not ®assert® that 
all values of a propos itionaX schema are (logically) true * since 
this is something that the theois ®shows* but does not ®fmy®>
(iv) What I tMnk I^wy has in mind <^n bo formulated in 
terms of. the notion of instantiation# To soy that "If John is not 
luüiapFy then John is happy" is an application ( ® epeoifloation® ) of 
®HpCMpp® a and hence a consequence of this thesis* is just to 
apply a rule pf universal instantiation to the universally 
quantified thesis* substituting "j o W  is happy" for *^ *e The 
question arises * however* whether the rule of substitution for 
the OPÛ warrants suoh an inference * 8pme logioians have thought 
that it does* Tarski* for example* formulates the rule of 
substitution so as to allow replaoemont of sentential variables by 
"other sentential variables or by sentential functions or by^ «SSiSÉÏ.’â'»
sentences# " Prior writes that the sentenoo "It is either
true/
true or false tliat Qeronirauo id dead" instantiates the thesis 
®Por eny 2 » either true or faloo that Wo ought to
' f  y  ■
diotinguiohà however* betweon* on the one hand* roplao:h% 
propositional variahloo in theme, of the GIG by wellvfoiméd 
formulae (wff) aad* on the other hand* substituting eontenoes of 
some mtural language for these variables* Aomming for the 
moment that the see of the OBO are universally quantified 
proppBltional sohemata* then the dietinotion I h&tve in mind oan be 
illustrated by comparing univerml instantiation in functioml or 
olaes logic with substitution in the OPOq JTollowing J«bo Mackie* I 
distinguish between (arb)®8
From b (%) ^  053% be iziferrëd 1-gg^* for ^  an azAitrarily
eeleotod individual I « . V
and what -I; call oinqdy, , ' (246:From } (%)F% can be inferred t Fa* for ^  a: 'red ® individuals
That is A (afb) warrants deduction of from ®(%)F3c®* for
m#individuolvariableg whereas V^l. warrants deduction of
from * A for W  an individual constant or definite desorlption#
This distinotlon is builb into most fornmiations of Bniverml
Instantiation^ Ghuroh* for .'example* who mploys the notion of .
substitution* gives the status of an asciom sohwp,.
*306# (a)A 3 where a is an individual variable*;'an 'individual '.w^isble or. an individual constant* and no free oocurrence of a in A ic in a T/f part of A 
of the form (b) 0^ 9 (S^i/ stands for the result of , .
substituting b for ati free ooourronoes of a in A*,)'
Quine/
Q t d m  In a w M e h  hb "mAodlôo t%io
'  ^ ■ ! _ nrimipXo of or gi^t&gà^j&âSâ prjnoi'pio tlï^ t
I m d o  a goaorol 'W?^ a mtlVGrcbi qtami-tlflcatlon (oc)((*
to each opoolal m s o  9( falling u W w  tho goaorol '
:  ^ ■••-■• \  ' '■'■ : i*831p; 9[ iG l&kQ ^  ogtcopt for free
qpcus%GÈW@8 of ^  Aorovorj^ ooatalmo froo 
oeom^ànooG of oc * then ^^((x)^ Dx'^,
3&% proving thlG Q # m ,  0 8 W > I W % O 0  two csoooD f o r ï  à variable m &  .' 'I t
f o r ^  Gn ®abotmpt^ (o^g#. a definlto douôÿlî^tloa)^ Row t;o miglit 
W < 0  (& Gimilor Clotlaotlm within t W  3R;&G of ouhotltutlon fo%» the 
GiO* i^e# botwoon replobing propos! tiomi ytzriablec by wff end
roplooing 'tWa by v0%bal Gmtoncoo^ For wo could latso^do
. *■
tliQ wordo' " wff] 'g g 'pa%:pdBltioa«'02q^oolng m u t m o e . o f  m m
..m t u m l  langungg" iiito otatcmont of the. .%%l0 of
oi^botitutiom - . . ' ' .:r :
" ' Froia A.* if ^  lo à vnriaWlèi) ' to ; W &  g % / 4 :.'(& ' '
m y  boony, v ^ f ( , m K | 0 ^. %;o . , V' GùbbtitutWi ' O f fç^cbôh OGcdrronoQ of b #:^wAoi%t A*)
%ik thie way w0 would i m W  emIogouG to *306* * mid b r i %
Ohurch^O v w G l o n  of t W  rulo of oubotitutim into
with t W  tMnklng of Tctrokl m &  P r l o %  \
3h 80 for ao lony^s # that dqtomiueto. I ^ p otWtimlo » lAiioh 
Qso ®opGOlfioatlom® of loglmX theopo o m  bo oaid to ^ l l o w
thèGGG i" rests on this anaibgy Wtwèen substitution in' "the " 
dPO and inptaàtlatlon 'in class and fumotlbml 3,oglo* then .by 
attàdkihÈ' the analog ; One m^ÿ argue again# the olaim# I do'V'* I
not think' that thsseb of .the OPG are usefully to be regarded 
%^\ GGhsmâta miiversally (paantifièd o Wr the raàge of propositions* 
rnid'hèhoê it seems tô' mê tWt sûbsti^tlôh of assoitiblo ^htcmoes
' . \ ' ' 'r . ' i ' ' \ ^for propôsitïùhal variables is *hôt lo^càlly wàrtëatod 
axiBlégouBlj aé ‘ rMbstitütioas-' of individual constants for individual 
variables g ^  other wor&s* whereas both and m ÿ  be 
said to bë déduolbio from ® # only e*g.,  ^and not
; "ïf John is not unhappy then Joîm is împpy"^ Biay be said to be 
dediicible from the. thesis ®CMHpp® » It follows that lewy® s oldim* 
if based on this asmlogy* does not hold# (a) If theses are to be 
viewed as universally quantified proposit ional schemata, then 
surely their range of quantification. consists of. truth^vnlues, and 
not of propositions neither wffa nor assertible sentences of a 
natitral language# Thus* for example* U^nOMpn*.- should be construed 
as) *0RR11 « 1 & GRRoo Q ,l*.g and ®]lDlIqGnOQU® can be jJuterpretedB 
® 01011 » 1 & OlGol #» 1 & Oc§io *3,1 & OoGoo ,1® # In this way* 
quantification in tl^ OPO would resemble quantification over a 
specified range of indlvictuals in functional and class logic# (b) 
But why should quantification be introduced into the 010 at all?
In/
In Gome versions of the GPO* Theory .of.
implication* and in;some non^olassloàlrprbpooitlonal oalouli*
6* g* 'MEâ8iewioSK*Ta%8lci ® à * (fended sentential oalouOLus*-*- 
quantification ie legitimately introduoed for definitional pù3?pose(;^ ^^  ^
but if y as in other vêrelone of the OPG* these purpoGes are 
oervsd without need of qnantif ication* then why ahohld theses 
of; these calculi he oCnetrued as universally quantified? I»ewy 
would argue that propoeitloi^I schemata: âre not* "uhleoe 
quantified* propositions) hut surely the way to ihdloate that d 
schema has tîxesiè«*sta/tus where the eohema is developed within<Sixt;t'n<S«yis™ia3fvï* : ' « ' « ‘ **•
a quahtifioatibnless GPO #- lo to prefix the th8sis«»8ig«i ®1-® to
Turning now to the oeqond eeneo of ®apply® distinguished by /
%le w. the eenee in which lnference',*rule8 are said to be * applied®
(®observed®) in Inferenoei^perfommnoée - it io again convenient 
to begin by conclderihg hewy's comments on Byle®e argument# heey 
pointe out that Ryle goeo wrong in saying that gomèbne who argues g 
®Tomorrow is not Tuesday* so today le nbt Monday®* is "conjointly 
applying" (the rules formul#ed in) both ®00nQ.GRqRn® and ®if* 
given that today is Monday tomorrow is Tuesday* then given that 
tomorrow is not Tuesday tod^ is not Monday® ; aq lowy says* 
someone ®'conjointly applying" these rules would argue» ®Tomorrow 
is/
la TuGBûay on condition tlmt today is Monday* so,today Is not
Monday on condition that tomoiww Is not' TuoGday^g /whoroas*
in arguing) . ® Tomorrow is not Tuesday* @o today io not ]&^ nday®*
oho, ^ applies® only tho ®rulo® implicit In tomorrow la not
Tuooday then today la not M o n d a y h o w y  t h w  comblnob tho
®8p80lfioatlon® and ®ohGorwnoo® sonses, of ®application^ into
a prinolple which I pas^phraoos
(I) All ihfbranoo ®A* oo 10 an qhæa:vanoe of the mlo formulated in . thesis ®0o(g ® of the CFO (o{ and ^  are wff) if* and only if* the detominàto hymthotiqal , ®If A then B® is a sneclfloatlon of ®C6//S ®
onlyIt will he ohaerved that (I) aooounte/fpr ®ohse3wnoo® of mles 
formulated in logical thesOB* I want now to develop an analogous 
principle for ®rules® dmplloit in determinate tgrpotheticale wbioh
are not (neoeBsarily) ®spécifications* of some logical thesis#
To Implement my dieousBioh I consider ByXe®s analysis * in
"80"$ and "Because"®, of determinate hypothetloalG#
- \ '
Ryle olaimp* at one point in this eoooy* to "harden the 
edgeo of the notion of application#"^ He màne ^application® 
in . the ® observance® eenèeg thougti, ao we shall aee* ho uooo 
«apply® intmneitively (i#e; in the «fit® eeneo) in one paeeago. 
Arguing that both "the officially recognised Ruleo of Inferenoe" 
as iTGll a.8 "tho most ®mea%r® and determinate 
statements" are Involvod as prinolpleo rather than ao premlsBeo 
in/
In ixifereaoGS* Ryle oontlnuqs) . .
The argumont "Today. l8 Monday eo tomorrow, is Tuesday" ie an application of "if today is Monday* tomorrow; is Tuesday"; and It^is in this notion of application that lies thé answer to our question "How does a valid argument require the. tiizth, of the corresponding hypothetical otatQmonW"(^55)
A few, pûgea later we find him using «apply® in a somewhat 
peoifLlor way) , .
*"1:%%thor applies!it in hei^  an operation with. yp" a]"q" eicecuted in obhfbrmiîy with it* so "q* because p" does not embody "if p* then q" a# part; pf its %eoause" clause hut applies it in another why*
T,!hen Ryle says tlxat an inferenoe «applies® an liypothetioal 
statement* he must surely mean that someone making tho inference 
«'observes® a rule formulated in the hypothetical# Rote that ho 
calls inference ®an operation®# %loholds that «theorising 
conduct® is like «practical oonduot® in that it involves rules* 
teolmiques* skills*. &c* He writes* for escamplo) "in. orbing (and 
following àrguAionts) a person is :operating with a teohniquo or 
method* 1*0* he is ex:erôising a skill; but .in^ mhlcing or considering 
hypothetical statemahts he is* for exâmplc* giving or taking 
instruction In that toohniqu^ Z) or operation*®!^ (This should bo 
compared with the distiwticn between FrooiusteEm and oanohicai 
ruleSB "methods* techniques* crafts* skillsp Otç^ÿV being 
‘lisibodif iable/
uîicodiflaMe and learnt by prcictioe* "are subject to oaaoraieal 
rules"; but since inference^ruloG are oodlfiable into tliBGOQ or 
hypothetical 8 g and therefore jgi be oonnecl by drill rather than 
by praotioG* it follows that they are Procs^qsteon rulee and not « 
as Ryle implies ih this ^ssage # oanpaical rules#).
The notion of «Btateméntwgpeoifioation® must next be
introduced* Ryle writes 0,
It is bôc^sé hypqthetioo^ st#Œiez%t8 embody statement spécifications* that inference from one statement' to anotlier om be desoribGd ao being "in aooordahoe with" or being "an application of"- the hypqthetiôàl»(
In explaining how determinate bypôthëtioals are relate& to.
statements which satisfy or fhlfil their otatemont'^spedifioations*
Ryle uses «apply® in its intransitive* or «fit® sohsOB
That ' sdmothing ia an eligible filling for (ore aatisfioa). mi open Specif icatipn is ' part of, what is meant by aayihg that the statemehtg !mle* or warrant (etc#) ihcoigporating . the, specification "applies" to that something# (^59)
Qonaider* for example* the hypothetical aentenoe '^ If A then g
! » - .
I^le olaimo that in stating «if A then (i#e* in asserting B on 
condition that A) * one states neither that A nor that B| whereas’ in 
arguing or inferring in adcbrdanco with the «iule® implicit in 
«If_À .tWii * one asserts B on assertible (if not aBsèrted) grounds 
that À# Rresut#bIy^/Rylo wbuld say that this «rule® "applies" to 
these assertions* 'Since the hypothetical «If A then B® is catlofied
w
by Btatemenbsthat A and that B# Ho oompaz^e deteminate hypotheticals 
with Buoh «variable hypothotioalo® as «For all %*if g is a man*, g 
io morbal® * claiming that "oomê kind of opsmioBO* vaa&àblonog$* 
or satisfiability charaotorises all liypothetioal statemento alilco#"^^^^ 
To empbaoioQ the «openness® of dète%inàte 'hypbthetioals Rylo points 
out that we can reword e*g* «If today is Monday then tomorrow id 
Tuoodoy « either modally ( « It oaimOt be Monday today and not be 
Tueoday tomorrow®) or eubjunotivoly («If today be Monday then 
tomorrow be Tuesday®)» beoanoe ouch reformnlatione do not* unlike 
the hypothetical «If today ié Monday* &o#«* embody asaertible 
sentenbee* Ryle mggeete that their nqeBibility enpporto 'his analyeie 
of determinate hypothetical statement8», Hie orltice* on the other 
hand* argue that neither oomparioon with' quantified hypothetical $ 
(which are not* in caoG* «opài«)^nor the poeeiMlity of modal 
and mibjunotiW; iféformûlàtioiie of l^pothetical eexitencee^  serves to 
demonstrate that hypothetioal statements (;t#e* asserting B on 
condition that A) consist* not of (categorical) statements* but of 
(utterance of ) statcmm t^»specifioatione# ^ %t; will be evidei^ itg
from my terminology» here* that tho sentence/statement distinction is 
crucial in. this discussion*. Ryle does not make this clear* and what 
he oalls «hypothetical statements®. I have taken to be «hypothetical 
sentences®* except when I speak of «asserting.*6 on condition that*,*®' 
this 'Ipcntion is borrowed f m m  von Wri^tÿ )^
Assuming/
. Assuming^ for the momeitg th&t determinate hypothetloala  ^
contain ë.tatement#*opeolfi(^'W:ôn8ÿ _ let' w  ' oonneot « the notion cf 
« Bl^tementyspeoifloàtion® with the view tlmt « miee® impllolt in 
determinate ; hypothetical e' âro_, qheorved in inferences* First im 
intrpduoe thé idea of ®üafèrenôe-êpeéifioAtion« (®Iwspecifioation®)# 
À determinate. ü^pthetlqel*; H#, .18 aeeooiated. with et&temGnt^p&ir&p 
'%)»' g^eatieflee'%«e protasis statement-speoifioation.and 
satisfies its apodosia speoifloAtion*: such that is asserted on
grounds wlildh, i f  " asqerted* izonid he âBsérted in  p, $ any snoh '
■ ■ ' ' ' ' . ‘ - ’ '
(%# Sis), ,iB sai4 to be àtt,5rS^iÉ^|^tiÉ'G.- for&mto^i
à statement*'pair made up of - statements * that today is 'Monday and 
that tomorrow ie Tuesday ie sn I-epeoificatlon of the hypothetical 
®If today "is MOhday'then tomorrow is-'Tuesday® * in so. fair as the 
etatomonts are' termini of an inference made in aoôoscdànoe with the- 
®rùle« implioit in this hypothetical* I^speoifications need not 
consist of sentential utteranpes, A statement to the effect that 
tomorrow is Tuesday might .be e*g* a nod in response to the question 
« Is 'tomorrow .Tuesday? ® § if the head^nodder replies to a further 
question ®Do yon "say" tomorrow is Tuesday ‘beoauèo yon believe today 
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